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Executive summary 
What is the HANCI? 
The Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index (HANCI) was launched in April 2013 to: 
1. Rank governments on their political commitment to tackling hunger and 
undernutrition; 
2. Measure what governments achieve and where they fail in addressing hunger and 
undernutrition – providing greater transparency and public accountability; 
3. Praise governments where due, and highlight areas for improvement; 
4. Support civil society to reinforce and stimulate additional commitment towards 
accelerating the reduction of hunger and undernutrition; 
5. Assess whether improving commitment levels lead to a reduction in hunger and 
undernutrition. 
Why measure political commitment to reduce hunger and 
undernutrition? 
Globally, levels of hunger and undernutrition remain unacceptably high. 
Hunger and undernutrition are among the most persistent global development challenges. At 
the global level, insufficient progress has been made towards achieving Millennium 
Development Goal 1. Global numbers of undernourished people have been static at 870 
million for the past five years and the prevalence of stunting has remained high in South Asia 
and sub-Saharan Africa at around 40 per cent (FAO 2012). One in eight people do not get 
enough food to be healthy and lead an active life. Undernutrition contributes to 2.6 million 
deaths of children under five each year – one-third of the global total. 
Progress towards reducing hunger and undernutrition has been highly 
variable. 
Many developing countries have benefited from substantial economic growth during the last 
two decades. For growth to have maximum impact, the poor must benefit from the growth 
process, enabling them to use additional income for improving the quantity and quality of 
their diets, and for accessing health and sanitation services, whereas governments need to 
use additional resources for public goods and services to benefit the poor and hungry. Thus, 
‘economic growth is necessary but not sufficient to rapidly accelerate reduction of hunger 
and malnutrition unless it is equitable’ (FAO 2012). 
A high level of political commitment is essential to prioritise the fight 
against hunger and malnutrition (FAO 2012). 
There are many reasons for insufficient progress in reducing hunger and undernutrition. One 
of these is a ‘lack of political will’ or political prioritisation (FAO 2012: 22). Political 
commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition would be shown by purposeful and decisive 
public action, through public policies and programmes, public spending and legislation that 
are designed to tackle these twin problems, drawing on newly gained wealth. 
 x 
The research methodology 
The HANCI compares 45 developing countries for their performance on 22 indicators of 
political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition. It looks at three areas of 
government action: 
1. Legal frameworks 
2. Policies and programmes 
3. Public expenditures 
Figure ES.1 shows the structure of the HANCI. 
Figure ES.1 Structure of the HANCI 
 
The HANCI separately measures commitment to reduce hunger and commitment to reduce 
undernutrition, because hunger and undernutrition are not the same thing. Hunger is the 
result of an empty stomach and is caused by people having insufficient income or social and 
economic entitlements to access food. Hunger makes people more susceptible to disease 
and thus leads to increased illness and death. Hunger strongly undermines development. To 
‘cope’ with hunger families can be forced to sell vital assets, such as farming tools, often 
perpetuating their vulnerability to hunger. Hunger can mean that children (particularly girls) 
are taken out of school so they can work; it causes communities to migrate away from their 
homes and, at worst, leads to permanent destitution, prostitution and child trafficking. Hunger 
also contributes to the onset of armed conflict (Foresight Project 2011: 3). 
Undernutrition is related to, though subtly different from, hunger. Undernutrition is not only a 
consequence of hunger, but can also exist in the absence of hunger, and can be caused by 
non-food factors. Undernutrition results from both a critical lack of nutrients in people’s diets 
and a weakened immune system. In a vicious cycle, poor nutritional intake can make people 
more susceptible to infectious diseases while exposure to disease can lower people’s 
appetite and nutrient absorption. Undernutrition in the first 1,000 days of a child’s life (from 
conception until the age of two) has lifelong and largely irreversible impacts because it 
impairs a child’s physical and mental development. Undernutrition increases the risk of 
chronic diseases and premature death in adulthood, and negatively affects people’s lifelong 
ability to learn, be economically productive, earn income and sustain their livelihoods, and 
thus perpetuates poverty. In short, undernutrition undermines all aspects of development. 
 xi 
Because hunger and nutrition are not the same thing, we investigate both hunger reduction 
commitment and undernutrition reduction commitment using distinct measures. For instance, 
governments can support child care and feeding practices and take measures to improve 
sanitation: such measures are critical for improving nutrition, though less clearly related to 
hunger. Conversely, emergency food aid, or subsidised food in ration shops can help to 
reduce hunger, but are often not aimed at achieving a balanced diet. By separately analysing 
nutrition commitment and hunger reduction commitment we identify how governments 
prioritise action on hunger and/or undernutrition. 
The Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index draws on secondary data (owned by 
governments) and complements this with primary data on expert and community 
perspectives on political commitment in Bangladesh, Malawi and Zambia. 
We situate levels of political commitment within specific country contexts, such as their levels 
of wealth and economic growth, government effectiveness and, not least, their hunger and 
undernutrition statuses. 
Key findings 
Guatemala claims top spot and Guinea Bissau is the worst performing 
country in 2012 
Guatemala is a resounding number one on our list. When compared to the other 44 
countries that were assessed, Guatemala performs best for both hunger and nutrition 
commitment. It does especially well in terms of nutrition commitment. This is very 
encouraging as undernutrition in particular constitutes a major challenge for Guatemala. The 
country has one of the world’s highest child stunting rates (48 per cent), and annually loses 
over US$300 million in GDP to vitamin and mineral deficiencies (World Bank 2010). The 
Global Hunger Index considers the situation in Guatemala to be ‘alarming’ (WHH, IFPRI and 
Concern 2012). While much remains to be done, and substantial social inequities persist 
between indigenous and other communities, hunger and nutrition outcomes in Guatemala 
are gradually improving. This is partially thanks to substantial political commitment expressed 
through a range of efforts by the Government of Guatemala: 
1. Ensuring high level of access to drinking water (92 per cent of the population); 
2. Ensuring good levels of access to improved sanitation (78 per cent); 
3. Promoting complementary feeding practices, and ensuring over nine out of ten 
pregnant women are visited by a skilled health personnel at least once before 
delivery; 
4. Investing substantially in health and having a separate nutrition budget line to make 
its spending accountable to all; 
5. Putting in place a Zero Hunger Plan that aims to reduce chronic malnutrition in 
children less than five years of age by 10 per cent in 2016; 
6. Ensuring that public policy is informed by robust and up-to-date evidence on nutrition 
statuses; 
7. Establishing a multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder coordination mechanism that is 
regionally recognised as an example of good practice. 
Guinea Bissau shows the lowest level of political commitment to reduce hunger and 
undernutrition. This is very worrying, because the country faces very serious hunger and 
nutrition challenges. The Global Hunger Index considers the situation in Guinea Bissau to be 
‘alarming’. Child stunting rates are fairly high (28 per cent), though not as high as in 
Guatemala (48 per cent), but the contrast in government commitment levels is very sharp. 
 xii 
Guinea Bissau fails to invest in agriculture, despite a commitment to invest 10 per cent of its 
budgets in agriculture (as part of the African Union’s Maputo Declaration). Access to 
agricultural extension services is weak. While Guinea Bissau makes modest investments in 
health, it is not yet setting aside budgets for nutrition. Its nutrition policies, while not 
altogether lacking, need substantial strengthening, for instance by instituting coordination 
mechanisms and by establishing time-bound nutrition targets. Guinea Bissau needs to 
strengthen people’s right to social security and enhance very weak economic rights for 
women. While this leaves women especially vulnerable to hunger and destitution, there are 
yet no effective safety nets to protect them and other vulnerable groups. 
Economic growth has not necessarily led to a commitment from 
governments to tackle hunger and undernutrition 
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are global hotspots of hunger and undernutrition. Here, 
not only is hunger and undernutrition prevalence high, this is also where hunger is increasing 
most rapidly. Many countries within these regions have achieved substantial and sustained 
economic growth over the last decade. This makes it possible for governments to more 
effectively address hunger and undernutrition. Yet, progress on reducing hunger and 
undernutrition is either too slow (e.g. South Asia) or stagnating (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa). 
Low wealth or slow economic growth in a country does not necessarily 
imply low levels of political commitment 
Our data shows that in cases where there are serious hunger and nutrition challenges, low 
aggregate and per capita wealth in a country does not mean that governments are simply 
unable to act on hunger and undernutrition. For instance, Angola and Malawi both have an 
‘alarming’ and Guinea Bissau a ‘serious’ hunger status (WHH/IFPRI/Concern 2012). Out of 
these three countries, Malawi has by far the lowest Gross National Income per capita ($870) 
as compared to Guinea Bissau ($1,240) and Angola ($5,230), and relatively slower economic 
growth. Yet, Malawi ranks 2nd on the HANCI, while Angola and Guinea Bissau languish at 
the bottom of the league table. Similarly, India’s child stunting rates are on a par with 
Guatemala’s. The latter’s somewhat higher GNI per head ($4,390 compared to $3,590), 
however, seems insufficient to explain the divergence in political commitment levels. 
Significantly, within areas of high and growing hunger and undernutrition 
prevalence, some countries are clearly showing much greater political 
commitment to address these problems than others 
Thus, the political commitment levels of the global rising economic powers (BRIICS) vary 
substantially. South Africa performs strongly on hunger commitment, and relatively poorly on 
nutrition commitment. Brazil and Indonesia perform well overall. China does well in terms of 
hunger commitment, though less strongly on nutrition commitment. India’s commitment 
ranking is lowest within the group of BRIICS, even though its hunger and nutrition situation is 
the most serious. 
Within sub-Saharan Africa, there are some success stories to be told. Some of the smaller 
economic powers (Malawi, Madagascar, The Gambia) are now leading the charge against 
hunger and undernutrition, leaving traditional powerhouses (South Africa, Ethiopia, Nigeria, 
Kenya, Angola) in their wake. 
 xiii 
The relative commitment to hunger reduction does not predict the relative 
commitment to nutrition 
In fact, we found a low correlation between the two. This is demonstrated by the divergent 
performance of countries such as Nepal, South Africa and Mali on the two sub-indices. 
 Nepal ranks number three for nutrition commitment, but ranks only 34th (out of 45 
countries) for hunger reduction commitment. 
 Peru ranks 2nd highest for hunger reduction commitment, 11th for nutrition 
commitment. 
 The Gambia ranks 24th for hunger commitment, 2nd for nutrition commitment. 
 Mali ranks 5th on hunger commitment and 29th on nutrition commitment. 
 South Africa shows 2nd highest commitment levels for hunger reduction, though 
ranks 36th for nutrition commitment. 
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1 Introduction 
Hunger and undernutrition are among the most persistent global development challenges. At 
the global level, insufficient progress has been made towards achieving Millennium 
Development Goal 1. At the global level the numbers of undernourished people have been 
static at 870 million for the past five years and the prevalence of stunting has remained high 
in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa at around 40 per cent (FAO 2012). 
There are many reasons1 for insufficient progress in reducing hunger and undernutrition. One 
of these is a ‘lack of political will’ or political prioritisation (FAO 2012: 22). Political 
commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition would be shown by purposeful and decisive 
public action, through legislation, public policies and programmes and public spending that 
are designed to tackle these twin problems. 
Hunger and undernutrition reduction are currently on donor agendas. In April 2013, the Irish 
government inaugurates its Presidency of the European Union with the hosting of a 
conference on Hunger, Nutrition and Climate Justice. In June 2013, the British government 
led by the Prime Minister David Cameron will host the G-8 summit seeking to persuade 
donor as well as developing countries to make new commitments aiming to address hunger 
and undernutrition and to be accountable for doing so. In May 2012, health leaders 
worldwide adopted the Maternal, Infant and Young Child Nutrition Plan at the 65th World 
Health Assembly, agreeing to commit to reducing the number of stunted children in the world 
by 40 per cent by 2025. Underpinning much of this is the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) 
movement, which seeks to galvanise and guide public and private action towards improved 
nutrition outcomes, especially for the worst off. 
How will we know whether commitments like these are being made, if they will be met, and if 
all countries are pulling their weight? 
This report presents the first Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index (HANCI). The HANCI 
presents a new tool to assess the extent of government commitment to reduce hunger and 
undernutrition. 
The HANCI’s objective is to develop a credible measure of the commitment to reduce hunger 
and undernutrition to help focus support and pressure for change. The measurement of 
hunger and nutrition outcomes alone is not a sufficiently strong accountability mechanism, 
largely because attribution is difficult. There are many factors contributing to hunger and 
undernutrition outcomes, many of which governments cannot control. Moreover, in the 
absence of transparency and better information on what governments are doing to address 
the situation, it is very difficult to link outcomes with government action or inaction. When the 
outcomes trend positively, governments can claim credit (perhaps falsely), and when they 
trend badly, governments get the blame (perhaps unfairly). We thus need to be able to track 
a government’s commitment. 
How might the measurement of political commitment change anything? The theory of change 
behind the HANCI is that: (a) by credibly measuring commitment it will strengthen our ability 
to hold governments to account for their efforts in reducing undernutrition and hunger; (b) if 
                                               
1
 The Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition (cited in FAO 2012) identifies the following causes of hunger 
and malnutrition: ‘lack of good governance to ensure transparency, accountability and rule of law, which underpin access to 
food and higher living standards; lack of high-level political commitment and prioritization of the fight against hunger and 
malnutrition, including failure to fully implement past pledges and commitments and lack of accountability; lack of coherence in 
policymaking within countries, but also globally and regionally; lack of prioritization of policies, plans, programmes and funding 
to tackle hunger, malnutrition and food insecurity, focusing in particular on the most vulnerable and food insecure populations; 
war, conflict, lack of security, political instability and weak institutions; and weak international governance of food security and 
nutrition’. 
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civil society is better able to hold governments to account, it can apply pressure and ensure 
that hunger and undernutrition are put high on development agendas; (c) governments can 
hold themselves to account in their efforts to keep hunger and undernutrition high on the 
agenda: the index can help them to track and prioritise their efforts because the index is 
constructed on the basis of performance in different areas (legal, policy and expenditure); 
and (d) commitment can be linked to outcomes, to allow all to assess the ‘value added’ of 
different commitments and effort. 
The HANCI is unique in three respects. First, its methodological insistence on decoupling the 
measurement of political commitment from outcomes (levels of hunger and undernutrition) 
distinguishes it from other food security metrics and scorecards, such as the Global Hunger 
Index (WHH, IFPRI and Concern 2012), the Global Food Security Index (EIU 2012); SUN 
country analyses (SUN 2012b) and WHO’s Global Landscape Analyses (WHO 2012a). 
Second, the HANCI presents composite as well as separate analyses of the political 
commitment to hunger reduction (using ten distinct indicators) and undernutrition reduction 
(12 indicators). Third, while the HANCI is calculated using secondary (government-owned) 
data, primary research is employed to deepen analysis of political commitment for selected 
countries in order to further support in-country advocacy by partner organisations. 
This report focuses on political commitment in developing countries; an accompanying report 
interrogating the commitment of donor countries will be launched ahead of the G-8 2013 
summit. 
1.1 HANCI: what’s new? 
We end this introductory chapter by setting out what is new about the HANCI. The HANCI 
substantially builds on (and replaces) the Hunger Reduction Commitment Index (HRCI) (te 
Lintelo, Haddad, Leavy and Stanley 2011), drawing on its theory of change and 
methodology. 
The HANCI also presents a substantial range of innovations (Table 1.1). Thus, the HANCI: 
 Establishes a set of nutrition commitment indicators; 
 Separately analyses political commitment for improved nutrition and political 
commitment to reduce hunger; 
 Introduces a new set of indicators, across the familiar themes of expenditures, legal 
frameworks and policies and programmes; 
 Covers a greater range of countries in its rankings; 
 Covers a greater range of countries in which primary research is conducted; 
 Presents community perspectives on political commitment within selected countries. 
1.1.1 HANCI dissemination 
If the HANCI is to add value by highlighting success and deficits in commitment to ending 
hunger and undernutrition, it has to be well known and easy to access. We have begun the 
first phase of setting up mechanisms and channels for outreach and developed a 
communications plan. 
A new website has been launched (www.hancindex.org) to coincide with the publication of 
the first index. It will be regularly updated to provide latest information on the project and to 
provide access to relevant background papers, presentations and the latest data. Users 
interested in the project can subscribe to receive updates. 
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Table 1.1 Overview of features of HANCI and HRCI for developing 
countries 
Features HANCI 2012 HRCI 2011 
Focus Hunger commitment + 
Nutrition commitment 
Hunger commitment 
Themes Legal frameworks 
Policies and programmes 
Public expenditures 
 
Secondary data 
 Countries 45 21 
Indicators 22 9 
Index construction   
 Indicator values aggregated Normalised values, at theme 
level 
Normalised values, at theme 
level 
Ranking scheme Borda Borda 
Primary data 
 Countries Bangladesh (this report) 
Ethiopia (in process) 
India (in process) 
Malawi (this report) 
Nepal (in process) 
Tanzania (in process) 
Zambia (this report) 
Bangladesh 
Zambia 
Experts interviewed 133 72 
Community sites 16 0 
Communications products and 
awareness raising 
2 reports 
3 audio slideshows 
1 animated film on HANCI 
(under development) 
2 blogs 
1 IDS seminar 
External presentations: 
• FAO (December 2012); 
• Irish Aid (September 2012); 
• IDS Nutrition Training   
Course (June 2012) 
Workshops: 
• India (May 2012; December 
2012) 
• Bangladesh (May 2012; 
August 2012) 
Consultations: 
• ONE Campaign; 
• Save the Children, Oxfam 
1 report 
3 external presentations 
1 blog 
1 HRCI workshop 
1 IDS seminar 
Website www.hancindex.org www.hrcindex.org 
The website includes a number of interactive data visualisation applications. These present 
HANCI findings in a number of ways and allow users to interact with and explore the 
underlying data. 
Multimedia products such as an animated film, photo-slideshows and interviews are being 
developed to explain the HANCI and reflect the views and experiences of communities most 
affected by hunger and undernutrition. These will also be available on the HANCI website. 
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The HANCI approach has been developed and shared with practitioners in key countries. 
Three HANCI workshops were run in India and Bangladesh in 2012. A launch event in 
Bangladesh scheduled for March 2013 had to be postponed due to political instability. 
The HANCI approach has also had exposure at high-level development events. The HANCI 
was presented to the UK Global Hunger Event in August 2012, to Irish Aid officials in 
September 2012 and at a Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) consultation in Rome on 
‘New metrics to measure and monitor performance in agriculture and food security’ in 
December 2012. Further attention was brought to the HANCI at the launch events of the 
Global Hunger Index 2012 and the Ibrahim Index for African Governance in October 2012. 
HANCI findings will be presented in a pod-casted IDS seminar in April 2013. Awareness-
raising workshops are planned to take place in Zambia, Tanzania, Nigeria and possibly 
Nepal in the coming months. A launch event will be organised in Bangladesh. 
In addition, discussions were held on multiple occasions with policy directors of the ONE 
Campaign and with Save the Children on HANCI indicators and country selection and to 
identify possible outreach avenues using ONE and Save the Children’s global and in-country 
networks. 
HANCI blogs were written on the IDS Povertics blog (November 2012), as well as the 
Development Horizons blog by Lawrence Haddad and the Povertics site (April 2013). 
The project was covered as a news item on the IDS website (April 2013). 
In order to assess the impact of the HANCI, an outcome mapping exercise was undertaken 
to identify stakeholders, boundary partners and ‘expect to see’, ‘like to see’ and ‘love to see’ 
results. In coming years, the project will seek to establish evidence of impact using the 
outcome map. It is presented in Annex 6. 
The remainder of the report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 focuses on the HANCI 
methodology, discussing both secondary and primary data collection and use. Chapter 3 
presents the HANCI country rankings, based on secondary data analysis. Chapter 4 
discusses the empirical functioning of the index and the findings from a sensitivity analysis. 
Chapter 5 presents findings from primary research for three case study countries 
(Bangladesh, Malawi and Zambia). It is followed by a brief set of conclusions in Chapter 6. 
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2 Methodology 
This chapter sets out a conceptualisation of key terms, followed by a first section discussing 
the methodological choices involved in developing the index based on secondary data. A 
second section reflects on the research methodology for the collection and use of primary 
data, drawing on expert and community perceptions of political commitment in Bangladesh, 
Malawi and Zambia. 
2.1 Building the HANCI using secondary data 
Index construction involves decisions about what indicators to include and how to weight 
each. Indices need to be critically evaluated on the following aspects (Ravallion 2010): 
 Conceptual clarity; 
 Transparency about trade-offs within the index; 
 Robustness tests; openness on the quality of data and on the weights used; 
 A critical perspective on policy relevance. 
The following sections reflect on these aspects. 
2.1.1 Conceptualising political commitment, hunger and undernutrition 
The concept of political commitment can be broken down into components of government 
action and intention (te Lintelo et al. 2011). The difficulty of identifying and measuring 
intention leads us to focus on government action2 towards hunger reduction and improved 
nutrition. Actions of particular interest concern sustained material, legal and financial efforts 
(POLICY Project 2000). Government action addressing social problems typically takes the 
form of a combination of legislation and policy or programmatic action, with both underpinned 
by public spending. Consequently, we identify three domains or themes under which 
government action is compared across a selected group of developing countries: (a) Legal 
frameworks, (b) Policies and programmes, and (c) Public expenditures. For each theme, we 
identify several indicators for which secondary (existing) data can be used to measure 
political commitment. 
How do we apply these themes to hunger and undernutrition? We choose to relate the index 
to the term hunger because hunger resonates with non-experts, and the index is designed to 
help those who want to motivate non-experts to put pressure on their governments to act. 
Hunger is the body's way of signalling that it is running short of food and needs to eat 
something. Hunger can lead to malnutrition (SUN 2010). Nevertheless, hunger, 
undernutrition and food insecurity are not the same thing (Foresight Project 2011). For 
example, an individual can be food insecure and suffering from undernutrition, but not hungry 
because although the quality of his or her diet is poor, the bulk is sufficient to satiate. 
The operationalisation of the HANCI is informed by definitions of food security and nutrition 
security. ‘Food security exists when all people at all times have physical, social and 
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food 
preferences for an active and healthy life’ (CFS 2009). A broad interpretation of this definition 
recognises that individuals’ access to adequate food that fully satisfies nutritional needs must 
be understood in conjunction with non-food factors that enable a person to metabolise their 
                                               
2
 For the purpose of building an index that compares across countries, this project focuses on national-level governments. This 
aggregates political will at a high level and is thus not suitable for identifying differences in commitment at a lower level of 
aggregation, e.g. across departments, or between levels of administration. 
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food and use the nutrients to support growth, to maintain the body and to carry out basic life 
functions (CFS 2012). The concept of nutrition security makes such aspects more explicit. 
Thus, nutrition security is achieved when secure access to an appropriately nutritious diet is 
coupled with a sanitary environment and adequate health services and care, to ensure a 
healthy and active life for all household members (SUN 2010).3 Accordingly, the HANCI 
references key dimensions of food availability, access, stability and utilisation emphasised in 
the food security definition, and also actively seeks to address food, care-related and other 
non-food aspects of nutrition more explicitly identified in the nutrition security definition. 
2.1.2 Indicator and country selection criteria 
Malnutrition is often misperceived by policymakers as a basic food problem, rather 
than a complex multisectoral problem. Welcome efforts to raise awareness of the 
problem mostly focus on outcomes – such as the Global Hunger Index – but more 
emphasis is needed on inputs… as well as better tracking of more specific nutrition 
policies. (Headey 2011: 30) 
The HANCI distinguishes (levels of) political commitment to reduce hunger and 
undernutrition from actual hunger and nutrition outcomes. While political commitment should 
drive such lagged outcomes and outcomes should affect commitment in turn, there are many 
other factors that drive hunger and undernutrition. Commitment should therefore not be 
confused with outcomes, and should be measured separately. Hence, the HANCI is 
calculated using political commitment indicators only. Yet, commitment must be understood 
within context. Chapter 3 accordingly presents how commitment levels compare to critical 
context variables such as hunger and undernutrition levels, wealth and governance 
effectiveness. 
Hunger, undernutrition and the commitment to fighting hunger and undernutrition are 
imprecise concepts and need to be approximated by several variables. We use a theory-
based approach to the selection of the index items and are guided by three general 
principles. 
Figure 2.1 Aspects covered by HANCI indicators 
 
                                               
3
 At the global level, undernutrition, especially among children, increasingly coexists with overweight and diet-related chronic 
diseases and micronutrient malnutrition. While this double burden of malnutrition is growing (FAO 2012), the HANCI focuses on 
undernutrition because we are unable to find suitable indicators of political commitment to address overnutrition for which data is 
available across a wide range of countries. 
Hunger Undernutrition
Hunger 
and 
under-
nutrition
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First, indicators should cover the major aspects of efforts to reduce hunger and to enhance 
nutrition: food availability (production and market availability), food access (the ability to 
access and purchase food) and food utilisation (including non-food factors affecting 
individuals’ ability to use food to build and maintain nutrition status and to carry out basic life 
functions). We include a variety of indicators that (a) address only hunger; (b) address both 
hunger and nutrition; and (c) focus only on nutrition (Figure 2.1). For instance, governments 
can promote exclusive breastfeeding or improve sanitation; these are important nutrition 
interventions (c) but they rarely aim to address hunger per se. Conversely, emergency food 
aid or subsidised food in ration shops can help to reduce hunger, but are often not aimed at 
achieving a balanced diet. Annex 3 shows which HANCI indicators fall under the three 
categories. 
Second, we looked for indicators representing different types of nutrition interventions. 
 Nutrition-specific or direct interventions (e.g. complementary feeding). 
 Nutrition-sensitive or indirect nutrition interventions (e.g. skilled health attendance for 
pregnant women). 
 Indicators referring to wider political and financial enabling environments (FAO 2012) 
necessary to sustain progress in tackling global undernutrition. Gillespie, Haddad, 
Mannar, Menon and Nisbett (forthcoming) define an ‘enabling environment’ as the 
‘wider political and policy processes which build and sustain momentum for the 
effective implementation of actions that reduce undernutrition’ (Gillespie et al. 2013). 
Third, we select indicators that are simple and transparent in order to be easily understood 
by all stakeholders. 
The process of identifying indicators started with a brief review of literature on hunger and 
nutrition commitment drawing on sources such as the WHO Nutrition Landscape Information 
System (Chopra, Pelletier,Witten and Dieterich 2009; Engesveen, Nishida, Prudhon and 
Shrimpton 2009; REACH 2012); Scaling Up Nutrition country documents and reflections on 
the SUN process (SUN 2010, 2011; ACF 2012; Mannar 2012; SUN 2012a, 2012b); work at 
IDS on nutrition governance (Mejia-Acosta and Fanzo 2012) and the Hunger Reduction 
Commitment Index (te Lintelo et al. 2011; STC and WVI 2012). We further reflected on how 
governments could contribute towards achieving highly effective nutrition interventions 
identified in the 2008 Lancet series on nutrition (Bhutta, Ahmed, Black et al. 2008). We also 
drew on the work of Gillespie et al. (2013) in the Lancet series on nutrition. 
Having drafted a list of tentative indicators, we operationalised these and consulted hunger 
and nutrition specialists at IDS about the suitability of indicators. We also benefited from 
academic peer reviews of an article submitted for publication regarding the HRCI. Having 
identified indicators that we would have liked to be included in the HANCI, we conducted a 
desk review to identify data sources, drawing on international databases, academic and grey 
literature and web-based materials. 
Countries included in the HANCI (Table 2.1) were selected on one or more of the following 
grounds: 
 Being part of the 'high burden' countries for undernutrition identified in the Lancet 
Series 2008; 
 Being focus countries of the Scaling Up Nutrition Movement; 
 Having been included in HRCI 2011; 
 Being countries in which partners such as the ONE Campaign and Save the Children 
operate to optimise use of the HANCI in hunger and nutrition advocacy. 
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Table 2.1 HANCI 2012 countries, in alphabetical order 
Afghanistan China Indonesia Myanmar Sierra Leone 
Angola Congo, DR Kenya Nepal South Africa 
Bangladesh Côte d’Ivoire Lesotho Niger Sudan 
Benin Ethiopia Liberia Nigeria Tanzania 
Brazil Gambia Madagascar Pakistan Togo 
Burkina Faso Ghana Malawi Peru Uganda 
Burundi Guatemala Mali Philippines Vietnam 
Cambodia Guinea Bissau Mauritania Rwanda Yemen 
Cameroon India Mozambique Senegal Zambia 
We were also mindful of the quality of the data as reported by other analysts (Ravallion 
2010) and whether there was sufficient variation in indicator scores across countries to be 
able to distinguish between countries. For reasons of data unavailability, several countries 
were excluded from the HANCI, notably Cape Verde, Iraq and Turkey. Annex 1 shows the 
indicators that we considered including but were unable to, and explain why they could not 
be included (chiefly because of data unavailability and lack of variation from year to year). 
2.2 HANCI indicators 
This section first provides an overview of selected HANCI indicators (Table 2.2). It is followed 
by a brief discussion of the logic behind each indicator’s selection. 
Table 2.2 HANCI indicators by theme and by type of intervention 
 Legal frameworks Policies and programmes Public expenditures 
Direct 
interventions 
ICMBS in domestic law* 
Constitutional right to food
‡
 
Vitamin A coverage* 
Complementary feeding* 
Nutrition budget* 
Indirect 
interventions 
Women’s access to 
agricultural land
‡
 
Access to improved drinking water* 
Access to sanitation* 
Skilled birth attendance* 
Public expenditures 
on agriculture
†
 
Enabling 
environment 
Constitutional right to social 
security
‡
 
Women’s economic rights
‡
 
Civil registration of live births
‡
 
Status of safety nets 
‡
 
Security of access to land
†
 
Access to agricultural extension 
services
†
 
Nutrition in national development 
policies/strategies* 
National nutrition plan or strategy* 
Multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder 
coordination mechanism* 
Time-bound nutrition targets* 
National nutrition survey
‡
 
Public expenditures 
on health
†
 
ICMBS, International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes. 
*Nutrition indicators, 
†
Hunger reduction indicators, 
‡
Hunger and nutrition indicators. 
2.2.1 Hunger reduction commitment indicators 
The index assesses political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition and increase 
food security, all of which are multifaceted. We deliberately include indicators that allow the 
index to assess ‘curative’ action (efforts that seek to address immediate needs) as well as 
‘preventive’ action (efforts to avert future hunger and undernutrition incidence, to reduce food 
insecurity and to prevent people from becoming malnourished). Consequently, some of our 
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proxy indicators measure interventions that are not primarily instituted to combat hunger or 
undernutrition (e.g. civil registration of births or investments in public health). Nevertheless, 
governments recognise that these efforts do contribute to hunger reduction and improved 
nutrition statuses in the short, medium and long term, and are therefore included in the index. 
The discussion below refers to key data sources. Complete data sources can be made 
available upon request to the authors. 
The HANCI’s ten indicators for hunger reduction commitment draw substantially on the HRCI 
(te Lintelo et al. 2011) albeit with some modifications.4 
Legal framework 
For the Legal framework theme, the four hunger reduction commitment indicators are: 
Women’s access to agricultural land 
Women are vital players in food production systems yet often lack equal legal status in 
respect of access to productive agricultural land. Even in cases where women have de jure 
equal status to men, this often does not translate into de facto equality of access. This 
enhances women’s vulnerability to hunger. If women in rural areas had the same access to 
land, technology, financial services, education and markets as men, agricultural production 
could be increased and the number of hungry people reduced by 100–150 million (FAO 
2011). The data are derived from the OECD Social Institutions and Gender Index (OECD 
undated). 
Women’s economic rights 
This indicator is based on the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Index (CIRI 2010). It 
assesses the extent to which women have equal economic rights, legally and in practice. It 
assesses whether systematic gender discrimination is built into law, and the extent to which 
governments effectively enforce equal rights legislation. Gender discrimination, in law and in 
practice reduces the economic opportunities for women to gain income and support their 
livelihoods, and accordingly renders them more vulnerable to hunger. 
Constitutional right to social security 
The constitutional right to social security signals a clear willingness and strong legal duty for 
governments to protect their citizens from destitution and attendant hunger. Our data are 
derived from (Vidar 2006; Knuth and Vidar 2011) and a manual update. 
Constitutional right to food 
A constitutional right to food provides a very clear signal of government commitment to 
reduce hunger. This indicator recognises the various ways in which such a right may be 
more or less explicitly incorporated in the highest body of law. Data are derived from Vidar 
(2006) and Knuth and Vidar (2011) and a manual update. 
Policies and programmes 
For the Policies and programmes theme, the following four indicators were selected: 
                                               
4
 The indicators on the ‘Implementation of FAO national programmes for food security’ and ‘Public expenditure on education’ 
were dropped following expert consultations and peer review because they were considered to be weak commitment indicators 
for governments. We added three new indicators: ‘Security of access to agricultural land’, ‘Access to agricultural extension 
services’ and ‘Status of social safety nets’. 
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Civil registration of births 
Public acknowledgement of an individual’s existence from birth (to death) is vital for the 
effective realisation of various legal and civil rights enshrined in constitutional declarations 
and socio-economic provisions granted by states (Szreter 2007: 67–68). It enhances access 
to a range of government services, including health and social protection, which can assist in 
combating hunger. Moreover, an identity registration system, in conjunction with collective 
social security provision, can be of fundamental importance for the stimulation of economic 
growth, even in impoverished agrarian economies (Szreter 2007: 69). This indicator 
assesses the share of children under five years of age that were registered at birth. Data on 
this indicator are derived from the annually published World Health Statistics of the World 
Health Organisation and UNICEF (2012b). 
Security of access to land 
This indicator draws on International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) expert 
assessments (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/IFD.xlsx) of the extent to which 
countries’ legal, institutional and market frameworks provide a basis for the poor to have 
secure access to land, in the form of individual title and as common property resources. 
Access to land critically enables people to produce food for self-consumption and for 
markets. Security of access is important as it enables people to take entrepreneurial risks 
and to invest in the productivity of land. 
Access to agricultural extension services 
This indicator assesses the extent to which agricultural research and extension services are 
accessible for poor farmers, including women farmers, and is responsive to their needs and 
priorities. Greater access to these services will allow farmers to produce food and other 
crops more productively to enhance access to food and income. The data are based on IFAD 
expert assessments (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/IFD.xlsx). 
Status of safety nets 
This indicator assesses the overall provision of social safety nets for protecting vulnerable 
people from a variety of economic and life cycle associated risks such as retirement, 
workplace injury, unemployment and extreme poverty. Social safety nets and social 
protection is a critical policy instrument for protecting poor people from hunger and is 
therefore included in the HANCI. The data are sourced from expert assessments made as 
part of the Transformation Index (Bertelsmann Foundation 2012). While the data include 
provision by non-state actors, they are largely driven by state provisioning of social 
assistance and social insurance. 
Public expenditures 
For the Public expenditures theme, the two selected indicators are: 
Public expenditures on health 
This indicator expresses the relative share of public spending going to health. It 
acknowledges the importance of a well-financed public health system for the prevention of 
hunger and malnutrition. Where women have access to adequate health services, their 
children are less likely to be malnourished (van de Poel, Hosseinpoor, Jehu-Appiah, Vega 
and Speybroeck 2007). The WHO World Health Statistics 2012 (with data pertaining to 2010) 
provides the data. 
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Public expenditures on agriculture 
Public investment in agricultural systems is critical for total food production, as promoted, for 
example, by the Global Fund for Food Security and Agriculture and by the African Union’s 
Maputo Declaration (2003), which commits member states to spend at least 10 per cent of 
government budgets on agriculture. This indicator measures the relative share of public 
spending going to agriculture. Data on this indicator are derived from a wide range of 
sources, including the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), 
FAO, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and Fan, Omilola and Lambert 
(2009). 
2.2.2 Nutrition commitment indicators 
Legal framework 
For the Legal framework theme, the following nutrition commitment indicator is selected: 
Enshrining ICMBS in domestic law 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) 
have for many years emphasised the importance of breastfeeding as a way to improve the 
nutritional and health status of infants and young children. The promotion of manufactured 
breast-milk substitutes risks being detrimental to nutrition and maternal and child health 
programmes that promote breastfeeding. The International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk 
Substitutes (ICMBS) aims to regulate inappropriate sales promotion of infant foods that can 
be used to replace breast milk (WHO 1981). This indicator assesses the extent of the 
adoption of ICBMS in domestic law of countries. Adoption can be done in various ways, from 
voluntary non-binding approaches to fully fledged incorporation in statutory law. Data are 
sourced from the World Breastfeeding Trends Initiative (2012) and UNICEF (2011). 
Policies and programmes 
For the Policies and programmes theme ten indicators were selected. These reflect: 
 Governance mechanisms (multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder coordination; 
generation of credible evidence for policymakers using nutrition surveys); 
 Output measures regarding essential nutrition services (Vitamin A coverage; access 
to water; access to sanitation; skilled health attendance); 
 The existence of key nutrition policies and programmes (complementary feeding; 
national nutrition strategies/policies; time-bound nutrition targets); 
 The extent to which nutrition features in national development plans and economic 
growth strategies. 
Multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder coordination mechanisms 
Nutrition is often said to be no one's responsibility but everyone's business. Within 
governments, typically, multiple departments and agencies (including Health, Finance, 
Agriculture, etc.) carry out policies and programmes that affect nutrition outcomes. This 
indicator assesses whether governments have instituted multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder 
coordination mechanisms to enhance coherent and effective action on nutrition. Data for this 
indicator are sourced from SUN (2011), EIU (2012) and STC and WVI (2012). 
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Recent national nutrition survey 
Regular surveys using nationally representative sampling techniques are essential for 
providing policymakers with up-to-date relevant data on nutrition. Such data help to guide 
policy interventions and to monitor and evaluate policy impacts. This indicator assesses 
whether governments have conducted a Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), a Multiple 
Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) or a comparable national nutrition survey in the past three 
years. It draws on data from UNICEF (2012b), http://www.measuredhs.com and various 
other sources. 
Skilled birth attendance 
Skilled health personnel have the required skills to provide life-saving care, including giving 
the necessary supervision, care and nutrition advice to women during pregnancy, labour and 
the postpartum period. They also care for newborns (WHO 2011). Providing skilled birth 
attendance services is therefore a measure of a health system’s ability to provide adequate 
health and nutritional care for pregnant women during labour and delivery, and for their 
newborns. The indicator assesses the percentage of women aged 15–49 years attended at 
least once during pregnancy by skilled health personnel (doctor, nurse or midwife). 
Government action can affect this outcome indicator by various means, including through 
adequate provision of public health systems, and by supporting people to access adequate 
private health care provisioning where appropriate. 
Access to clean water 
Nutrition security can be achieved when secure access to food is combined with access to 
clean water, a sanitary environment, adequate health services and knowledgeable care 
nutrition (World Bank 2006: 66). Water supply, given its direct impact on infectious disease, 
especially diarrhoea, is important for preventing undernutrition. Especially among children in 
developing countries, repeated or persistent diarrhoea has major effects on undernutrition, 
and undernutrition itself will lead to greater susceptibility to infectious diarrhoea, thus forming 
a vicious circle. This indicator considers that committed governments ensure universal 
access to clean drinking water. It draws on data from the WHO Nutrition Landscape 
Information System (WHO 2012a), expressed as the percentage of persons with access to 
an improved water source as a share of the total population. 
Access to sanitation 
High levels of access to sanitation are critical for preventing undernutrition given sanitation’s 
impact on limiting infectious disease, especially diarrhoea. This indicator considers that 
highly committed governments ensure universal access to sanitation. It draws on World Bank 
data assessing the percentage of persons with access to an improved sanitation source as a 
share of the total population. 
Vitamin A coverage 
Globally, it is estimated that 140–250 million children under five years of age are affected by 
vitamin A deficiency. These children suffer a dramatically increased risk of death, blindness 
and illness, especially from measles and diarrhoea. In areas where the intake of vitamin A is 
inadequate, vitamin A supplementation is critical for addressing this problem (in combination 
with other sources such as breastfeeding, dietary improvement, food fortification etc.). 
Provision of vitamin A supplements every four to six months is an inexpensive, quick and 
effective way to improve vitamin A status and save children's lives (WHO 2012b). 
Consequently, this indicator assesses the number of children aged 6–59 months who 
received two high doses of vitamin A supplements within the last year, as a share of the total 
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number of children aged 6–59 months x 100. The data draws on MICS4 Indicators (UNICEF 
2012a), DHS data (MEASURE DHS 2012), WHO World Health Statistics and Countdown to 
2015 (2012). 
National nutrition policy, plan or strategy 
The existence of national nutrition policies, plans and strategies signals a government’s 
recognition of nutrition as a social problem that needs addressing, and is often a prerequisite 
for further government action, in terms of programming and at lower levels of administration. 
Data on this indicator are derived from EIU (2012), STC and WVI (2012) and web searches. 
Numeric time-bound nutrition targets 
Numeric, time-bound nutrition targets are important for focused nutrition interventions, and 
for enhancing government accountability regarding its performance towards reducing 
undernutrition. This indicator assesses whether such targets exist. Data are drawn from SUN 
country reports (including SUN 2011) and STC and WVI (2012). 
Complementary feeding 
When breast milk is no longer enough to meet the nutritional needs of an infant, 
complementary foods should be added to the diet in a timely and adequate manner. The 
transition from exclusive breastfeeding to family foods (i.e. complementary feeding) typically 
covers the period from 6 to 18–24 months of age. Globally, infant growth often falters at 6 
months of age (stunting) when weaning foods are introduced that lack sufficient nutrients. 
Continued breastfeeding can help prevent such stunting. This indicator accordingly considers 
whether governments promote complementary feeding in conjunction with breastfeeding for 
children between 6 and 24 months. The data are sourced from SUN reports and World 
Breastfeeding Trends Initiative (2012). 
Nutrition in national development plans and economic growth strategies 
The last policy indicator assesses to what extent nutrition features in key multi-year national 
development and economic growth strategies, such as Five Year Plans, Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers, Vision 2020/2030 documents etc. Data on this indicator have been 
collected through content analysis of such documents (one per country, see Annex 8), by 
counting the presence of key search terms regarding nutrition.5 The total count of search 
terms is expressed relative to the page length of the document. The documents were 
collated using web-based searches. 
Public expenditures 
For the Public expenditures theme, in the absence of cross-country databases showing 
nutrition spending or budget allocations, we selected the following indicator: 
Nutrition budgets 
Funding on nutrition is often difficult to track but deemed severely inadequate (SUN 2012a). 
Governments with budget lines for nutrition or for specific sectoral nutrition programmes 
clearly signal financial commitments to address nutrition challenges. Moreover, budget lines 
                                               
5
 The full list of search terms included: nutritio*.*; undernutrition/under-nutrition; malnutrition/mal-nutrition; nutrient; diet*.*; 
stunt*.*; wasting/wasted; short-for-age; short for age; height-for-age; height for age; weight-for-age; weight for age; weight for 
height; weight-for-height; underweight; under-weight; low birth weight; thinness; micro-nutrient; micronutrient; 1000 days; one 
thousand days; breastfeed*.*; behaviour change; behaviour change; iron deficiency anaemi/anemi; zinc; deworm; de-worm; 
vitamin A; supplementary feed; complementary feed. 
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provide a level of transparency of investment, enabling critical scrutiny and further advocacy 
by various nutrition stakeholders. Data are drawn from SUN 2011; STC and WVI 2012; SUN 
2012a; 2012b. 
Following this detailed exposition, Table 2.3 presents the HANCI indicators by sector and 
dimension of food and nutrition security. Several indicators are not shown in the table 
because they are cross-cutting (‘national nutrition policy or strategy’; ‘nutrition in national 
development policies/strategies’; ‘multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder coordination 
mechanism’; ‘time-bound nutrition targets’; and ‘regular national nutrition survey’). 
Table 2.3 Political commitment indicators by sector and dimension of 
food and nutrition security 
 Food and 
agriculture 
Women’s 
empowerment 
Social protection Health and nutrition 
environment 
Availability of 
food and key 
nutrients 
Public expenditures 
on agriculture
†
 
Women’s access 
to agricultural 
land
‡
 
 Nutrition budget* 
Access to 
food and key 
nutrients 
Security of access 
to land
†
 
Access to 
agricultural 
extension services
†
 
Women’s 
economic rights
‡
 
Constitutional right to 
social security
‡
 
Constitutional right to 
food
‡
 
Status of safety nets
‡
 
Civil registration of live 
births
‡
 
Vitamin A coverage* 
Complementary feeding* 
Skilled birth attendance* 
Utilisation of 
food and key 
nutrients 
   Public expenditures on 
health
†
 
Access to water* 
Access to sanitation* 
ICBMS in domestic law* 
*Nutrition indicators, 
†
Hunger reduction indicators, 
‡
Hunger and nutrition indicators. 
Finally, it should be noted that HANCI indicators share a common limitation: they weakly 
express the quality of government efforts. Arguably, real commitment should be reflected in 
thorough implementation of policies and laws, and in spending that reflects value for money. 
Typically, such data do not exist to allow for comparisons between countries. This is a 
problem across this whole class of commitment and governance indicators. At best, 
secondary data such as provided by the World Governance Indicators tell us something 
about the general quality of public administration in a country; accordingly, in Chapter 3 we 
show how countries’ commitment compares to governance effectiveness. Moreover, the 
primary data explore the quality of implementation. 
Having set out the selected indicators, the following section will reflect on the structure and 
technical design choices underpinning the HANCI. 
2.3 Index design 
The HANCI is constructed using secondary data.6 It is composed of two sub-indices on: 
 Hunger reduction commitment; 
 Nutrition commitment. 
                                               
6
 STATA datasets and syntax files are available on request. 
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Each sub-index is composed of three main themes: (a) Legal frameworks, (b) Policies and 
programmes and (c) Public expenditures. Each theme contains one or more indicators 
(Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2 The structure of the HANCI for developing countries 
 
Having identified indicators, we use a theoretical rather than a data-driven approach (e.g. 
factor analysis, principal components analysis etc.) to constructing the index because (a) we 
want users of the index to understand the rationale for indicator choice; (b) we want the 
weighting to be easy to understand; and (c) we feel that the theory behind hunger and 
nutrition measurement and commitment is sufficiently well developed to guide choices. 
Nevertheless, as part of a sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of the HANCI, we do 
compare HANCI rankings with an index driven by a principal components analysis and a 
factor analysis (Chapter 3). Furthermore, to ensure different dimensions of commitment are 
captured, indicators within our sub-indices should be highly correlated, but less strongly 
correlated with indicators in other sub-indices. 
The index structure is influenced by various technical decisions about normalisation, 
weighting schemes and scoring techniques. Table 2.4 provides an overview of actual versus 
some alternative design choices for the HANCI. In the following paragraphs we set out 
design choices underpinning the HANCI. The sensitivity analysis in Chapter 3 shows how 
alternative design choices affect HANCI outcomes. 
Table 2.4 Actual and alternative design choices for the HANCI 
 HANCI Alternative options 
Normalisation Re-scaling using HDI methodology Standardisation (Z-score) 
Weighting 
schemes 
Equal weighting by theme Equal weighting by indicator 
Factor analysis/PCA 
Aggregation 
and scoring 
Borda scores only (for themes; sub-
indices; HANCI) 
Additive values only 
Additive values and Borda scores 
Borda scores only (for indicators, and themes) 
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2.3.1 Aggregation, normalisation and scoring 
Indicators need to be normalised before being aggregated. Normalisation prevents an 
indicator from having greater weight in the determination of an index simply because of its 
unit of measurement. For example, adding infant mortality rate (absolutely low) and 
undernutrition rate (absolutely large) without normalising, implicitly attributes higher weight to 
the item that is absolutely larger (assuming they have similar variances). The normalisation 
procedure we use is the one adopted by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI), which re-scales indicators based on the following 
formula: 
 
This normalises the value of all indicators to [0,1] range. Going back to the earlier example of 
infant mortality versus undernutrition, both variables will lie in the [0,1] range after this re-
scaling. Some indicators (e.g. the dichotomous variables) in the HANCI are already in the 
[0,1] range, hence this re-scaling is redundant for them. Having all indicators in a uniform 
range is of particular value to the HANCI as it mitigates unequal weight being given to 
indicators as a result of their scale. Other normalising methods such as standardisation and 
distance to a reference country, while useful under other circumstances, do not constrain the 
normalised indicators within a uniform range.7 This was the main reason why we did not use 
them in the HANCI. However, a robust or ‘meaningful’ index would produce a ranking that is 
invariant to these choices (Ebert and Welsch 2004). The sensitivity analysis in Chapter 3 
accordingly assesses whether the HANCI rankings are robust to alternative design choices. 
After normalisation, indicator scores were aggregated to form the HANCI. This was done in 
two steps: (1) Aggregation of indicators to form composite indicators formed around the three 
themes; and (2) Aggregation of thematic composite indicators (CIT) to form the overall 
composite indicator (CI) which is the HANCI. Both of these aggregations were done using 
additive methods. Aggregation of indicators at thematic level was done as the summation of 
weighted and normalised indicators: 
 
where ∑wi=1 and 0≤wi≤1 for all i. In the case of the HANCI the indicator weights were equal 
within each them, i.e. wi=wj for all i and j within each theme. The next round of aggregation 
was done at the theme level. This too was an equally weighted aggregation but using the 
Borda rule instead of a summation. The Borda rule used here is: 
 
where ∑wT=1 and 0≤wT≤1 for all T=expenditure, policy, and legal themes. Again, equal 
weights were selected in this aggregation, such that each theme was equally weighted in the 
HANCI. However, this means that individual normalised indicators ( ) are not equally 
weighted in the HANCI even though they are equally weighted within themes. 
Various ranking schemes can be employed once indicator scores are calculated, before 
and/or after aggregation. One disadvantage of ranking is that it leads to a loss of information. 
                                               
7
 Not all normalisation methods can be applied to the HANCI. For a fuller list see Nardo, Saisana Saltelli, Tarantola, Hoffman 
and Giovannini (2005). 
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Table 2.5 illustrates that the ranking scheme employed can have impacts on the overall 
ranks for countries. The cardinal ranking scheme adds up absolute values across legal 
framework; policies and programmes and public expenditure themes for each of the three 
countries. Consequently, outlier (very high or low) values on any of the themes can dominate 
the aggregated values. The Borda method overcomes this by adding up the ranks achieved 
for each of the themes, and the country with the overall lowest sum of ranks is shown to 
perform strongest overall. 
Table 2.5 Hypothetical Cardinal and Borda ranking schemes compared 
Country Legal 
framework (a) 
Policies and 
programmes (b) 
Public 
expenditures (c) 
Cardinal 
ranking 
Borda  
ranking 
Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Add up 
values 
Overall 
ranks 
Add up 
ranks 
Overall 
ranks 
One 0.6 2 0.5 3 0.9 1 2.0 First 6 Second 
Two 0.3 3 0.6 2 0.5 2 1.4 Third 7 Third 
Three 0.8 1 0.8 1 0.1 3 1.7 Second 5 First 
Note: Indicator scores between 0 and 1, with 1 as best. 
One major advantage of Borda ranking is that it allows for easy comparison of indicators 
expressed on different scales. HANCI indicators are measured on both cardinal, continuous 
and ordinal, dichotomous scales.8 We thus use a Borda scheme to preserve the ordinal 
nature of the index. In other words, rather than ranking the values of the indicators across 
themes we rank the sum of the rankings across themes (Dasgupta 2001 and Masset 2011) 
The Borda method thus only provides a rank, not an absolute commitment value. 
2.3.2 Weighting schemes 
This section draws substantially on a recent review of the literature on weighting schemes by 
Decancq and Lugo (2010). These authors identify various approaches that use information 
that is very different in nature, leading to diverse weighting schemes. Any weighting scheme 
involves trade-offs between the dimensions of the index. As there is no widely accepted 
theoretical framework on how to set these trade-offs, researchers need to consider the 
reasonability of implied trade-offs between the dimensions and exercise common sense and 
caution (Decancq and Lugo 2010). 
                                               
8
E.g. the relative share of agricultural spending in overall public spending expressed as a percentage is measured on a 
continuous, cardinal scale. The indicator assessing whether or not a government uses a nutrition budget line is measured on an 
ordinal, dichotomous scale. 
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Normative, equal weighting 
The HANCI applies a subjective, theory-driven weighting scheme that allocates equal 
weights to: 
1. Each of the two sub-indices, such that the hunger reduction commitment and nutrition 
commitment sub-indices each contribute 50 per cent to overall HANCI scores; 
2. Each of the three policy, legal and expenditure themes (within the sub-indices and 
consequently in the overall HANCI). 
Although equal weighting schemes are often defended from an agnostic perspective, they 
are not uncontroversial. Like any other weighting scheme, equal weighting involves value 
choices regarding the substitutability of various dimensions of the index, without specifying 
the normative attractiveness of such choices (Decancq and Lugo 2010). 
For the HANCI, we assume full substitutability of sub-indices and themes. Given that the 
HANCI uses uneven numbers of indicators for its themes, and for its two sub-indices, any 
weighting scheme applied at sub-index and thematic level implicitly affects the weightings 
attributed to the individual indicators (Table 2.6). This approach is also adopted, for instance, 
by the UNDP’s Human Development Index and by the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture 
Index (Alkire, Meinzen-Dick, Peterman, Quisumbing, Seymour and Vaz 2012). While we 
suggest a trade-off between legal frameworks, policies and programmes and public 
expenditures, we cannot reasonably uphold this position at the indicator level. The unequal 
weighting of indicators means that for instance, putting the ICBMS into law, or having a 
nutrition budget is weighted ten times more than coverage of access to sanitation; clearly this 
is contestable. Nevertheless, we decided to privilege comprehensiveness over equality of 
weighting for indicators. That is, we do not want equal indicator weighting to drive down the 
number of indicators to the lowest common denominator, as we want to capture the multi-
dimensional nature of political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition. 
Normative weights identified by experts and communities 
In order to compare our subjective allocation of equal weights to themes with alternative 
preferences, we devised a simple exercise that allows others such as in-country experts, 
hunger- and undernutrition-affected communities, and third parties to set their own subjective 
weights. This exercise thus avoids imposing the weighting preference of a group of 
researchers at IDS. In our primary research, we requested both experts involved in the 
perception surveys and community members involved in the focus group discussions (FGDs) 
to propose their own preferential sets of weights. A web-based tool allows HANCI website 
visitors (www.hancindex.org) to apply their own subjective weighting schemes to the three 
themes, and see how these affect country rankings.9 
We employed a questionnaire to identify the importance that hunger and nutrition experts 
gave to the three themes. In rural and urban hunger and undernutrition-affected communities 
in Bangladesh, Malawi and Zambia, we conducted the same question using a more visual 
approach (Figure 2.3). Here community groups of men and women allocated 100 marbles 
between ‘policies and programmes’, ‘public spending’ and ‘laws’. This approach facilitated 
the inclusion of less literate and numerate community members in setting weights (see the 
Box at the end of Chapter 2 for the protocol for using this method). Final weights were 
determined by computing the mean of the distribution of responses (standardised to sum to 
100). 
                                               
9
 Our web-based tool (http://www.hancindex.org) shows how website visitor-determined weighting schemes compare to (a) 
expert, (b) community, and (c) equal weighting schemes, and instantaneously demonstrate how such schemes produce 
divergent country rankings. 
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Table 2.6 Weightings in the HANCI 
Index Sub-index Theme Indicator Weight 
HANCI Hunger 
Reduction 
Commitment 
(1/2) 
Legal frameworks (1/6) Constitutional protection right to food 1/24 
Women’s access to agricultural land 1/24 
Constitutional right to social security 1/24 
Women’s economic rights 1/24 
Policies and programmes 
(1/6) 
Access to land 1/24 
Access to agricultural extension 1/24 
Civil registration 1/24 
Status of safety nets 1/24 
Public expenditures (1/6) Agriculture expenditure 2/24 
Health expenditure 2/24 
Nutrition 
Commitment 
(1/2) 
Legal frameworks (1/6) Incorporation ICMBS in law 1/6 
Policies and programmes 
(1/6) 
Vitamin A coverage 1/60 
Complementary feeding 1/60 
Access to water 1/60 
Access to sanitation 1/60 
Skilled birth attendance 1/60 
Nutrition in development policy 1/60 
National nutrition plan/strategy 1/60 
Multi-sectoral stakeholder 
coordination mechanisms 
1/60 
Time-bound nutrition targets 1/60 
National nutrition surveys 1/60 
Public expenditures (1/6) Nutrition budget 1/6 
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Figure 2.3 Communities selecting weights, Bangladesh 
  
 
The expert- or community-selected weights needs to be interpreted with a little caution. We 
aimed to avoid bias in the selection of experts by seeking a balanced representation of 
actors from diverse sectors. The community weighting is specific to the community and 
members involved in the process. The HANCI project continues to conduct this exercise in 
additional communities in new countries. In case this shows a high level of convergence in 
weighting schemes, we may decide to use this to replace our equal weighting scheme. 
Data-driven weighting 
Various statistical devices can be used in data-driven approaches to identify weighting 
schemes.10 We can distinguish descriptive and explanatory models. 
Explanatory models (such as factor analysis) assume that some observed indicators are 
dependent on a certain number of unobserved latent variables (Decancq and Lugo 2010). 
Descriptive statistical models such as Principal Components Analysis (PCA) or cluster 
analysis aim to minimise double counting, as indicators within the model may be strongly 
correlated and thus capture the same latent dimension. PCA has been widely used to build 
indices of ‘wealth’ or ‘intelligence’ (Filmer and Pritchett 2001; Hunt 2007). It assigns weights 
to indicators based on their correlations in order to find the ‘principal component’ that best 
represents the available data. In PCA, the set of indicators is transformed into an equal 
number of mutually uncorrelated (orthogonal) linear combinations of indicators, each 
explaining a proportion of the variance in the data (Decancq and Lugo 2010). 
Data-driven approaches have the advantage of being ‘objective’ and seemingly avoid value 
judgements. They also have several limitations: PCA, factor analysis and other multi-variate 
                                               
10
 Other data-driven approaches use frequency-based weights or most favourable weights. 
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statistical approaches to determine weights are atheoretical and non-transparent. They do 
not offer clear explanatory narratives for their findings and therefore do not speak easily to 
policymakers and non-specialist audiences. Moreover, weights based on data-driven 
approaches can change between different editions of the same index, so that comparability 
over time is lost (this is a critical objective of the HANCI). Furthermore, PCA assigns lower 
weights to dimensions that are poorly correlated. This procedure may not be suitable, 
because the HANCI needs to capture multiple underlying dimensions of political 
commitment, which may not necessarily be strongly correlated (see Somarriba and Pena 
2009, in Decancq and Lugo 2010). 
Keeping in mind these limitations, in the sensitivity analysis presented in Chapter 3 we 
compare the implications that equal weighting and data-driven weighting approaches have 
for HANCI outcomes. 
2.4 Primary research on political commitment in Bangladesh, 
Malawi and Zambia 
Secondary government-owned data stored in various databases impose substantial 
limitations for measuring political commitment. They do not capture many indicators of 
political commitment identified in the literature, or allow for including community perspectives 
on political commitment that could support in-country advocacy on hunger and 
undernutrition. This section of the report sets out the methods employed to capture and 
analyse primary data on political commitment. It first discusses perception surveys 
conducted with experts based in Bangladesh, Malawi and Zambia, and then explores 
community voices expressing local perspectives on political commitment. 
2.4.1 Expert perception surveys 
This research developed an expert perceptions survey to capture contemporary perspectives 
on political commitment. The survey employed a structured questionnaire posing over 30 
questions (plus additional sub-questions) to a variety of experts on hunger and nutrition in 
Bangladesh, Malawi and Zambia.11 The surveys were conducted in August–September 2011. 
Respondents were identified by in-country partner organisations working on hunger and 
nutrition issues, and aimed to cover a spread of experts from government, academia, private 
sector, international donors and civil society organisations to avoid bias of any particular 
group and to ensure that divergent opinions are represented (Table 2.7).12 
Table 2.7 Summary of respondent types, expert interviews 
 Bangladesh Malawi Zambia Total 
Government 7 24 11 42 
NGO/civil society 15 11 11 37 
Academia/research 8 11 2 21 
Development partners 5 7 12 24 
Other 5 - 4 9 
Total 40 53 40 133 
                                               
11
 Research in India was successfully completed in 2012, but cannot be presented in this report. Research in Ethiopia 
commenced, but was not successfully completed. Research in Tanzania commenced in April 2013; in Nepal in April/May 2013. 
12
 Prior to the survey, respondents were given a one-page summary outlining the objectives, and setting out our procedure 
regarding confidentiality and anonymity. 
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The survey questionnaire employs five-point Likert scales, where respondents are asked to 
indicate their level of agreement with statements and questions, with low scores 
corresponding to high levels of government commitment to reduce hunger (1 = very strongly, 
2 = strongly, 3 = moderately, 4 = weakly, 5 = very weakly). The survey included questions 
aimed to address the following political commitment indicators (see Brinkerhoff 2000): 
 The institutionalisation of credible incentives for individuals in, and between, 
government agencies (e.g. is poor performance on hunger objectives sanctioned, and 
is success rewarded, with, say, promotions and extra resources?). 
 Institutions’ coordinating policy (e.g. do the various ministries of agriculture, health 
and social protection effectively coordinate?). 
 Locus of policy origin (e.g. is the body in charge of implementing policies also the one 
that designed it, having strong ownership?). 
 Learning and adaptation mechanisms and practices (e.g. is there regular monitoring 
and evaluation?). 
 The marshalling of scientific evidence in decision-making processes (e.g. is policy 
informed by new insights on how to address hunger?). 
 Mobilisation of stakeholders (e.g. do government agencies actively aim to get 
widespread support for their interventions?). 
 Public commitment (e.g. are decision-makers’ policy preferences revealed, and 
resources assigned to achieve these open to public scrutiny?). 
 Resource allocation and expenditures (e.g. what is the strength, relevance and 
sufficiency of expenditures on hunger reduction policies and programmes?). 
 Continuity of effort (e.g. are efforts strong and sustained, or episodic, one-shot 
efforts?). 
 Political leadership (e.g. to what extent political leaders and political party manifestos 
speak out against hunger and undernutrition; how convincing are statements by 
political leaders; how knowledgeable are politicians about status, causal factors and 
solutions; how strong is top-level leadership?). 
All questionnaire questions for each of the indicators above are listed in Annex 2.13 
2.4.2 Community perspectives on political commitment 
The research on community voices aimed to examine individual and collective accounts and 
perceptions of existing government actions and intentions to reduce hunger and 
undernutrition. The research focused on affected communities at a limited number of 
localities, to complement desk-based research and expert surveys, to help interpretation of 
index scores and to explore opportunities for greater involvement of affected communities in 
policy advocacy work following publication of the Index. 
Local grassroots NGOs as well as district-level government officials assisted the research 
team in identifying the communities (Table 2.8). Communities were selected on the basis of 
proposals by in-country partners, keeping in mind (a) the need for inclusion of communities 
that have experienced varying levels of government action to reduce hunger and 
malnutrition; (b) inclusion of urban and rural locations; and (c) incorporation of different 
groups known to be vulnerable to hunger and undernutrition, including small-scale farmers, 
landless labourers, urban informal sector workers, indigenous communities and slum 
dwellers. 
                                               
13
 Building on the HRCI 2011 questionnaire, the HANCI questionnaire includes new questions concerning: political leadership, 
budget lines, financial mechanisms and vertical coordination. Revised answer categories were introduced such that answers are 
given for hunger and nutrition not as combined but as separate categories, to allow for greater analytical specificity. 
 23 
Table 2.8 Community voices: focus group discussion locations 
Country Locations Number of communities Total FGDs 
Bangladesh Dhaka (urban) 2 8 
Nilphamari District (north) 2 
Patuakhali District (south) 2 
Bandarban District (south-east) 2 
Malawi Balaka District 2 4 
Kasungu District 2 
Zambia Lusaka (urban): Kamanga; Mutendere 2 4 
Luangwa District: Kavalamanja; Chitope 2 
Total   16 
Within chosen communities, local partners conducted focus group discussions with men and 
women, where possible in separate groups. Participants included older and younger 
(adolescent) members. Group sizes varied between 7 and 20 participants, depending on 
location. Focus group discussions followed a non-restrictive pre-identified scenario of topics, 
which included questions about the nature of hunger and malnutrition in the community and 
government intentions and actions to reduce hunger and malnutrition in the community. 
Furthermore, a simple exercise was conducted through which community members allocated 
weightings to three dimensions of political commitment: legal frameworks; policies and 
programmes; and public expenditures. 
In addition to the research, community perspectives were captured in audio-visual materials, 
using photographs, videos and audio-recordings, for subsequent transcription, production 
and dissemination.14 In Bangladesh, a video was produced by Action Aid. Materials for 
Malawi were produced by IDS. Materials for Zambia were of insufficient quality and could not 
be used. 
Box: Protocol for weighting exercise 
 • Explain to the group/individual that the government can consider doing three things to (1) 
combat hunger and (2) improve nutrition: 
  (a) pass laws (e.g. to enshrine a right to food); 
  (b) initiate policies and programmes (e.g. to ensure subsidised food is available in village); 
  (c) spend government budgets. 
 • Explain that the exercise will be run separately, first for hunger, second for nutrition. 
 • Hunger: Draw three circles in the sand and clarify what each stands for (laws; 
policies/programmes; expenditures) (or some other way – for a group, it should allow 
everyone to be able to see and contribute to the discussion and allocation). 
 • Explain that the individual/group can distribute 100 marbles, and invite group members to 
allocate the marbles across the circles. 
 • Record ensuing discussions, and keep the final tally. 
 • Now repeat the exercise for government action on nutrition. 
                                               
14
 This was guided by a protocol explaining and agreeing with respondents the voluntary waiver of anonymity and confidentiality. 
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3 HANCI findings drawing on secondary data 
This chapter presents findings for the HANCI 2012 drawing on secondary data. Before 
presenting HANCI rankings, we first discuss some key features of the rankings. The chapter 
next shows how commitment levels relate to key contextual factors such as a country’s 
wealth, administrative capacity, and hunger and undernutrition situation. 
3.1 HANCI rankings 
Before setting out the HANCI rankings, readers should be aware of the following features of 
the index: 
 The HANCI aggregates relative (not absolute) political commitment levels. HANCI 
indicators are measured on ordinal, categorical and cardinal scales, and the index is 
therefore not able to meaningfully calculate absolute commitment levels aggregated 
across indicators. Instead, HANCI employs the Borda scoring technique to calculate 
scores for the HRCI and NCI sub-indices and for the three themes that compose 
these (policies and programmes, spending and legal frameworks). Borda scoring 
respects the diversity of measurement scales, and thus allows the valid calculation of 
aggregate scores across indicators. Resultant Borda scores are translated in 
rankings. It is important to remember that the Borda scores do not represent absolute 
commitment levels; they represent relative political commitment levels. For this 
reason also, HANCI does not identify absolute benchmarks of commitment to be 
achieved. 
 The HANCI compares countries’ performance relative to one another. Consequently, 
a ranking emerges regardless of the (weak or strong) performance of countries. 
 Countries that show relatively high commitment levels in the HANCI do not 
necessarily perform strongly on each of the composite indicators. High rankings 
should not be a reason to sit back and relax: often, substantial scope remains to 
enhance performance on selected indicators. 
 Absolute commitment levels can be ascertained for all individual indicators (not 
aggregations) by referring to the raw data (prior to normalisation) shown in the 
spreadsheet in Annex 4. 
 HANCI rankings are planned to be recalculated in 2013 and 2014. Over time, 
countries may improve their absolute performance on indicators, yet fail to improve 
their rankings, when other countries’ performance improvements are at least just as 
fast. To prevent demotivation, we suggest that wherever absolute performance on 
indicators improves, this should be the benchmark (not country rankings). 
 Finally, commitment rankings should not be confused with hunger and nutrition 
outcomes. 
3.2 Key findings for the HANCI 2012 
Below we set out key findings for the HANCI 2012. 
Guatemala claims top spot and Guinea Bissau is the worst performing country in 
2012. 
Guatemala is a resounding number one on our list. When compared to the other 43 countries 
that were assessed, Guatemala performs best for both hunger and nutrition commitment. It 
does especially well in terms of nutrition commitment. This is very encouraging as 
undernutrition in particular constitutes a major challenge for Guatemala. The country has one 
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of the world’s highest child stunting rates (48 per cent), and annually loses over US$300 
million in GDP to vitamin and mineral deficiencies (World Bank 2010). The Global Hunger 
Index considers that the situation in Guatemala remains ‘alarming’ (WHH/IFPRI/Concern 
2012). While much remains to be done, hunger and nutrition outcomes in Guatemala are 
gradually improving, with year on year improvements in the Global Hunger Index, partially, 
we would hypothesise, thanks to substantial political commitment and concomitant 
government action. 
So what has the Government of Guatemala done well and where are further improvements 
needed? The government has ensured a high level of access to drinking water (92 per cent 
of the population) and fairly high levels of access to improved sanitation (78 per cent); over 
nine out of ten pregnant women are visited by a skilled birth attendant at least once before 
delivery; and the government promotes complementary feeding practices. It has fully 
enshrined the International Code of Marketing of Breastfeeding Substitutes into domestic 
law, although active enforcement requires greater resources. Guatemala invests 
substantially in health, and has a separate nutrition budget line to make its spending 
accountable to all. The 2012 budget assigns funds for the fight against chronic child 
malnutrition and infant-maternal mortality. A further budget line exists for activities related to 
the window of opportunity of the first 1,000 days of a child’s life. Public policy benefits from 
up-to-date information on nutrition statuses, as a nationally representative sample survey has 
been conducted in the last three years (SUN 2012b). 
Guatemala’s National Strategy for the Reduction of Chronic Malnutrition (started in 2006) 
was incorporated into a National Zero Hunger Pact in 2012 – as part of the ‘National Agenda 
for Change’ of President Otto Perez Molina. Its objective is a 10 per cent reduction of chronic 
malnutrition in children under five years of age by the end of the presidential tenure in 2016. 
A Strategic Plan for Food Security and Nutrition – better known as the Zero Hunger Plan – 
while in an early stage of implementation, has ambitious strategies for chronic child 
malnutrition, for acute malnutrition, for micronutrient deficiency and food insecurity, and a 
clear set of performance indicators. Furthermore, Guatemala’s National Food Security and 
Nutrition System is regionally recognised as a reference model for multi-sector, multi-
stakeholder coordination (SUN 2012b). 
Guatemala is showing a good all-round performance. Yet, there are clear areas for 
improvement. Guatemala invests relatively little in agriculture and, as a consequence, its 
poor farmers do not always have sufficient access to extension services. Furthermore, 
although the right to food and the right to social security are enshrined in the Guatemalan 
Constitution, women’s access to land and women’s economic rights can be strengthened to 
reduce their (and their families’) vulnerability to hunger and undernutrition. The Zero Hunger 
Plan is still in its early stages, with low implementation of available budget so far. Finally, it 
should be noted that in Guatemala, children from indigenous communities have rates of 
stunting and underweight almost twice that of non-indigenous children (PAHO 2008). Nearly 
eight out of ten indigenous children are stunted compared to four of ten non-indigenous 
children. Such large differentials may reflect social exclusion or other forms of differential 
access to services. Supply-side barriers have been shown to be particularly important for the 
indigenous population (World Bank 2010). It should be noted that while a highly committed 
government would address such inequities as a priority, the HANCI currently does not 
measure this. 
Guinea Bissau shows the lowest level of political commitment to reduce hunger and 
undernutrition. This is very worrying, because the country faces very serious hunger and 
nutrition challenges. The Global Hunger Index considers the situation in Guinea Bissau to be 
‘alarming’ (WHH/IFPRI/Concern 2012). Child stunting rates are fairly high (28 per cent), 
though not as high as in Guatemala (48 per cent), but the contrast in government 
commitment levels is very sharp. Guinea Bissau fails to invest in agriculture, despite a 
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commitment to invest 10 per cent of its budgets in agriculture (as part of the African Union’s 
Maputo Declaration). Access to agricultural extension services is weak. While Guinea Bissau 
makes modest investments in health, it is not yet setting aside budgets for nutrition. Its 
nutrition policies, while not altogether lacking, need substantial strengthening, for instance, 
by instituting coordination mechanisms and by establishing time-bound nutrition targets. 
Guinea Bissau needs to strengthen people’s right to social security and enhance very weak 
economic rights for women. While this leaves women especially vulnerable to hunger and 
destitution, there are yet no effective safety nets to protect them and other vulnerable groups. 
Table 3.1 presents the HANCI 2012 rankings. It also shows the Borda scores and rankings 
for the Hunger Reduction Commitment and Nutrition Commitment sub-indices. 
Economic growth has not necessarily led to a commitment from governments to 
tackle hunger and undernutrition. 
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are global hotspots of hunger and undernutrition. Here, 
not only is hunger and undernutrition prevalence high, this is also where hunger is increasing 
most rapidly (FAO 2012). Many countries within these regions have achieved sustained 
economic growth over the last decade (see section 3.3.2 ‘Political commitment, wealth and 
economic growth’). This makes it possible for governments to more effectively address 
hunger and undernutrition. Yet, progress on reducing hunger and undernutrition is either too 
slow (e.g. South Asia) or stagnating (sub-Saharan Africa). 
Significantly, within areas of high and growing hunger and undernutrition prevalence, 
some countries are clearly showing much greater political commitment to address 
these problems than others. 
Thus, the political commitment levels of the global rising economic powers, Brazil, Russia, 
India, Indonesia, China, South Africa (BRIICS), vary substantially. South Africa performs 
strongly on hunger commitment, and relatively poorly on nutrition commitment. Brazil and 
Indonesia perform well overall. China does well in terms of hunger commitment, though less 
strongly on nutrition commitment. India’s commitment ranking is lowest within the group of 
BRIICS, even though its hunger and nutrition situation is the most serious. 
Within sub-Saharan Africa, there are some success stories to be told. Some of the smaller 
economic powers (Malawi, Madagascar, The Gambia) are now leading the charge against 
hunger and undernutrition, leaving traditional powerhouses (South Africa, Ethiopia, Nigeria, 
Kenya, Angola) in their wake. For instance, in our fieldwork in Malawi, rural communities of 
women and men expressed strong appreciation of the subsidised farm input supplies 
programme. Women in Balaka district also recounted how timely food transfers, provided by 
the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee during the ‘hungry season’, made a big 
difference. The food transfer made it possible for beneficiary households to avoid engaging 
in distress labour in other people’s fields (ganyu). This critically allowed them to focus on 
their own crops, to ensure better harvests and reduce their future vulnerability to hunger. 
The relative commitment to hunger reduction does not predict the relative 
commitment to nutrition. 
In fact, we found a low correlation between the two. This is summarised in Figure 3.1 and 
demonstrated by the divergent performance of countries such as Nepal, South Africa and 
Mali on the two sub-indices. 
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Table 3.1 HANCI 2012 (with Borda scores and rankings by sub-index) 
 Hunger 
Reduction 
Commitment 
Score 
Nutrition 
Commitment 
Score 
Hunger and 
Nutrition 
Commitment 
Score 
Hunger 
Reduction 
Commitment 
Ranks 
Nutrition 
Commitment 
Ranks 
Hunger and 
Nutrition 
Commitment 
Ranks 
Guatemala 109 131 240 1 1 1 
Malawi 105 117 222 2 5 2 
Madagascar 101 112 213 8 9 3 
Peru 105 105 210 2 11 4 
Brazil 96 114 210 10 7 4 
Philippines 100 105 205 9 11 6 
Indonesia 90 114 204 14 7 7 
Gambia 71 130 201 24 2 8 
Tanzania 91 110 201 13 10 8 
Burkina Faso 104 94 198 5 16 10 
Ghana 94 104 198 12 13 10 
Bangladesh 74 115 189 21 6 12 
Mozambique 68 118 186 26 4 13 
Vietnam 86 93 179 18 17 14 
Rwanda 90 89 179 14 21 14 
Mali 104 73 177 5 29 16 
Zambia 74 102 176 21 14 17 
Nepal 50 125 175 34 3 18 
Cambodia 87 88 175 17 22 18 
Uganda 81 92 173 19 19 20 
Senegal 89 83 172 16 26 21 
China 103 65 168 7 33 22 
South Africa 105 62 167 2 36 23 
Niger 72 90 162 23 20 24 
Ethiopia 96 64 160 10 34 25 
Sierra Leone 59 88 147 31 22 26 
Pakistan 63 84 147 30 25 26 
Benin 54 93 147 33 17 26 
India 67 71 138 27 30 29 
Nigeria 55 80 135 32 27 30 
Côte d’Ivoire 45 87 132 39 24 31 
Togo 78 45 123 20 42 32 
Cameroon 47 75 122 36 28 33 
Kenya 46 68 114 38 32 34 
Liberia 65 47 112 28 40 35 
Lesotho 70 34 104 25 43 36 
Afghanistan 8 96 104 45 15 36 
Mauritania 48 53 101 35 37 38 
Yemen 28 69 97 42 31 39 
Sudan 64 28 92 29 45 40 
Myanmar 26 63 89 43 35 41 
Burundi 35 51 86 40 38 42 
Angola 47 33 80 36 44 43 
Congo, DR 29 47 76 41 40 44 
Guinea Bissau 24 50 74 44 39 45 
Note: Calculations based on Additive + Borda method, with equal weights by theme. 
 Nepal ranks number three for nutrition commitment, but ranks only 34th (out of 45 
countries) for hunger reduction commitment. 
 Peru ranks 2nd highest for hunger reduction commitment, 11th for nutrition 
commitment. 
 The Gambia ranks 24th for hunger commitment, 2nd for nutrition commitment. 
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 Mali ranks 5th on hunger commitment and 29th on nutrition commitment . 
 South Africa shows 2nd highest commitment levels for hunger reduction, though 
ranks 36th for nutrition commitment. 
Figure 3.2 further demonstrates that the commitment to reduce hunger is not the same as 
the commitment to reduce undernutrition. 
Figure 3.1 Country nutrition commitment and hunger reduction 
commitment scores 
 
Figure 3.2 HRCI versus NCI rankings, 45 developing countries 
 
3.3 Political commitment within context 
The HANCI is calculated using political commitment indicators only. Yet, commitment must 
be understood within context. Here we present how commitment levels compare to critical 
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context variables such as hunger and undernutrition, wealth and governance effectiveness. 
This process of ‘decoupling and recoupling’ commitment levels from outcomes and context 
variables enhances HANCI’s diagnostic relevance for policymakers and civil society. 
Accordingly, in the tables and figures below we present a set of cross-tabulations and 
regression diagrams to assist reflections on political commitment set off against these 
contextual factors. 
For analytical purposes, countries are organised into four groupings expressing relative 
commitment levels (not absolute commitment levels): 
 High commitment (relative to other countries in the sample); 
 Moderate commitment (relative to other countries in the sample); 
 Low commitment (relative to other countries in the sample); 
 Very low commitment (relative to other countries in the sample). 
Two principles are applied to demarcate four country groupings. First, each of the four 
groups contains the nearest approximation of a quarter of all Borda points that were 
distributed in the scoring process. As such, groups with the relatively higher commitment 
levels (based on aggregate Borda scores across themes and HRCI and NCI sub-indices) 
contain fewer countries. Second, countries with the same number of Borda points must be 
located in the same group. Table 3.2 sets out resultant groupings. 
Table 3.2 Political commitment groupings based on HANCI Borda 
scores 
High 
commitment 
HANCI 
Borda 
score 
Moderate 
commitment 
HANCI 
Borda 
score 
Low 
commitment 
HANCI 
Borda 
score 
Very low 
commitment 
HANCI 
Borda 
score 
Guatemala 240 Gambia 201 Nepal 175 Togo 123 
Malawi 222 Tanzania 201 Cambodia 175 Cameroon 122 
Madagascar 213 Burkina Faso 198 Uganda 173 Kenya 114 
Peru 210 Ghana 198 Senegal 172 Liberia 112 
Brazil 210 Bangladesh 189 China 168 Lesotho 104 
Philippines 205 Mozambique 186 South Africa 167 Afghanistan 104 
Indonesia 204 Vietnam 179 Niger 162 Mauritania 101 
  Rwanda 179 Ethiopia 160 Yemen 97 
  Mali 177 Sierra Leone 147 Sudan 92 
  Zambia 176 Pakistan 147 Myanmar 89 
    Benin 147 Burundi 86 
    India 138 Angola 80 
    Nigeria 135 Congo, DR 76 
    Côte d’Ivoire 132 Guinea Bissau 74 
3.3.1 Political commitment within diverse hunger and nutrition contexts 
Table 3.3 shows current stunting levels versus current commitment levels. It is striking to see 
how countries with very similar stunting levels show highly divergent commitment levels. 
For instance, in right-hand column five, Guatemala and Malawi have among the highest 
stunting levels but show real commitment to address this, in contrast to conflict affected 
countries at the bottom of this column such as Burundi, Afghanistan, Burundi and Yemen. In 
left-hand column two, some notable differences exist between Brazil and China. Although 
both would want to move towards zero stunting levels, Brazil is closer to this target (7.4 per 
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cent) than China (14.5 per cent), and should also be expected reaching this target earlier 
because of its higher commitment levels. 
Table 3.3 HANCI commitment levels and stunting levels for children 
under 5 years of age 
 Percentage of under-5 stunting (severe and moderate) 
<20% 20–29% 30–39% ≥40% 
High commitment Brazil Peru Philippines Guatemala 
Malawi 
Madagascar 
Indonesia 
Moderate commitment  Gambia Burkina Faso Tanzania 
Ghana Vietnam Bangladesh 
 Mali Mozambique 
 Rwanda 
Zambia 
Low commitment China Senegal Uganda Cambodia 
South Africa Sierra Leone Nepal 
  Niger 
Ethiopia 
Benin 
Pakistan 
India 
Nigeria 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Very low commitment  Togo Cameroon Afghanistan 
Mauritania Kenya Yemen 
Angola Liberia Burundi 
Guinea Bissau Lesotho Congo, DR 
 Sudan  
Myanmar 
Given that commitment now is expected to have time-lagged effects on stunting rates, in 
future editions of the HANCI, one would: 
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 Expect to see countries in the top right corner move sideways to the left (i.e. reduce 
the incidence of stunting) driven by high levels of political commitment; 
 Hope to see countries in the bottom right corner moving up the commitment rows, 
and move sideways to the left in the table; 
 Hope to detect a pattern where countries with relatively low commitment are located 
in the bottom left corner of the table. 
Table 3.4 compares past stunting trends (comparing the 1990s to the 2000s) with current 
commitment levels. It is hard to draw firm conclusions on this data. We do not know what 
past commitment levels looked like, but we assume that high commitment drives lower 
stunting (rather than the reverse). We propose that time-lags between the commitment level 
at a given time and its positive future effects on stunting reduction occur; however, the size of 
such latencies remains to be determined.15 
Table 3.4 HANCI political commitment and decadal stunting trends 
(1990s–2000s) 
 Percentage of under-5 stunting rate change between 1990s and 2000s 
≥0% –1% to –10% –11% to –20% >–20% 
High commitment  Guatemala Malawi Brazil 
Madagascar Peru Indonesia 
 Philippines  
Moderate commitment  Burkina Faso Tanzania Gambia 
Ghana Mozambique Bangladesh 
Rwanda  Vietnam 
Mali  
Zambia 
Low commitment Niger Uganda Nepal Cambodia 
Sierra Leone South Africa Senegal China 
Benin Nigeria Pakistan  
Côte d’Ivoire  India 
Very low commitment Afghanistan Cameroon Congo, DR Togo 
Lesotho Kenya Mauritania 
Yemen  Angola 
Sudan  
Burundi 
Within these provisos, the table shows that highest decadal reductions in stunting have been 
achieved by countries having high as well as those having low (current) commitment levels. 
Moreover, countries with current high commitment levels have had diverse past 
achievements in terms of stunting reduction. 
Worryingly, in those countries that have seen stunting increases over the last two 
decades, current levels of political commitment are low to very low. 
                                               
15
 A good index should be able to predict (explain) phenomena within the theoretical framework of its construction. For example, 
an index of hunger and nutrition commitment should explain, after controlling for a series of confounding factors, achievements 
in hunger reduction and nutrition improvements. If the predictive power is poor then either commitment does not matter in 
hunger reduction – possible but unlikely – or we have a poor index. The only methodology available to statistically test the 
predictive power of the index on hunger outcomes is the use of cross-country regressions, although they have their limitations 
(Smith and Haddad 2000). Calculations of the index for past (and future) years may allow us to link it to hunger and nutrition 
outcome data and test for the relevance of different commitment formulations. 
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Many countries in this position are currently or have recently been afflicted by conflict (Sierra 
Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, Yemen, Afghanistan and Sudan). Benin, Lesotho and Niger do 
not fall in this category; we suggest that political commitment levels in these countries have 
been low in the past for reasons other than conflict. Figure 3.3 shows this diagrammatically. 
Niger has the highest HANCI rating of the countries that experienced deteriorating stunting 
prevalence in the 2000s as compared to the 1990s. In future editions of the HANCI particular 
attention may be given to political commitment changes in countries such as Niger, Lesotho 
and Benin to ascertain whether these drive undernutrition. 
Figure 3.3 Decadal stunting trends (1990s/2000s) by country and HANCI 
country ranks 
 
Figure 3.3 also shows that several countries buck the trend. Mauritania and Angola are 
among the countries showing the highest past decadal stunting reduction rates, yet they 
record low levels of current political commitment. In Angola, substantial non-agricultural 
economic growth (oil based) has lifted average incomes to among the highest in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
Alternatively, political commitment levels can be compared to countries’ hunger and 
undernutrition statuses as defined by the Global Hunger Index (Table 3.5). The GHI is a 
composite index, calculated by combining hunger prevalence, child mortality and stunting 
prevalence data (WHH/IFPRI/Concern 2012). 
Burundi stands out as having very low commitment levels in conditions that are ‘extremely 
alarming’. Countries experiencing ‘alarming’ or ‘serious’ conditions demonstrate a wide range 
of commitment levels. Development partners may consider that in those showing high 
commitment, investments in hunger and nutrition may be more likely to bear fruit. 
Conversely, in countries having low commitment despite high hunger and undernutrition 
incidence, development partners may focus support on bringing this higher up political 
agendas, for instance through support for civil society advocacy. 
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Table 3.5 HANCI political commitment and hunger and undernutrition 
status as per GHI 
HANCI 2012 GHI 2012 
Low:  
≤4.9 
Moderate:  
5.0–9.9 
Serious:  
10.0–19.9 
Alarming:  
20.0–29.9 
Extremely alarming:  
≥30.0 
High commitment Brazil Peru Guatemala Madagascar  
Malawi 
Philippines 
Indonesia 
Moderate commitment  Ghana Gambia Bangladesh  
Tanzania Mozambique 
Burkina Faso Zambia 
Vietnam  
Rwanda 
Mali 
Low commitment  China Cambodia Nepal  
South Africa Uganda Niger 
 Senegal Ethiopia 
Benin Sierra Leone 
Pakistan India 
Nigeria  
Côte d’Ivoire 
Very low commitment   Togo Yemen Burundi 
Cameroon Sudan 
Kenya Angola 
Liberia  
Lesotho 
Mauritania 
Guinea Bissau 
3.3.2 Political commitment, wealth and economic growth 
Low wealth in a country does not necessarily imply low levels of political commitment. 
Our data (Table 3.6) show that in cases where there are serious hunger and nutrition 
challenges, low aggregate and per capita wealth in a country does not mean that 
governments are simply unable to act on hunger and undernutrition. For instance, Angola 
and Malawi both have an ‘alarming’ and Guinea Bissau a ‘serious’ hunger status 
(WHH/IFPRI/Concern 2012). Out of these three countries, Malawi has by far the lowest 
Gross National Income per capita ($870, as compared to Guinea Bissau ($1,240) and 
Angola ($5,230). Yet, Malawi ranks 2nd on the HANCI, while Angola and Guinea Bissau 
languish at the bottom of the league table. Similarly, India’s child stunting rates are on a par 
with Guatemala’s. The latter’s higher GNI per head ($4,390 compared to $3,590) seems 
insufficient to explain the large divergence in political commitment levels. 
Table 3.6 HANCI political commitment groupings versus Gross National 
Income per capita 
HANCI Gross National Income per capita ($) 
<1,000 1,000–1,499 1,500–1,999 2,000–3,499 >=3,500 
High commitment Malawi    Guatemala 
Madagascar Brazil 
 Peru 
Philippines 
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Indonesia 
Moderate commitment Mozambique Burkina Faso Tanzania Vietnam  
Rwanda Gambia 
Mali Ghana 
Zambia Bangladesh 
Low commitment Niger Ethiopia Benin Cambodia India 
Sierra Leone Nepal Côte d’Ivoire Nigeria China 
 Uganda Senegal Pakistan South Africa 
Very low commitment Congo, DR Togo Kenya Lesotho Angola 
Liberia Afghanistan Sudan 
Burundi Guinea Bissau Yemen 
  Cameroon 
Mauritania 
Furthermore, Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show first, how stunting trends and economic growth 
trends compare for our set of countries over the last two decades. 
Figure 3.4 compares change in average annual GNI growth rates between the periods of 
1990–1999 and 2000–2011. The average growth rate for the two periods was calculated 
using purchasing power parity adjusted GNI per capita. We removed Angola from the figures, 
being a strong outlier. The overall fitted linear trend is weakly positive, suggesting that 
countries that reported increasing growth between the two decades were not able to achieve 
increased reductions in stunting rates, affirming similar findings by Headey (2011). 
Figure 3.4 sets out on the X-axis the difference in mean economic growth rates in the 2000s 
compared to the 1990s. Countries on the left-hand side of the Y-axis (in quadrants Q1,Q3) 
experienced a slowing of growth rates during the 2000s. Guatemala and Malawi, our top two 
countries are in this group. Countries above the X-axis (Q1 and Q2) show worsening stunting 
rates during this period. In quadrant 2 therefore, we see countries that experience an 
acceleration of economic growth as well as stagnating or worsening stunting rates. For 
instance, in Sierra Leone strongly increased mean growth rates of up to 10 per cent per 
annum (compared to the previous decade) did not go hand in hand with accelerations in 
stunting declines. In case of Burundi, a 3 per cent GNI growth rate per annum is 
accompanied by worsening stunting rates. Nevertheless, for the majority of countries (Q3) 
positive economic growth trends go together with reducing rates of stunting. 
Figure 3.5 presents the same data as Figure 3.4 with a twist: it adds a coding scheme of 
symbols that demonstrates which countries have relatively high, moderate, low or very low 
political commitment (HANCI 2012 data). The diagram shows clearly that all countries above 
the X-axis (those with increasing stunting rates) are countries currently showing low or very 
low current political commitment. 
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Figure 3.4 Change in mean annual GNI growth versus mean annual 
change in stunting rates for 1990s versus 2000s 
 
Note: Outlier Angola was removed. 
Figure 3.5 HANCI political commitment levels, change in mean annual 
GNI growth versus mean annual change in stunting rates for 
1990s versus 2000s 
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Finally, Figure 3.6, using data for the decade 2000–2011, again suggests that there is a 
weak relation between levels of economic growth and accelerations in reducing stunting 
rates. 
Figure 3.6 Annual change in stunting versus annual GNI growth rates, 
2000–2011 
 
3.3.3 Political commitment and government effectiveness 
Only very weak government effectiveness seems to bar the development of political 
commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition. 
Governments in our sample demonstrate that high levels of commitment to reduce hunger 
and undernutrition occur at all but the weakest levels of government effectiveness. Our data 
(Table 3.7) suggest that low levels of political commitment may be partially caused by very 
low levels of government effectiveness. Governments of countries such as Sierra Leone, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, Liberia, Myanmar, DR Congo, Afghanistan and Sudan may feel stifled 
undertaking initiatives towards hunger and undernutrition reduction because of legitimate 
concerns regarding their capacity to deliver policies and programmes, put legal frameworks 
into practice and effectively use government spending. 
Nevertheless, once a relatively low threshold of government effectiveness is passed (>10), 
governments seem able to be moderately to highly committed (e.g. Madagascar, 
Bangladesh, Mali, Guatemala, Malawi). 
Figure 3.7 further demonstrates that high HANCI rankings overall coincide with higher levels 
of high government effectiveness. The regression coefficient of -0.7992 is fairly strong. 
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Table 3.7 HANCI political commitment and government effectiveness 
(World Governance Indicators 2011) 
HANCI Government effectiveness 
0–10 10–25 25–50 50–75 75–100 
High commitment  Madagascar Guatemala Brazil  
Malawi Philippines 
Peru  
Indonesia 
Moderate commitment  Bangladesh Gambia Ghana  
Mali Tanzania Rwanda 
 Burkina Faso  
Mozambique 
Vietnam 
Zambia 
Low commitment Sierra Leone Nepal Cambodia China  
Côte d’Ivoire Pakistan Uganda South Africa 
 Nigeria Senegal India 
 Niger  
Ethiopia 
Benin 
Very low commitment Togo Cameroon Kenya   
Liberia Mauritania Lesotho 
Afghanistan Yemen  
Sudan Burundi 
Myanmar Angola 
Congo, DR Guinea Bissau 
Note: Government effectiveness 100 = highest. 
Source: World Bank, World Governance Indicators (WGI 2011). 
Figure 3.7 A linear regression of HANCI rankings and government 
effectiveness levels 
 
Source: World Bank, World Governance Indicators, 2011. 
y = -0.7992x + 48.031
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4 The empirical functioning of the index 
Although the HANCI employs a theory-driven approach to building the index, this section 
explores whether the index hangs together empirically, by ascertaining its internal reliability. 
We further present a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate the robustness of the index. 
4.1 Internal reliability 
HANCI can be considered reliable if it ranks two countries with the same level of political 
commitment on par with each other. In statistical terms, reliability is a measure of whether 
individual indicators in HANCI produce results that are consistent with the overall HANCI. 
Arguably, the most commonly used measure of internal reliability is Cronbach’s alpha or the 
standardised version thereof. In cases such as the HANCI where all indicators are 
normalised before being used in the index the standardised version is recommended 
(Cortina 1993). Cronbach’s alpha is calculated as: 
 
where N is the number of indicators and M(COV) is the mean of inter-indicator covariance 
and SUM(VAR/COV) is the sum of all elements in the variance covariance matrix (Cortina 
1993). The standardised Cronbach alpha, on the other hand, uses information from the 
correlation matrix instead of the variance covariance matrix. Therefore, we use the 
correlation matrix of the full set of indicators to calculate the standardised alpha. 
The calculation of the correlation matrix for all indicators needs to consider that HANCI 
comprises a mix of indicators measured on ordinal and continuous scales. If all were 
continuous indicators then we could have used Pearson moment correlation calculations to 
populate the correlation matrix that is needed to calculate the standardised alpha. However, 
the presence of ordinal variables requires that the calculation of correlation measures in each 
cell of the correlation matrix be determined as follows: 
 (ordinal multicategories, ordinal multicategories) → polychoric correlation 
 (ordinal two categories, ordinal two categories) → tetrachoric correlation 
 (continuous, ordinal multicategories) → polyserial correlation 
 (continuous, ordinal two categories) → biserial correlation 
 (continuous, continuous) → Pearson moment correlation 
The resulting heterogeneous correlation matrix is summarised in Figure 4.1. The figure 
groups indicators according to whether they represent the hunger reduction commitment 
sub-index (HRCI) or the nutrition commitment sub-index (NCI) components of the overall 
index. 
)/(
)(
 sCronbach'
2
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COVMN 
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Figure 4.1 Heterogeneous correlation matrix (45 countries, 22 
indicators) 
 
Note: The diagonal of 1s is not marked. The indices are separated into hunger and nutrition commitment sub-indices. 
Figure 4.1 shows that quite a number of indicators are negatively associated with other 
indicators (81 out of a total of 231 are a red shade). These negative values push down the 
average intercorrelation among the HANCI indicators to a low but positive level (0.09). Sub-
index level average intercorrelations, which are tabulated in Table 4.1, suggest that the 
average intercorrelation among indicators within a given sub-index (HRCI or NCI) is higher 
than across sub-indices. This may be interpreted as preliminary statistical evidence 
supporting our theory-based decision to separately account for hunger and nutrition elements 
within the HANCI. 
Table 4.1 Heterogeneous correlations by sub-index 
 HRCI NCI 
HRCI 0.131  
NCI 0.072 0.095 
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Table 4.2 tabulates Cronbach’s alphas based on the heterogeneous correlation matrix for 
HANCI and its sub-indices (HRCI and NCI). The alphas based on heterogeneous correlation 
matrices are identified in the table as ‘Modified α’ to distinguish them from regular alphas 
calculated from Pearson moment correlations which assumes that all indicators are 
continuous. Though both types of alphas are presented in the table for completeness, the 
modified version is more accurate as it uses accurate correlation type for all indicators based 
on their data types. 
Table 4.2 Cronbach’s alphas for HRCI, NCI and HANCI 
 Number of countries Indicators Cronbach’s α Modified Cronbach’s α 
HANCI 45 22 0.5997 0.6852 
HRCI 45 10 0.5205 0.6008 
NCI 45 12 0.4477 0.5588 
The first observation to make from Table 4.2 is that the alphas for HANCI are higher than for 
either of its sub-indices, confirming that hunger reduction commitment and nutrition 
commitment are distinct (albeit related) entities. Because Cronbach alphas should not be 
used as a measure of unidimensionality (Field 2009), HRCI and NCI alphas should not be 
expected to be greater than overall HANCI alpha, to demonstrate statistical evidence for the 
existence of underlying themes/factors. 
Researchers commonly use 0.7 as a rule of thumb cut-off value when using Cronbach’s 
alpha to determine the internal reliability within a set of indicators. Table 4.2 shows that 
HANCI’s modified α misses the 0.7 level by a narrow margin. We are nevertheless confident 
that this is not something to be worried about. There are at least three reasons for not putting 
too much emphasis on the lower than 0.7 alpha. First, there is a substantial literature that 
argues against the blind application of 0.7 cut-off value of Cronbach’s alpha (Cortina 1993; 
Schmitt 1996). This literature clearly shows that factors other than reliability affect alpha 
values. For instance, Cortina (1993) argues that Cronbach’s alpha declines with the number 
of underlying dimensions of the data. For example, 18 indicators with an average 
intercorrelation of 0.3 would have an alpha of 0.88 if the data had just one dimension. 
However, alpha will decline to 0.64 when the dimensions of the data increase from 1 to 3 
while retaining the average intercorrelation at the 0.3 level (Cortina 1993). HANCI currently 
considers that the theoretical construct of political commitment to reduce hunger and nutrition 
is hinged on at least two dimensions – hunger and Undernutrition – although conceivably a 
third dimension involves a commitment to reduce overnutrition.16 
Second, even though we consider all elements of the correlation matrix in Figure 4.1 for 
calculating Cronbach’s alpha many of those are not statistically significant. Figure 4.2 
emphasises this by crossing off correlation values that are not significant at the 5 per cent 
level. Notice that none of the negative correlations are significant. 
                                               
16
 Many developing countries face a double burden of nutrition, where undernutrition goes hand in hand with overnutrition in 
various population groups. HANCI cannot measure levels of government action regarding overnutrition due to the absence of 
comparable data for its countries. 
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Figure 4.2 Heterogeneous correlation matrix (excluding non-significant 
correlations) 
 
Note: The correlations that are not significantly different from 0 at the 5 per cent level are crossed out. The size and colour of the 
circles indicate the size and sign of the correlations. 
Third, upon further analysis, we find that the negative correlation coefficients that drive down 
Cronbach’s alpha values are a consequence of the inclusion of a select number of countries 
with relatively low hunger and undernutrition levels. We examined scatter plots of all pairs of 
variables that had generated negative correlations in a bid to identify outliers. Quite a few of 
these scatter diagrams identified countries that scored low in the Global Hunger Index (GHI) 
i.e. Brazil, China, Peru and South Africa. When these countries were removed from the 
sample the analysis revealed that intercorrelations of most pairs of variables had increased. 
This suggests that our preferred indicators of political commitment interact differently in 
countries with low/moderate incidence of hunger (low GHI scores) compared to countries 
with high GHI scores. 
To examine this further we looked at the change in the internal reliability of the index when 
low GHI countries were removed from the sample. Table 4.3 tabulates Cronbach’s alpha for 
the truncated sample (41 countries – excluding Brazil, China, Peru and South Africa). It also 
includes a modified version of Cronbach’s alpha which is based on the heterogeneous 
correlation matrix. Both versions of the Cronbach alpha strongly suggest that the removal of 
low/medium GHI countries from the sample enhances the internal reliability of HANCI. 
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Table 4.3 raises some interesting questions. It suggests that once countries are relatively 
successful in bringing down hunger and undernutrition (to a certain level which remains to be 
empirically determined), their performance on several commitment indicators used in HANCI 
come down. This may simply be because there is less need for government action. For 
instance, as GDP grows and countries become less dependent on their agricultural 
economies for income and food production, and better able to finance food imports, the 
relative share of public expenditures going to agriculture is likely to come down. This for 
instance seems to be the case for Brazil. 
Table 4.3 HANCI’s internal reliability and country selection 
 Countries Indicators α Modified α 
HANCI 41 22 0.6359 0.7174 
HRCI 41 10 0.4434 0.5414 
NCI 41 12 0.5287 0.6344 
Yet, not all political commitment indicators are equally sensitive to a reduction (or increase) 
of effort when the need for action on hunger and undernutrition reduces (or rises). Take for 
example an indicator like the constitutional protection of the right to food (the variable ‘rtf’): 
once this right materialises, governments are relatively unlikely to revoke it. Constitutional 
law tends to be very robust because amendments require very high levels of political 
consensus that are difficult to achieve. In contrast, programmatic interventions, such as the 
promotion of complementary feeding may be abandoned relatively easily, e.g. once 
complementary feeding is deeply rooted in people’s awareness and everyday child care 
practices. Stopping a programme under such circumstances could be well justified and not 
involve lower political commitment, even though the mechanics of HANCI would interpret it 
as such. 
In all, in this section we have demonstrated that HANCI works empirically, to affirm our 
theory-driven choice of hunger reduction commitment and nutrition commitment sub-indices. 
In the next section we discuss the sensitivity analysis that we conducted. 
4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is used to check the robustness of the index to choices about its 
components or construction. An index is robust if the rankings it generates do not vary 
substantively after small changes in composition or construction. We thus calculate the index 
in different ways and explore correlations between ranks. If the correlation between ranks 
(the Spearman rank) is high the index is said to be robust to the variation. 
We test the robustness of the HANCI, by comparing it with six alternative ways of 
constructing the index (Table 4.4). The HANCI was built with HDI-type normalisation, and 
equally weighted thematic aggregation to produce index scores based on an additive plus 
Borda method. These choices are tabulated in the first row of Table 4.4. The rest of the table 
presents a few of the other ways this index could have been compiled had we made different 
design choices. 
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Table 4.4 HANCI versus HANCI alternatives 
 Normalisation Weighting Aggregation level Aggregation method 
HANCI HDI Equal Theme Additive + Borda 
Alt 1 Standardise Equal Theme Additive + Borda 
Alt 2 HDI Equal Theme Borda + Borda 
Alt 3 HDI Equal Indicator Borda 
Alt 4 HDI Equal Indicator Additive 
Alt 5 HDI PCA Indicator Additive 
Alt 6 HDI Factor Analysis Indicator Additive 
The six alternative specifications presented in Table 4.4 are: 
1. where the normalisation of indicators is done using standardisation (Z scores); 
2. where indicators within each theme is aggregated using the Borda method instead of 
the additive method used in the HANCI; 
3. where aggregation is done at the indicator level using Borda method (in this case 
themes are not considered); 
4. where indicators are aggregated using additive method; 
5. where Principal Components Analysis identifies weights for calculating the index; 
6. where factor analysis-based weights are used in aggregating the indicator. 
Our PCA results suggest that there are nine principle components for the 22 indicators. We 
selected nine components with the support of the scree plot, λ>1 criterion, and explained 
proportion of variance. The factor analysis on the other hand supported the idea that there 
are four underlying factors. 
If HANCI is sensitive to design changes then we expect country ranks to change as a result 
(Table 4.5). 
Table 4.5 tabulates the HANCI ranks as well as the ranks based on the above alternative 
indices. The rankings of HANCI with these alternate rankings are then compared and 
summarised using Spearman rank correlation coefficients, which assess the degree of 
correspondence between rankings. The rank correlations are all above 0.7, which confirms 
that the ranks are robust for all changes discussed here (all of these are significant at the 5 
per cent level). 
As high Spearman correlations can occur in conjunction with significant re-rankings 
(Ravallion 2010) we also assess how design choices affect country re-rankings. As 
expected, the lower the Spearman correlation coefficient of alternative design options, the 
greater variation in country ranks. Alternatives 1 and 2 in particular are highly robust. 
It is however apparent that HANCI rankings seem most sensitive to decisions around 
weights, specifically by means of a Principal Components Analysis and by Factor Analysis. 
This is brought out more clearly in Figure 4.3 where the horizontal bars indicate the HANCI 
rankings and dots the alternative rankings. The white dots are the rankings for when the 
weighting assumption is changed from equal to either PCA-based or Factor Analysis-based. 
Clearly these deviate more. 
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Table 4.5 Comparison of country ranks: HANCI versus alternative 
design options 
 HANCI Alt 1 Alt 2 Alt 3 Alt 4 Alt 5 Alt 6 
Guatemala 1 1 1 1 1 4 6 
Malawi 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 
Madagascar 3 4 5 11 12 15 9 
Peru 4 5 3 4 11 2 18 
Brazil 4 3 4 2 4 5 4 
Philippines 6 7 9 6 6 12 7 
Indonesia 7 7 14 8 3 6 17 
Gambia 8 6 7 5 8 7 2 
Tanzania 8 9 12 17 16 32 25 
Ghana 10 11 10 14 9 18 11 
Burkina Faso 10 10 8 13 13 19 5 
Bangladesh 12 13 10 12 7 14 21 
Mozambique 13 11 6 9 19 11 8 
Vietnam 14 18 17 10 5 8 14 
Rwanda 15 16 15 7 14 10 3 
Mali 16 20 21 20 18 23 19 
Zambia 17 14 13 15 15 16 15 
Cambodia 18 17 20 18 10 9 20 
Nepal 18 23 23 22 17 25 32 
Uganda 20 19 16 16 22 28 29 
Senegal 21 15 18 23 24 3 12 
China 22 25 22 19 21 24 24 
South Africa 23 22 19 21 27 26 10 
Niger 24 21 25 28 23 22 16 
Ethiopia 25 24 24 32 30 44 38 
Sierra Leone 26 28 29 26 20 34 28 
Benin 26 26 27 27 29 31 26 
Pakistan 26 27 26 25 28 40 36 
India 29 28 28 35 38 27 34 
Nigeria 30 31 33 30 26 37 41 
Côte d’Ivoire 31 30 30 24 25 21 22 
Togo 32 33 31 33 33 13 23 
Cameroon 33 32 32 37 37 30 37 
Kenya 34 35 34 31 32 20 35 
Liberia 35 34 36 36 35 17 33 
Lesotho 36 36 40 38 36 36 13 
Afghanistan 36 38 38 40 40 42 44 
Mauritania 38 37 37 29 31 35 27 
Yemen 39 38 39 44 45 41 45 
Sudan 40 41 41 43 39 45 39 
Myanmar 41 40 35 34 34 33 30 
Burundi 42 43 41 41 42 38 31 
Angola 43 42 43 42 41 43 42 
Congo, DR 44 45 45 45 43 29 43 
Guinea Bissau 45 44 44 39 44 39 40 
Spearman rank  0.9895 0.9785 0.9515 0.9442 0.7638 0.7922 
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Figure 4.3 HANCI rank (black bar) versus the ranks of alternative 
indices (circles) 
 
Note: White circles indicate ranks based on alternative weights. 
When employing alternative ranking and normalisation procedures, for developing countries, 
we find Spearman Rank Correlation coefficients that are close to one across the various 
components and that are always significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level. We 
conclude that the HANCI rankings are robust. 
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5 HANCI findings drawing on primary data 
Chapter 5 presents analyses of political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition for 
three case countries: Bangladesh, Malawi and Zambia. These countries were selected as 
high burden countries. The primary data is devised to complement rather than corroborate 
the index. We present new data on important aspects of political commitment on which no 
secondary data is routinely collected. The primary data hence is devised to support in 
country advocacy on hunger and undernutrition (rather than cross-country comparisons). The 
country analyses provide a brief discussion of context, before presenting the findings from 
the primary research conducted with experts and communities. 
5.1 Country analysis: Bangladesh 
Summary 
 HANCI ranking: 12 (out of 45) 
 Hunger: 25 million (17 per cent of population) 
 Stunting: 41 per cent of children under 5 years of age 
 Wasting: 16 per cent of children under 5 years of age. 
5.1.1 Hunger and undernutrition in Bangladesh 
Bangladesh has experienced rapid economic growth and substantial poverty reduction 
successes during the past two decades. Poverty rates declined by 8 per cent between 2005 
and 2010. Per capita GDP doubled between 1990 and 2010, and agricultural growth 
averaged 3.3 per cent per year, due to impressive gains in rice yields (FAO 2012). Current 
estimates indicate that Bangladesh has already achieved a 50 per cent reduction in 
undernourishment and is likely to achieve the same reduction for underweight, meeting the 
hunger target of the first MDG (FAO 2012). Bangladesh has already achieved MDG4 (child 
mortality), and is on track to achieve MDG5 (maternal health) (SUN 2011). 
Bangladesh also performed relatively well in terms of nutrition improvements, particularly in 
the 1990s. Although progress stalled between 1999 and 2004, it has since returned, albeit at 
lower rates than those achieved in the 1990s (FAO 2012). 
Yet, much remains to be done; 25 million Bangladeshis still face hunger. Moreover, the 
distribution of hunger is highly gendered: nearly one-third of women in Bangladesh are 
undernourished (Ahmed, Mahfuz, Ireen et al. 2012). Population growth, vulnerability of 
improved crop varieties to pests and diseases, poor access to food due to poverty, 
deteriorating access to increasingly scarce natural resources, and worsening soil fertility 
pose key challenges to food security (ACF 2012). 
Malnutrition in Bangladesh costs an estimated US$1 billion a year in lost economic 
productivity (FAO 2012). 
Figure 5.1 gives the latest data, drawing on the Bangladesh Demographic and Health 
Surveys. A steady reduction in underweight prevalence has been achieved during 2004–
2011. The prevalence of wasting declined from 1990 to 2000, but then increased steadily 
until 2007 when it reached 17 per cent. 2011 data shows wasting rates stand at 16 per cent, 
still exceeding the emergency threshold (FAO 2012). Nearly one in six children suffers from 
acute shortages in food intake. Deficiencies of micronutrients consumption are widespread in 
Bangladesh. Vitamin A, iron, iodine and zinc deficiencies are of particular relevance to public 
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health, with the prevalence of iron-deficiency anaemia among young infants, adolescent girls 
and pregnant women remaining very high (Ahmed et al. 2012). 
Figure 5.1 Trends in nutritional status of children under five, 
Bangladesh, 2004–2011 
 
Note: Rates are based on WHO Child Growth Standards (BDHS 2011). 
While Bangladesh demonstrated good reductions in stunting rates during the 1990s, recently 
the rate of progress seems to have sharply declined (in 2004–2007 from 51 per cent to 43 
per cent compared to only a 2 per cent reduction in the period 2007–2011). The country-level 
statistics presented above hide regional and urban/rural disparities. Rural children are more 
likely to be stunted than urban children (43 per cent compared with 36 per cent). Moreover, 
children living in some administrative divisions are more affected than others: stunting is 
lowest in Khulna and Rajshahi (34 per cent each) (Ahmed et al. 2012). 
The effects of the global food price crisis (and the cyclone Sidr) are likely to have contributed 
substantially (if only temporarily) reversing progress on undernutrition in the period 2007–
2011. Time will have to tell whether previous stunting reduction trends can be re-established. 
Encouragingly, some of the underlying social factors that help to drive reduced stunting 
outcomes have also seen improvements, notably (FAO 2012): 
 Literacy rates for young females (aged 15–24 years) have doubled, rising from 38 per 
cent in 1991 to 77 per cent in 2009. 
 The coverage of vitamin A supplementation for children aged 6–59 months (which 
started in the 1990s) is now nearly universal, and consumption of iodised salt has 
also increased substantially in recent years. 
 The use of oral rehydration salts to treat diarrhoea has nearly doubled, from 35 per 
cent in 2000 to 68 per cent in 2007. 
 A substantial increase in exclusive breastfeeding during the first six months of life, 
from 43 per cent in 2007 to 64 per cent in 2011. 
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5.1.2 HANCI findings 
In 2012, the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) declared its commitment to food security ‘for 
all people of the country at all times’ (Ahmed et al. 2012). Although not yet an official member 
of the Scaling Up Nutrition movement, the GoB’s commitment to improving nutrition is well 
recognised (SUN 2011). Hunger and nutrition are clearly identified development issues in the 
current Sixth Five Year Plan 2011–2015. The GoB has actively pursued nutrition policies and 
programmes for some time. The Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition Project (BINP), initiated by 
the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) in 1995 had a beneficial impact on 
nutrition outcomes. It was followed in 2002 by the National Nutrition Programme and other 
related programmes including the Health and Population Services Project (1998–2003), the 
Health, Nutrition and Population Sector Project (2003–2011), and the Health, Population and 
Nutrition Sector Development Programme (2011 to 2016) (CSNSI 2012). 
The GoB takes a multi-sectoral approach to nutrition. The National Nutrition Service, situated 
in the MoHFW, coordinates multi-sectoral contributions, and may have a central role in 
mainstreaming nutrition across ministries and health services. Mainstreaming nutrition within 
the existing health system is likely to improve access to nutrition interventions for those living 
in hard to reach areas and the poorest segment of the population. Government efforts also 
invest substantial resources in demand creation for nutrition, through public awareness 
building and community mobilisation (SUN 2011). 
The GoB puts a strong focus on the first 1,000 days of a child’s life, and targeted nutrition 
interventions for scaling up tally with those recommended by the authoritative Lancet series 
on maternal and child undernutrition (SUN 2011). More so, government policy is informed by 
up-to-date and robust evidence. The government has conducted nationally representative 
sampling surveys investigating nutrition statuses in 2004, 2007 and 2011. This compares 
favourably to, for example, India. 
While not all nutrition programmes have yet been implemented at scale to reach the entire 
population (notably programmes against Severe Acute Malnutrition), programmes such as 
the Expanded Programme on Immunization and vitamin A supplementation have been very 
successful (Ahmed et al. 2012). The coverage of vitamin A supplementation in Bangladesh is 
around 90 per cent, one of the highest in the region (SUN 2011). It is now reported that all 
children aged 6–59 months have received two high doses of vitamin A supplements within 
the last year. The coverage of zinc treatment for diarrhoea is 20 per cent, which is the 
highest among countries with high burdens of undernutrition. The GoB is scaling up its infant 
and young child feeding programmes throughout the country and remains committed to 
providing community nutrition interventions provided through community clinics (SUN 2011). 
Exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months, followed by complementary feeding is 
actively promoted. Bangladesh has also taken measures to substantially enshrine the 
provisions of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes in domestic law. 
The budget of the GoB now contains a separate line for nutrition, and this enhances 
transparency and accountability of government spending on nutrition. 
Other government interventions supporting the reduction of hunger and undernutrition 
include substantial investments in agriculture and health. The GoB has successfully 
promoted the adoption of new rice varieties and supported expansion of irrigation 
infrastructure, and these have driven agricultural growth rates of over three per cent per 
annum, which contribute substantially to reduced hunger. The share of government spending 
going to health is about double that of India and Pakistan. Yet, equitable access to adequate 
public health systems needs further strengthening: for instance, 47 per cent of all pregnant 
women are not attended even once by skilled health personnel during pregnancy. 
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The government supports programmes to improve female literacy and gender equity, and 
has also introduced social safety nets for the poor, such as the Vulnerable Group 
Development Scheme (supported by the UN World Food Programme) (CSNSI 2012).17 Yet, 
there are significant funding gaps for social protection programmes. 
The Constitution of Bangladesh enshrines a right to food, and the right to social security. 
Article 15 recognises the fundamental responsibility of the state to secure to its citizens the 
provision of the basic necessities of life including food. There is, therefore, a clear 
commitment on the part of the state to ensure access of food to those who are in need of it 
most. 
While appreciating these various government efforts, clearly more needs to be done as 
hunger and undernutrition remain major challenges. Here we identify some of the areas in 
which further improvements can be achieved that would accelerate hunger and 
undernutrition reduction. First, coverage rates of the civil registration system are still very 
low, at only 10 per cent of the population. Enhancing civil registration may help to improve 
people’s access to essential public services, including health and education. Second, other 
services that need strengthening concern access to improved drinking water (currently 81 
per cent of the population benefits) and improved sanitation (56 per cent). Third, in order to 
reduce women’s disproportionate suffering from and vulnerability to hunger, further 
government action may be taken to effect women’s economic rights, which exist on paper but 
are not effectively enforced (CIRI 2010). Similarly, while women have de jure equal rights to 
access and own productive agricultural land, various discriminatory practices prevent their 
realisation (OECD undated), and thus continue to keep women disproportionally vulnerable 
to hunger. Finally, at a systemic level, improvements in what the World Bank’s World 
Governance Indicators (World Bank 2011) identify as a relatively ineffective public 
governance system are likely to have major impacts on the successful delivery of the various 
government interventions aimed at reducing hunger and undernutrition. 
5.1.3 Expert perceptions of political commitment 
In Bangladesh, 40 experts (30 men, 10 women) were interviewed in the period August–
September 2012 by a team from ActionAid Bangladesh and consultants. This team had also 
conducted the 2011 survey, so it was well-versed in the practicalities of arranging and 
conducting the survey. Efforts were made to obtain a balanced sample with substantial 
representation of government officials, civil society organisations, research and academic 
institutions, international donors and some members of the media. However, the research 
team found it difficult gaining sufficient representation of government officials. All survey 
respondents were selected on the basis of having substantial knowledge and expertise in the 
areas of hunger and nutrition, food policy, agriculture, health and social policy. 
Thanks to the face-to-face interview approach, response levels were very high. On a few 
questions, up to two respondents refrained to answer. Otherwise all questions were 
answered by all respondents. 
One innovation of the 2012 survey (compared to the 2011 survey) is that respondents were 
asked to answer questions separately with reference to (a) hunger and (b) nutrition, in order 
to determine whether there are (different) commitment levels for hunger and undernutrition 
reduction. 
The analysis of expert survey findings is split up: we first discuss the theme of public 
expenditures, and then investigate government policies and programmes. 
                                               
17
 It may be noted that the NGOs in Bangladesh have successfully rolled out substantial social protection schemes, e.g. BRAC’s 
Targeting the Ultra Poor programme. These operate in parallel with government provisioning. 
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Overall, experts consider that current public expenditures by the GoB signal a fair 
commitment to hunger reduction and a mediocre commitment to reduce undernutrition (Table 
5.1). In a country that is frequently plagued by emergencies and natural disasters, budget 
expenditures on hunger are deemed to be sensitive to such events, signalling a level of 
responsiveness of the state to the needs of its citizenry. Budget expenditures on hunger are 
also deemed fairly sensitive to electoral cycles, interestingly suggesting that hunger is a topic 
of relevance in electoral party politics.18 However, spending on hunger and nutrition is too 
often done through non-transparent financing mechanisms. 
Table 5.1 Expert perceptions of public expenditures towards addressing 
hunger and undernutrition, Bangladesh 
Questions* 2011 2012 
Hunger and 
nutrition 
Hunger Nutrition 
To what extent are government policy preferences reflected in 
budget expenditures? 
3.02 2.56 3.08 
How strong or weak would you, in general, characterise the 
government’s absolute (in money terms) budget expenditures 
on hunger and nutrition 
3.05 2.72 3.28 
How reasonable would you, in general, characterise the 
government’s relative budget expenditures on hunger and 
nutrition? 
3.08 – – 
How sensitive are government budget expenditures on hunger 
and malnutrition to electoral cycles? 
2.4 2.40 3.10 
How sensitive are government budget expenditures on hunger 
and malnutrition to emergencies/disasters? 
2.18 1.93 2.78 
How well has the national government developed transparent 
financial mechanisms for earmarked funding 
– 3.38 3.56 
Indicator score (mean of means) 2.75 2.60 3.16 
Note: Mean score: 1 = very strong commitment; 5 = very weak commitment. 
*Tabulated questions are shortened. For full versions, see Annex 2 with questionnaires. 
Also in terms of policies and programmes, experts suggest that the GoB gives somewhat 
stronger attention to hunger than nutrition issues, overall, and for each of the indicators 
(Table 5.2); 85 per cent of experts think that the GoB is giving high to very high priority to 
hunger as a problem. No respondents consider that this is given low priority. No such 
agreement was found for nutrition; while 57.5 per cent of experts consider that the GoB gives 
it high to very high priority, 17.5 per cent of experts argue that the GoB considers nutrition a 
low priority. 
Overall, for the theme of policies and programmes, scores for 2011 and 2012 are not 
significantly different. 
                                               
18
 We interpret sensitivity to electoral cycles as a good thing (signalling responsiveness to voter concerns). A more cynical 
interpretation would be that this constitutes an attempt at manipulating voters. Even if that were to be the case, it affirms hunger 
to be part of party political agendas in Bangladesh. 
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Table 5.2 Expert perceptions of public policies and programmes 
addressing hunger and undernutrition, Bangladesh 
Indicator 2011 2012 
Hunger and 
nutrition 
Hunger Nutrition 
Institutional coordination 2.37 2.75 3.10 
Government intention and action 2.34 2.47 2.74 
Locus of initiative 2.42 1.98  
Analytical rigour 2.50 3.13 3.18 
Learning and adaptation 3.05 2.97 3.09 
Public commitment 3.06 2.43 2.61 
Mobilisation of stakeholders 3.11 2.72 2.92 
Continuity of effort 3.32 2.97 3.28 
Credible incentives 3.90 3.99 4.02 
Political leadership - 2.79 2.90 
Overall score (mean of means) 2.91 2.80 2.96 
Note: Mean score: 1 = very strong commitment; 5 = very weak commitment. 
The GoB regularly conducts nationally representative demographic and health surveys 
(2004; 2007; 2011). Nevertheless, experts considered that there is clear scope for 
strengthening government systems that monitor, evaluate and generate knowledge and 
evidence on hunger and nutrition. They consider current systems to be only ‘somewhat 
developed’ (‘analytical rigour’). 
The successful Bangladesh Infant Nutrition Programme that was developed in the 2000s was 
based on a model developed in Tamil Nadu (India) (Headey 2011). While the GoB has thus 
learnt lessons from other countries in the recent past, the experts consider that the GoB is 
currently neither weak, nor strong on this account (‘learning and adaptation’). This score 
reflects that expert responses were quite divided. 
Policies and programmes are generally carried out by the same ministry, department or 
agency that initiated it, enabling better ownership and implementation (‘locus of initiative’). 
The experts consider that policy and strategic decision-making processes on hunger and 
undernutrition benefit from moderate levels of representation of diverse stakeholders. The 
agencies in charge of these are fairly successful in building broad (political and social) 
support for their policies; implementing agencies find this harder (‘mobilisation of 
stakeholders’). 
GoB ‘intention and action’ is overall considered a little better than mediocre. The mean 
figures in Table 5.2, however, obscure that experts deemed that the GoB gives high priority 
to hunger, and fairly high priority to nutrition. GoB efforts towards achieving declared policy 
goals on flagship policies on food, health, agriculture, nutrition and safety nets are however 
only somewhat adequate, and the implementation of policy efforts is deemed to be mediocre, 
to bring down overall scores for the ‘intention and action’ indicator. 
Institutional coordination is deemed to be somewhat better than mediocre for hunger issues 
and mediocre for nutrition, which are under the respective stewardship of the Department for 
Food and Disaster Management, and the National Nutrition Council and the Ministry of 
Health and Family Welfare. Internationally, weak horizontal coordination of efforts to reduce 
hunger and malnutrition are often remarked on (Chopra et al. 2009; Engesveen et al. 2009); 
this does not sound quite true for Bangladesh. However, experts highlighted that horizontal 
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coordination efforts are stronger than vertical coordination between the central government 
and administrations at the sub-national level. 
Overall the GoB’s ‘public commitment’, openness and accountability to reduce hunger and 
undernutrition are fairly strong. For instance, government documents clearly express policy 
preferences and policy goals for hunger and nutrition. Budget lines are somewhat developed, 
and desirable outcome targets are fairly clearly set. The experts are however quite 
impressed by the way in which the GoB sets out its preferences regarding addressing hunger 
and nutrition in national policy documents: 67.5 per cent of experts consider that this is done 
clearly or very clearly (the remaining group thinks this is done neither clearly nor unclearly). 
Furthermore, 80 per cent and 70 per cent of experts considered that hunger and respectively 
nutrition are expressed strongly or very strongly in national development strategies. 
However, the existing administrative and financial capacity to successfully achieve these 
goals, and the utilisation of these capacities (continuity of effort indicator) is considered to be 
modest. Moreover, the GoB bureaucracy has weakly institutionalised incentives to reward 
good performance and punish weak performance by both individual civil servants and 
bureaucratic agencies in the fight against hunger and undernutrition. 
Finally, we assessed political leadership, which overall was found to be neither weak nor 
strong. This mean score, however, hides a certain political appetite for addressing hunger 
and undernutrition. Indeed, it is clear that hunger and nutrition are part of the development 
agendas of the GoB and its top political leadership. Top-level (presidential/prime ministerial) 
leadership was considered to be strong for hunger, and fairly strong for nutrition. Hunger 
reduction is considered to be fairly well defined in political party manifestos (nutrition less so). 
However, reflecting a polarised political climate, there is no cross-party support for the 
current GoB’s efforts to reduce hunger and undernutrition; over three-quarters of 
respondents felt that weak to very weak support was received from political parties in 
opposition. 
Moreover, senior political leaders are seen to be fairly strong at speaking out publicly against 
hunger and undernutrition. Their statements are, however, considered to be only modestly 
convincing (less so than civil service or civil society leaders); this may be bound up with a 
generic distrust of politicians and their posturing on social issues (this issue was frequently 
raised by poor communities that were consulted). 
Over 75 per cent of experts interviewed noted that politicians, civil society leaders and civil 
servants also have moderate to high levels of factual understanding of the status of hunger 
and nutrition in the country. Senior politicians, however, have only a modest grasp of 
underlying (complex) causal factors, and a fairly weak understanding of possible solutions 
that the government may seek to support for addressing hunger and undernutrition. 
Accordingly, the political appetite for addressing hunger and nutrition may be capitalised on 
by supporting greater efforts to enhance senior politicians’ understanding of its causes and 
solutions. 
In contrast to political leaders and leaders in civil society, government officials are seen to 
have a sound understanding of the causes of, and solutions for, hunger and undernutrition. 
However, they are not deemed to speak out substantially against hunger and undernutrition. 
This could either reflect that civil servants lack the mandate, confidence and/or capacity to 
fulfil such a role. If they are, however, seen as legitimately playing a role in publicly raising 
the issue of hunger and malnutrition, greater support may be given to this facilitate their 
leadership and championing the effort to combat hunger and undernutrition in the country. 
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5.1.4 Community perceptions of political commitment 
As part of the primary research, eight focus group discussions were conducted in four 
locations in Bangladesh: Dhaka (urban), and three rural districts, Nilphamari, Patuakhali and 
Bandarban. Discussions were held with men and women separately. This section briefly 
introduces experiences of hunger and undernutrition in these communities, and then 
highlights how they perceive their government’s intentions and actions towards the reduction 
of hunger and undernutrition. Finally, the communities offer suggestions on a suitable 
weighting scheme for political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition. 
In urban Dhaka, members of the communities are predominantly in the low-paid informal 
sector, whereas those based in rural areas are dependent on agriculture (subsistence and/or 
cash crop farming). All are prone to volatile incomes, and all respondents, including most 
small-scale farmers, depend on market purchases to access food. 
Communities defined hunger as having access to fewer than three meals a day; while 
nutrition deficiency was interpreted as lack of a balanced diet. Community members in all 
areas reported being dependent on meals comprising vegetables and rice. They felt unable 
to afford a balanced diet, which was interpreted as including fish, and felt that this resulted in 
nutritional deficiencies. 
‘Amar shami macher arode kaj kore, kintu jeie rojgar hoi tatey sheie mach kinte 
parena. Taie shak shobji diyeie khawa hoi.’ 
(My husband works in a fish market as a labourer. But with the little earning he 
himself cannot buy fish for the family. That’s why the family mostly lives on vegetable 
and rice.) 
(Female participant, Patuakhali District) 
Some of the consulted communities (including those in the urban area) reported as rarely 
going hungry. However, seasonal hunger is a problem in some of the rural areas, especially 
in the Monga period (September to November), particularly in Nilphamari. This leads 
community members to take out loans or sell their labour in advance (at discounted wage 
rates) to be able to buy food. The members of the community most severely affected in all 
areas are the women who prioritise food for their children and husbands. Even during 
pregnancy women do not eat any extra food, and this is likely to lead to both mother and 
child becoming underweight. 
‘Jokhon gorboboti thaki eki khabar khaie. Ekhon ja khacchi tokhon oiesomoi taie 
khawa lagey. Beshi kore khabar amader ke dibe? Taie to baccha durbol ar pushtihin. 
Porashonai bhalo korena boroloker cheleder moto. Eta ke bujhbe?’ 
(During pregnancy, they eat the same food. Whatever they are having now, they have 
the same then. Who will give them the extra food? That’s why their children are weak 
and suffer from malnutrition; for which they do not do well in education like the 
children of rich class. Who will get this fact?) 
(Female participant, Nilphamari District) 
Government health services, drinking water, sanitation and social security (insurance or 
saving facilities) exist; however, community members noted that these are often in a very 
poor state. 
Moreover, various national government programmes and policies aim to address food 
insecurity throughout Bangladesh. Participants had some awareness of the Vulnerable 
Group Distribution (VGD) and Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) schemes, 100 days 
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guaranteed employment programme, the agriculture subsidy programme and two 
programmes aimed specifically at children. 
The VGD and VGF programmes involve government distribution of food items at subsidised 
rates based on a ration card system. The VGF programme is implemented throughout 
Bangladesh to provide food to low-income and other vulnerable groups who cannot meet 
basic needs for survival due to natural disasters or socio-economic circumstances by means 
of food aid relief during a period of distress. The VGD programme aims to promote self-
reliance among the most vulnerable women, by providing them with food assistance and 
training in alternative livelihood skills. These include training in risk management for natural 
disasters, HIV/AIDS prevention, and enhancing maternal and child health. 
One of the government programmes that communities reported on aims to support families a 
scholarship of Tk100 per month to enable children to attend school regularly. With support 
from the World Food Programme a school feeding programme has also recently started in 
poor areas (where high-energy biscuits are distributed during the break). Community 
members also mentioned the Old Age Allowance and Widow Allowance, which both provide 
a monthly allowance of Tk300 to beneficiaries. The Old Age Allowance is for men over the 
age of 65 and women over the age of 62 whose average annual income is below Tk3,000. 
Widowhood or spousal abandonment are prime eligibility criteria for obtaining the Widow 
Allowance. Focus group participants noted that other than this and birth control programmes, 
no specific programmes or policies support women. 
When asked what actions a government that is politically committed to reducing hunger and 
undernutrition would take, people often responded that adequate policy measures could 
substantially alleviate food insecurity. Notably, communities emphasised that policy 
measures should assist them to engage in productive economic activity, rather than provide 
charitable handouts. Respondents stated that the government should create employment 
(e.g. in the ready-made garments industry) which could benefit both men and women. This 
would allow families to have higher and more stable household incomes, which in turn would 
enable them to eat three times a day (i.e. avoid hunger) and afford more balanced meals. 
Women in these communities also want to have access to free vocational training, which 
would enable them to get work and increase the family’s income flow. They consider this a 
more feasible and enduring solution to hunger and undernutrition than the existing 
programmes. This perspective may well inform prevailing notions that food security 
programmes provide only limited benefit to the poor, because their implementation is subject 
to manipulation by local political leaders. Eligible groups accordingly do not always receive 
the VGD/VGF card. Furthermore, for those with a card, distribution of food is irregular 
(especially in Dhaka) or less than the allocated quota (Patuakhali district). Workers rarely get 
100 days under the 100 days employment scheme, as powerful people get the contracts and 
hire someone else at a lower rate to carry out the work (bodol system). Although the 
government offers subsidies for agriculture for those farmers that open a low-cost bank 
account (Tk10), the poor fail to gain access due to a complex documentation process that 
can only be negotiated with bribes. For those who do receive the subsidy it is often not 
available on time. 
Community members also expressed serious concern about how local leaders can be a 
barrier to access information about the programmes. They find local government officials 
aloof and unresponsive, and feel that they lack the means to reach more senior officials. Due 
to such lack of information, communities remain unaware of programme benefits that they 
are entitled to. 
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‘Ami janina koijon shar pawar kotha. Boley to shudhu 20 ta naam.’  
(I don’t know how many people are supposed to get fertiliser from government; the 
officers say there are only 20 names allocated for it.) 
(Male participant, Bandarban District) 
Furthermore, most consulted communities harbour a deep scepticism about the democratic 
process and political leaders. In election times political representatives make many promises, 
which are considered to be rarely kept. Effective linkages to politicians are therefore rarely 
seen as a viable way of promoting greater food security in the communities. 
‘Jokhoni nirbachon ashey montri minister ra borabori golpo deie, nirbhachon sesh, 
keo naie.’ 
(When the election arrives, ministers start telling stories and giving hope. After the 
election no one cares!) 
Nevertheless, despite their serious concerns about the implementation of food security 
programmes, communities remain remarkably enthusiastic about their (potential) benefits, 
possibly because they notice how some people do benefit (participants who did gain the 
benefits of government programmes, such as agricultural subsidies, argued it to be important 
for enhancing their food security), and how other programmes do function well. Communities 
thus noted that the government programmes aimed at children such as the Tk100 
scholarship per month and the School Feeding Programme are able to deliver their benefits. 
5.1.5 Weighting schemes: community and expert preferences 
Chapter 2 showed how the HANCI research team applied an equal weighting scheme to the 
three themes that constitute the Hunger Reduction Commitment and Nutrition Commitment 
sub-indices. Recognising its subjective nature, we identified alternative weighting schemes 
based on the preferences of (a) experts and (b) communities affected by hunger and 
undernutrition. A simple exercise was devised for experts as part of the questionnaire survey, 
and for community members as part of the focus group discussions. Table 5.3 shows a 
summary of findings. 
Table 5.3 Experts’ and community members’ subjective weighting 
schemes, Bangladesh 
 Legal frameworks Policies and programmes Public expenditures 
Experts 22% 42% 37% 
Communities 24% 53% 23% 
The communities allocated separate scores for hunger and nutrition, which were combined to 
determine the overall weighting scheme. Communities gave even stronger emphasis than 
the experts to policies and programmes (53 per cent), and more emphasis to legal 
frameworks (24 per cent), though less emphasis to public expenditures (23 per cent). Details 
of the weightings allocated in each of the communities consulted can be found in Annex 5. 
Table 5.4 shows a summary of findings. 
Community members favoured policy and programmatic action in the shape of government 
employment creation and provision of social safety nets. Employment creation is seen to 
support household incomes, enhancing their ability to afford three nutritious meals a day for 
all members. 
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Table 5.4 A gendered breakdown of weights, community members, 
Bangladesh 
 Hunger Nutrition 
Legal 
frameworks 
Policies and 
programmes 
Public 
expenditures 
Legal 
frameworks 
Policies and 
programmes 
Public 
expenditures 
Male 19 63 18 30 38 32 
Female 29 50 22 21 60 19 
Total 24 56 20 25 49 26 
Note: Communities were consulted in urban Dhaka, and in Bandarban, Patuakhali and Nilphamari Districts. 
Women participants considered hunger as well as undernutrition to be the consequence of 
households having insufficient income to buy nutritious foods. Safety nets are appreciated as 
a last resort protecting people from hunger. When discussing hunger, women in the hunger-
prone Nilphamari District allocated substantially more points to ‘legal frameworks’. They 
argued that an effective legal framework would help to overcome persistent wage 
discrimination between men and women by putting pressure on employers and enable them 
to stand up against such discrimination. Enhanced wages (equating to the level of men’s 
wages) would help to combat hunger. In Dhaka, men considered that food adulteration and 
usage of harmful preservatives were important nutritional issues, and considered that strong 
legislation was required to address such concerns. This observation is interesting in the 
sense that nutrition seems to be identified as something external to household food and 
caring practices such as breastfeeding, complementary feeding and hygienic food handling. 
Overall, the weighting schemes identified based on the preferences of experts and 
communities are quite different from the equal weighting schemes used by HANCI. 
5.2 Country analysis: Malawi 
Summary 
 HANCI ranking: 2 (out of 45) 
 Hunger: 4 million (23 per cent of population) 
 Stunting: 47 per cent of children under 5 years of age 
 Wasting: 4 per cent of children under 5 years of age. 
5.2.1 Hunger and undernutrition in Malawi 
Malawi has in recent years benefited from substantial agricultural growth. As 80 per cent of 
the population work in agriculture, growth has had substantial impacts on reducing hunger, 
food insecurity and poverty. Malawi is expected to meet the millennium development hunger 
target by 2015 (FAO 2012). Poverty incidence has dramatically declined from 65 per cent in 
2004 to about 39 per cent of the population in 2010 (SUN 2011), yet remains high. Around 
23 per cent of people in Malawi suffer from chronic hunger (FAO 2012). Undernutrition also 
remains a major challenge. 47 per cent of children under five are stunted (low height for 
age), 4 per cent are wasted (low weight for height), and 13 per cent are underweight 
(MEASURE DHS 2011). 
Considerable gains in child survival and maternal health have translated into a small drop in 
the prevalence of underweight children in recent years. Yet, reductions in stunting rates have 
been worryingly low (Figure 5.2), from 53 to 47 per cent between 2004 and 2010, to remain 
among the highest in the continent. Wasting rates have decreased from 6 to 4 per cent in this 
period (MEASURE DHS 2011). 
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Figure 5.2 Trends in nutritional status of children under five, Malawi, 
2004–2010 
 
MDHS 2010. 
These statistics hide some gender and regional disparities. While boys and girls are equally 
likely to be wasted (4 per cent each), male children are more likely to be stunted (51 per 
cent) and underweight (14 per cent) than female children (43 and 12 per cent respectively). 
Children in rural areas are more likely to be wasted (4 per cent), stunted (48 per cent) and 
underweight (13 per cent) than those in urban areas (2, 41 and 10 per cent respectively). 
Stunting is high in all regions; however, there are small regional variations for wasting and 
underweight levels. The Central and Southern Regions have levels of wasting that are the 
same as the national average (4 per cent); whereas, the percentage of children wasted in the 
Northern Region is lower than average (2 per cent). Children in the Central and Southern 
Regions are the most likely to be underweight (14 and 13 per cent respectively). Eight per 
cent of children under five years in Malawi are overweight (MEASURE DHS 2011). 
High prevalence of micronutrient deficiency disorders such as anaemia and vitamin A 
deficiency also poses a major challenge (in a context of high HIV/AIDS incidence); 55 per 
cent of children between 6 and 59 months suffer from anaemia, and so do 13 per cent of 
pregnant women (SUN 2011). 
5.2.2 HANCI findings 
The Government of Malawi (GoM) joined the SUN Movement in March 2011 to underline its 
political commitment to enhance food security and nutrition. The GoM has undertaken a wide 
range of interventions aiming to improve hunger and undernutrition. Accordingly, nutrition is a 
priority area in the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy. Various policies are put in 
place, such as a National Nutrition Policy and Strategic Plan (2007–2012), a Food and 
Nutrition Security Policy (2005), a Food Security Policy (2006), a Food Security Action Plan 
(2008) and an Agriculture and Food Security Strategic Plan (2007–2012). 
The GoM takes a multi-sectoral approach to nutrition. It has received high-level political 
endorsement; the Department of Nutrition, HIV and AIDS (DNHA), which implements the 
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National Nutrition Policy and Strategic Plan, is situated in the Office of the President and 
Cabinet. Nutrition has been integrated in sector-wide approaches of Ministries of Agriculture; 
Gender and Youth; Health; Education; Information; Water and Irrigation; Natural Resources; 
and Local Government (SUN 2011). Nutrition is therefore increasingly integrated in key 
sectoral policies such as the cross-sectoral policy and strategy for HIV/AIDS and Agriculture 
(2003), the National School Health and Nutrition Strategic plan (2009–2018) and a draft 
social protection policy (2012–2016). 
Such a multi-sectoral approach requires effective coordination between agencies and 
between different administrative levels. Inspired by the SUN Movement, Malawi has set up 
multi-sectoral task force committees (with members from public and private sectors, civil 
society and development partners) to coordinate planning and implementation of the SUN-
1000 Special Days programme (SUN 2011). A SUN Core team (with a key role for the 
DNHA, whose Secretary chairs the National Nutrition Committee ) has also been established 
to steer the district-level roll-out of the programme, using similar multi-sectoral approaches 
during implementation (SUN 2013). This approach seeks to increase sector alignment at the 
district and community level. Multi-sectoral cooperation is reflected at the district level by the 
involvement of relevant officers, and at the community level through extension workers and 
frontline practitioners from the agriculture, health, education and development sectors (web 
appendix to Gillespie et al. 2013). 
The National Nutrition Committee19 leads coordination on nutrition among technical 
specialists and development partners. Its main function is to mobilise resources and support 
for the implementation of nutrition interventions to be in line with the country’s National 
Nutrition Policy and Strategic Plan, monitor progress and evaluate impact. 
The budget of the GoM contains a separate line for nutrition (SUN 2011), and this enhances 
transparency and accountability of government spending on nutrition. Nutrition policy in 
Malawi is also informed by up-to-date and robust evidence. The government has conducted 
nationally representative sampling surveys investigating nutrition statuses in 2004 and 2010. 
A number of programmes are implemented to address improved maternal nutrition and care; 
improved infant and young child feeding practices; improved intake of essential 
micronutrients; prevention and treatment of common infectious diseases; and improved 
management of acute malnutrition. The 1,000 Special Days National Education and 
Communication Strategy (2012–17) has been developed to tackle high stunting rates. This 
community-based action programme uses a strong behaviour-change and awareness-raising 
approach to enhance ‘demand for nutrition’. It has set a target of bringing down stunting rates 
of children under two years of age to under 20 per cent (SUN 2013). The community-based 
approach has significantly scaled up good nutritional practices in all districts of Malawi, 
including the treatment of severe acute malnutrition (SUN 2012a). 
National guidelines have been issued to promote good nutritional practices, micronutrient 
provision and therapeutic treatment of acute malnutrition. The GoM is currently developing a 
Nutrition Act and already has put into place legislation incorporating provisions of the 
International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes; covering salt iodisation; and 
maternity leave (for women in the formal economy).20 A successful vitamin A 
supplementation programmes is now reaching 96 per cent of children between 6 and 59 
months with two high doses (2009 figures) (UNICEF 2012a). Significant progress is also 
                                               
19
 The National Nutrition Committee is chaired by the Secretary for Nutrition, HIV and AIDS in the Office of the President and co-
chaired by UNICEF. 
20
 The New Labour Act in Malawi has increased maternity leave to 90 days (12 weeks) in the public sector and 60 days (8 
weeks) in the private sector. This increase does not achieve the 14 weeks recommended by the International Labour 
Organization and does not cover the great majority of women workers in the informal economy. 
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achieved in exclusive breastfeeding rates, covering, by 2010, 72 per cent of infants up to five 
months of age (2010 data, in SUN 2011; SUN 2012a). 
Malawi makes substantial investments in health and agriculture, resulting in important 
improvements in hunger outcomes. Agricultural spending amounts to 12.2 per cent of its 
public expenditures. Malawi is hence one of the few countries exceeding the 10 per cent 
commitment under the African Union’s Maputo Declaration. Malawi has pioneered 
agricultural policies (in many instances defying aid donors) that have successfully enhanced 
agricultural productivity of staple crops such as maize among smallholder farmers. The GoM 
has supported crop diversification, small-scale irrigation, and improving local market systems 
and its Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) has gained particular international 
recognition. Introduced in 2006, FISP provides subsidised fertilisers and seeds, targeting the 
most vulnerable smallholder farming households, to dramatically enhance food security 
(SUN 2011; Chinsinga 2012a). Investments in health amount to 14.2 per cent of government 
budgets. An impressive rate of 92 per cent of all pregnant women are attended at least once 
by skilled health personnel during pregnancy. 
While appreciating these various government efforts, clearly more needs to be done, as 
hunger and undernutrition remain major challenges. Here we identify some of the areas in 
which further improvements can be achieved that would accelerate hunger and 
undernutrition reduction. First, while the Constitution of Malawi enshrines a right to food and 
the right to social security, women’s economic rights and agricultural property rights can be 
strengthened to reduce their vulnerability to hunger. Some economic rights for women exist 
on paper, though they are not effectively enforced (CIRI 2010). Similarly, while women have 
de jure equal rights to access and own productive agricultural land, various discriminatory 
practices prevent their realisation (OECD undated). Second, key services that need 
strengthening to enhance people’s access concern improved drinking water (currently 83 per 
cent of the population benefits) and improved sanitation (51 per cent). Third, while there are 
some efforts at piloting donor-funded social protection programmes in selected districts and 
for selected groups (children, labour-incapacitated people), Malawi’s welfare regime is still in 
its infancy, perhaps unsurprisingly given its low wealth (Malawi’s GNI per capita amounts to a 
mere $870). Consequently, social assistance and social insurance mechanisms that can 
address widespread poverty and that can manage vulnerability to impoverishment and 
hunger are as yet weakly developed. Finally, there is substantial scope for enhancing 
coverage rates of the civil registration system; currently only half of the population is covered. 
Enhancing civil registration may help to improve people’s access to essential public services, 
including health and education, and (once in place) social protection. 
5.2.3 Expert perceptions of political commitment 
In Malawi, 53 experts (41 men, 12 women) were interviewed in the period August–
September 2012 through a local team of consultants. Experts were carefully selected to 
ensure a balanced sample with substantial representation of government officials, civil 
society organisations, research and academic institutions, international donors, and some 
members of the media. Survey respondents were selected on the basis of having substantial 
knowledge and expertise in the areas of hunger and nutrition, food policy, agriculture, health 
and social policy. Thanks to the face-to-face interview approach, response levels were very 
high. 
Our analysis of expert survey findings first discusses the theme of public expenditures, and 
then investigates government policies and programmes. 
Overall, experts consider that current public expenditures by the Government of Malawi are 
strong (2.05), whereas public expenditures for nutrition are considered mediocre (2.92) 
(Table 5.5). Hunger reduction budgets were considered to be more clearly developed. 
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Respondents noted that nutrition funding is fragmented and located in various agencies, 
such as in the Ministry of Health and in the Department of Nutrition, HIV and AIDS (Office of 
the President). Transparent financial mechanisms are also more developed for hunger than 
for nutrition. Possibly, at the time of the survey, not all respondents were yet aware of a 
newly introduced nutrition budget line by the GoM. 
Table 5.5 Expert perceptions of public expenditures towards addressing 
hunger and undernutrition, Malawi 
 Hunger Nutrition 
Q25. To what extent are government policy preferences for addressing hunger 
is reflected in budget expenditures 
1.56  
Q25. To what extent are government policy preferences for addressing nutrition 
reflected in budget expenditures 
 2.73 
Q26. How well has the national government developed transparent financial 
mechanisms for earmarked hunger funding 
2.36  
Q26. How well has the national government developed transparent financial 
mechanisms for earmarked for nutrition funding 
 2.78 
Q27. How government absolute expenditure on hunger can be characterised 2.09  
Q27. How government absolute expenditure on nutrition can be characterised  3.13 
Q28. Sensitivity of government budget expenditures on hunger to electoral 
cycles 
1.80  
Q28. Sensitivity of government budget expenditures on hunger to 
emergencies/disasters 
2.43  
Q28 Sensitivity of government budget expenditures on nutrition to electoral 
cycles 
 3.02 
Q28. Sensitivity of government budget expenditures on nutrition to 
emergencies/disasters 
 2.96 
Indicator score (mean of means) 2.05 2.92 
Note: Mean score: 1 = very strong commitment; 5 = very weak commitment. 
Strikingly, nutrition policy preferences are deemed to be much less well represented in 
budgets than hunger policy preference. The latter are deemed strong to very strong; the 
former fairly mediocre. Somewhat similarly, absolute budgets for hunger are deemed strong, 
while budgets for nutrition are neither weak nor strong. 
In Malawi, hunger and food security are deemed highly political. Government action on 
hunger, unlike nutrition, decides elections. In the mid-2000s, the late President Mutharika 
won elections due to the introduction of subsidised fertiliser and seed inputs for smallholder 
farmers through FISP. FISP is now considered to be at the heart of the social contract 
between the state and its citizens (Chinsinga 2012b). Budget expenditures on hunger are 
also found to be highly sensitive to electoral cycles, indeed more so than to emergencies and 
disasters. Yet, the situating of the national coordinating body on nutrition within the Office of 
the President perhaps suggests that nutrition is gaining the attention of the highest political 
leadership. 
For the policies and programmes theme, overall, experts scored the GoM as fairly strongly 
committed to reducing hunger (2.34) and undernutrition (2.60). This seems to affirm the high 
commitment ranking in the HANCI. Similar to Bangladesh, on all indicators, commitment 
levels are considered equal or somewhat higher for hunger reduction than for improving 
nutrition. Table 5.6 presents a summary of findings. The text, where relevant, also references 
respondent scores on underlying questions that compose the indicators. 
 61 
Table 5.6 Expert perceptions of public policies and programmes 
addressing hunger and undernutrition, Malawi 
 Hunger Nutrition 
Institutional coordination 2.13 2.57 
Government intention and action 2.13 2.55 
Locus of initiative 1.66 1.66 
Analytical rigour 2.15 2.69 
Learning and adaptation 2.31 2.51 
Public commitment 1.94 2.31 
Mobilisation of key stakeholders 2.31 2.46 
Continuity of effort 2.38 2.76 
Credible incentives 3.66 3.76 
Political leadership 2.74 2.74 
Mean of means 2.34 2.60 
Note: Mean score: 1 = very strong commitment; 5 = very weak commitment. 
The strongest commitment scores were given to the ‘locus of initiative’. Policies and 
programmes are generally carried out by the same ministry, department or government 
agency that initiates these, thus enabling better ownership and implementation. 
GoM ‘intention and action’ is overall considered fairly strong (nutrition) to strong (hunger). 
Experts considered that hunger in particular is seen as a strong to very strong policy priority 
(nutrition = fairly strong priority). This is for instance reflected in the Farm Input Subsidy 
Programme. FISP strongly focuses on maize production. Legumes are also included but 
receive much less attention, and FISP does little to promote crop diversification. 
Translating good commitment levels into improved hunger and nutrition outcomes is 
somewhat hampered by the quality of policy implementation. While hunger policies are seen 
to be implemented fairly well, for nutrition this is only mediocre. Particularly for nutrition 
therefore, capitalising on commitment may require supporting the effective functioning of 
policy and programme delivery mechanisms. 
‘Public commitment’ to reducing hunger is considered strong, and to improving nutrition as 
fairly strong. GoM policy documents clearly express priorities, goals and desired outcomes 
regarding hunger and undernutrition reduction. Whereas hunger budgets are clearly set out, 
this is considered much less the case for nutrition (again, at the time of the survey, not all 
respondents were yet aware of the newly introduced nutrition budget line by the GoM). Public 
policies are also considered to be fairly open to public scrutiny. 
On the ‘continuity of efforts’ indicator, the GoM again does fairly well, although again stronger 
for hunger than for nutrition. The GoM is seen to make fair use of existing capacities to 
address hunger and undernutrition and also invests fairly well in enhanced financial and 
administrative capacities. 
The experts consider that the GoM has developed strong horizontal coordination 
mechanisms for hunger issues and fairly strong mechanisms for nutrition (‘institutional 
coordination’). A coordinated approach through established structures such as Joint Task 
Force on Food Security and Nutrition across various government departments and agencies 
is deemed successful. Vertical coordination between the national government and sub-
national forms of government is also fairly strong, though improvements could be made. 
Experts noted that, for instance, the Office of President and Cabinet has a Department of 
Nutrition, HIV and AIDS at national level but no decentralised structure, and accordingly work 
with Ministry of Agriculture officials at local level. These coordination mechanisms also help 
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to achieve fairly good levels of representation of a wide range of stakeholders and assist 
gaining broad social and political support for the policies and programmes (‘political 
mobilisation’). 
The GoM has conducted nationally representative demographic and health surveys (2004; 
2010), and the evidence generated by these is potentially critical for informed public policy. 
Experts considered that government systems that monitor, evaluate and generate knowledge 
and evidence on hunger are strong. For nutrition, such mechanisms are less well developed, 
and considered only somewhat better than mediocre (‘analytical rigour’). Moreover, the GoM 
is deemed fairly strong at learning from and adapting policies and programmes in the light of 
new evidence (‘adaptation and learning’). 
The experts allocated the weakest aggregate scores to ‘political leadership’ and to ‘credible 
incentives’. Nevertheless, top-level (presidential) political leadership in the country on hunger 
is strong (1.76), and on nutrition also fairly strong (2.25). Senior political leaders speak out 
fairly strongly against hunger and undernutrition, although their public statements are only 
little more than moderately convincing. Leaders are seen to have only a little better than 
mediocre (2.75) understanding of the status; a mediocre understanding of causal factors 
(2.94) leading to hunger and undernutrition; and a fairly weak (3.38) understanding of 
potential solutions for these. 
Whereas we have seen that government hunger budgets are highly sensitive to elections, 
the electoral manifestos of political parties weakly (3.68) define desirable nutrition outcomes, 
whereas hunger outcomes are defined somewhat better (2.87). Nutrition is seen to be less 
amenable to political messaging than hunger. For instance, it is much easier to campaign on 
whether households have enough food to eat and whether they are harvesting enough, than 
on the subtleties of whether people have access to those foods needed to meet dietary 
requirements. Interestingly, weak attention to hunger (and nutrition) in political party 
manifestos (including of the ruling party) contrasts with the high sensitivity of government 
hunger budgets to elections. 
Finally, while experts considered that overall the GoM is showing (fairly) strong commitment 
to reduce hunger and undernutrition, the ‘credible incentives’ indicator was a major 
discrepancy. Experts thus considered that there are (fairly) weak institutional incentives to 
reward good performance and punish weak performance by both individual civil servants and 
bureaucratic agencies in the fight against hunger and undernutrition. 
5.2.4 Community perceptions of political commitment 
As part of the primary research, focus group discussions were conducted in Balaka 
(Southern Region) and Kasungu (Central Region) districts. Discussions were held in 
Mphamba and Chitenje villages (Kasungu) and Ntalika and Gibson villages (Balaka). 
Discussions were held with men and women separately. This section briefly introduces 
experiences of hunger and undernutrition in these communities, and then highlights how they 
perceive their government’s intentions and actions towards the reduction of hunger and 
undernutrition. Finally, the communities offer suggestions on a suitable weighting scheme for 
political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition. 
Community members in all four localities are predominantly subsistence farmers, growing 
maize, pigeon peas and sweet potatoes, although cash crops such as tobacco (in Kasungu 
District) or cotton (in Balaka District) are also cultivated. At the beginning of the harvest 
season, some people sell some of their food produce in order to get income to purchase 
other necessities. If the food produced is not adequate to last until the next harvesting 
season, food is purchased from the market using loans, proceeds from cash crops, casual 
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work (collecting mandasi reeds and firewood) or casual labour (ganyu) on other farmers’ land 
in exchange for food. 
Hunger and undernutrition are a regular feature of life in rural Malawi, particularly in the lean 
season prior to the harvest. Balaka District is prone to drought, and agricultural production is 
vulnerable to adverse weather events. In Kasungu District, the 2011/12 maize harvest was 
badly damaged by unseasonal rainstorms. The communities understood hunger as the 
absence of food, with households reducing the number of meals consumed per day or going 
to bed without any food at all. Malnutrition was defined as resulting from consuming 
inadequate food groups. The poor, people living with HIV and AIDS, the elderly, widows and 
people with disabilities are seen as the most vulnerable to hunger and undernutrition. 
With the HIV epidemic, we are keeping a lot of orphans in our homes. I keep six 
orphans for example. That makes my family one of twelve people including myself 
and my wife. I cannot make it. 
(Male participant, Balaka District) 
The community members identified various services and programmes run by the GoM. 
Government health facilities are free of charge, yet not always easily accessible. Some 
community members in Balaka District have to travel 20km for the nearest facility. Similarly, 
safe drinking water is not always available. Women fetching water either queue for the single 
borehole in the village or use the wet lands and shallow wells as their water source. 
Boreholes also tend to run dry for parts of the year (Kasungu). In Balaka, water is freely 
accessed from taps. Nonetheless, in periods of drought, villagers resort to drinking river 
water. 
Community members benefit from various government programmes, notably the Farm Input 
Subsidy Programme (FISP) and the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC). 
Relief food, irrigation programmes, food for work programmes, the school feeding 
programme, and the ‘good health’ programme were also mentioned as government initiatives 
relevant for addressing hunger and undernutrition. 
The FISP targets smallholder farmers and poor, vulnerable groups such as female- or child-
headed families and the elderly. It provides coupons for subsidised fertiliser and seeds 
(mainly for maize, sometimes also for legumes and cotton). Community members critically 
appreciate the FISP for enabling beneficiaries to enhance farm productivity. However, they 
also agree that the programme is poorly run, and that the majority of the programme’s 
intended beneficiaries hardly benefit. There are too many potential beneficiaries and, 
although the poor are notionally targeted, it is mostly the well-to-do in their community that 
receive the coupons, with traditional leaders implicated in the maladministration of the 
scheme. 
I really wished I benefited from the government farm input subsidies programme. 
Here, local chiefs are pivotal in the management of the programme but there is a lot 
of corruption that those of us that are not well known are usually left out. 
(Female participant, Kasungu District) 
Our chiefs distribute coupons for subsidised farm inputs but the problem is that the 
coupons are just so few when those who qualify to benefit are in thousands. 
(Female participant, Kasungu District) 
Women in Balaka District also recounted how timely emergency food transfers, provided by 
the MVAC during the 1 to 3 months ‘hungry season’, made a big difference. The food 
transfer, in the form of 50kg of maize, 5kg of beans, 2l cooking oil and 10kg of soya flour, 
made it possible for beneficiary households to avoid engaging in distress labour in other 
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people’s fields (ganyu). This critically allowed them to focus on their own crops, to ensure 
better harvests and reduce their future vulnerability to hunger. 
... everyone should stand up for themselves... 
(Female participant, Balaka District) 
While the MVAC is much appreciated, overall the communities stressed that they should be 
encouraged to grow their own food crops rather than relying on handouts. The effective 
scaling up of the FISP and reforming its inefficient administration was seen as critical to this 
objective. Farmers opined that the procedures for identification, selection, allocation and 
distributions of coupons should be transparent enough so that every farmer has an equal 
chance of receiving the subsidised fertiliser. It was also suggested that government assist 
farmers to organise themselves into clubs to facilitate receipt or purchase of fertiliser, or to do 
away with the targeting mechanism. 
... I really wish I had access to fertilisers. God willing, I could work out miracles, 
produce whatever I can to be able to support my children. I really want them well fed 
and going to school. I would like to contribute to ending malnutrition which is rampant 
in this area. 
(Female participant, Kasungu District) 
Participants overall were adamant that the government must support communities in their 
struggle against hunger and malnutrition through various means. The government could give 
greater support for access to reliable cotton pesticides; ensure functional Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) depots; invest in irrigation; improve 
easy access to safe water and health facilities; ensure effective laws to safeguard the natural 
environment; and provide relief food when required. Agricultural extension officers could 
support communities with good and nutritious farming practices. 
I request government to send us counsellors who would help us with knowledge on 
how to encounter these problems. I hate wanting for basics of life. 
(Female participant, Kasungu District) 
Some members noted that real progress would entail moving towards a less agricultural 
economy, with the government promoting small business and creating job opportunities. 
In this area, we would have loved government to bring in new methods of uplifting our 
lives. It is clear that farming alone is not the way out. We need introduction of new 
methods of survival. 
(Male participant, Balaka District) 
Community members identified various channels through which they can raise hunger and 
undernutrition concerns with the government. These include extension advisors, members of 
parliament (MPs), politicians, traditional leaders, the Village Development Committee (VDC) 
and Area Development Committee (ADC). Participants, however, noted that these channels 
are often ineffective, and political leaders remain aloof to their problems. 
Political leaders have let us down. We just hear them speak on the radios but we 
don’t see how we are benefiting from them... When we elect these leaders, they 
forget about us and disappear in towns... They are not interested in us... As villagers, 
there is nothing we can do about these disappointing leaders. We are suffering. 
(Male participant, Balaka District) 
Even the member of parliament for this area has never come here to inquiry about 
our situation with regard to food shortage. 
(Female participant, Balaka District) 
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...they [MPs] stay in town and get fat from drinking tea with milk while we languish 
here with hunger... 
(Male participant, Balaka District) 
My own children are malnourished and I am worried because there is very little I can 
do about it. We ask government to come in and assist... I wish these leaders came to 
hear from us what we are going through and see how they can assist us. 
(Participant, Balaka District) 
5.2.5 Weighting schemes: community and expert preferences 
Chapter 2 showed how the HANCI research team applied an equal weighting scheme to the 
three themes that constitute the Hunger Reduction Commitment and Nutrition Commitment 
sub-indices. Recognising its subjective nature, we identified alternative weighting schemes 
based on the preferences of (a) experts and (b) communities affected by hunger and 
undernutrition. A simple exercise was devised for experts as part of the questionnaire survey, 
and for community members as part of the focus group discussions. Table 5.7 shows a 
summary of findings. 
Table 5.7 Experts’ and community members’ subjective weighting 
schemes, Malawi 
 Legal frameworks Policies and programmes Public expenditures 
Experts 20% 50% 30% 
Communities 22% 46% 32% 
Expert and community scores are remarkably similar, and distinctly different from equal 
weighting. The communities allocated separate scores for hunger and nutrition, which were 
combined to determine the overall weighting scheme. 
Details of the weightings allocated in each of the communities consulted can be found in 
Annex 5. Table 5.8 shows a summary of findings. 
Community members favoured policy and programmatic action, particularly in the shape of 
an expanded and better functioning FISP, and also in MVAC. Government expenditures are 
critical for this, and for preventing officials from becoming corrupt. The men in Kasungu 
allocated 40 per cent weight to expenditure, arguing that this underpinned the functioning of 
clinical care and food supplements for malnourished children. Children can be taken care of 
in hospitals for a period up to a month. Overall, legal frameworks received low scores, 
because participants were not familiar with laws in Malawi that could protect them from 
hunger or malnutrition. Women in Kasungu allocated only 15 per cent towards that with 
specific mention that the funds could be utilised to sensitise them if any such laws existed. 
The men’s group in Balaka, however, considered that legislation may make the introduction 
of a school feeding programme inevitable, and therefore allocated substantial weight to it. 
They felt this would ensure that their children would benefit from healthy growth with diets 
meeting diverse dietary needs. 
Table 5.8 A gendered breakdown of weights, community members, 
Malawi 
 Hunger Nutrition 
Legal 
frameworks 
Policies and 
programmes 
Public 
expenditures 
Legal 
frameworks 
Policies and 
programmes 
Public 
expenditures 
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Male 17 50 33 32 38 30 
Female 17 50 33 17 50 33 
Total 17 50 33 25 44 31 
Note: Communities were consulted in rural Balaka and Kasungu Districts. 
Women’s groups considered that the government should give equal priority to issues of 
hunger and malnutrition because in either case women suffer more than men. Women carry 
the burden of care for their households, struggle more if food is not readily available in their 
homes and stay longer periods in hospitals tending to malnourished children. During periods 
of hunger women are forced to go out and look for casual work in Balaka town, and some 
engage in sex work to get money to purchase food for their children. The group in Balaka 
further argued that nutrition disorders are also common among expectant and lactating 
mothers in the area resulting in unhealthy children, maternal morbidity and mortality. 
5.3 Country analysis: Zambia 
Summary 
 HANCI ranking: 17 (out of 45) 
 Hunger: 6 million (47 per cent of population) 
 Stunting: 45 per cent of children under 5 years of age 
 Wasting: 5 per cent of children under 5 years of age. 
5.3.1 Hunger and undernutrition in Zambia 
Following a period of steady economic development, Zambia is now classified as a lower 
middle income country (World Bank 2012); however, Zambia is making insufficient progress 
towards MDG1 (FAO 2012). Zambia faces major development challenges including 
widespread poverty, HIV and AIDS, and food and nutrition insecurity. 
Zambia is facing an ‘alarming’ hunger and undernutrition situation (WHH/IFPRI/Concern 
2012). Hunger is highly prevalent: 47.4 per cent of people were undernourished in Zambia 
during the period 2010-2012 (FAO 2012). Household surveys report even higher figures: 58 
per cent of families reported that within a year they cannot always afford three meals a day 
(Chibuye 2011). 
At 45 per cent, stunting rates are among the highest in the world (SUN 2011; MEASURE 
DHS 2007); 5 per cent of children under five suffer from wasting and 15 per cent are 
underweight (MEASURE DHS 2007). Male children are more likely to be stunted (48 per cent 
compared with 42 per cent), wasted (6 per cent compared with 5 per cent) and underweight 
(17 per cent compared with 13 per cent) than female children. Zambia has high geographic 
variety in undernutrition. Stunting in children under five years of age is highest in Luapula 
Province (56 per cent) and lowest in Western and Southern provinces (36 per cent each). 
There is a small difference in wasting levels of urban (4 per cent) and rural children (6 per 
cent). At the provincial level, Western, North-Western, Northern, Luapula, and Central 
provinces reported wasting levels that are above the national average (5 per cent). The 
proportion of underweight children is higher in rural areas than in urban areas. Children in 
Lusaka are the least likely (10 per cent) to be underweight, while children in the North-
Western Province are the most likely (20 per cent). 
More than one in ten babies is born with low birth weight indicating poor maternal nutrition. 
(SUN 2011). One in ten women are undernourished or thin, and about one in five (19 per 
cent) are overweight or obese. Women in rural areas (11 per cent) are more likely to be 
underweight than those in urban areas (8 per cent), while women in the North-Western and 
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in Western provinces are more likely to be underweight than those in other provinces (14 per 
cent each) (MEASURE DHS 2007). 
Figure 5.3 shows key temporal trends in child nutrition in Zambia. 
Figure 5.3 Nutrition trends in children under 5 years of age, Zambia, 
1992–2007 
 
Source: Zambia Demographic and Health Surveys (MEASURE DHS 2007). 
Figure 5.3 shows that since the early 1990s, wasting levels have remained largely stagnant. 
Negative trends for stunting and underweight levels reached a nadir in the early 2000s and a 
corner seems to have been turned since. However, latest data is now over five years old, 
and unlikely to fully capture the negative impacts of the global food price crisis (commencing 
in 2007). 
Vitamin A and iron-deficiency anaemia affects over half of all Zambian children (SUN 2011). 
Progress is underway though. In 2009, 92 per cent of children from 6 to 59 months received 
two high doses of vitamin A supplements (SUN 2011). Exclusive breastfeeding also shows a 
positive trend. About six in ten (61 per cent) infants below six months of age are exclusively 
breastfed, up from 40 per cent in 2001–2002 (MEASURE DHS 2007). 
 
Zambia joined the SUN Movement in December 2010 (SUN 2011) and is aligning its National 
Food and Nutrition Strategic Plan with SUN objectives. The Government’s commitment to 
increasing food and nutrition security is further demonstrated by its signing of the Compact 
for the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) in January 
2011 (SUN 2012a). The Government of Zambia (GoZ) considers food and nutrition as 
priorities in the Fifth and the Sixth National Development Plans (SUN 2011). In 2008, the 
GoZ launched a National Food and Nutrition Policy. A National Food and Nutrition Strategic 
Plan 2011–15 strategically focuses on child stunting and a child’s first 1,000 days (Harris and 
Drimie 2012). Zambia also has several sectoral nutrition interventions. These include the 
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integration of nutrition within primary health care services, and include: a national 
breastfeeding programme; growth monitoring and promotion; universal child immunisation; a 
vitamin A supplementation programme; supplementary feeding for malnourished children; 
promotion of consumption of micronutrient-rich foods; and community-based nutrition (Harris 
and Drimie 2012). 
As in Malawi, a Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP) run by the Ministry of Agriculture 
provides subsidised seed and fertiliser to farmers in order to promote food security. A 
separate intervention, the Food Security Pack (FSP) aims to provide a basic level of farm 
inputs to households in need, encourage crop diversification, and promote conservation 
farming practices (Harris and Drimie 2012). 
5.3.2 HANCI findings 
Zambia invests substantially in health services (15.6 per cent of public spending). One 
positive outcome of this is that a very high percentage (94 per cent) of women are attended 
at least once during pregnancy by skilled health personnel (nurse, doctor or midwife). 
Zambia also invests fairly well in agriculture (8.3 per cent), although the latter does not 
achieve the 10 per cent commitment target agreed as part of the 2003 Maputo Declaration of 
the African Union. 
Nevertheless, public agricultural research and extension have made major efforts to improve 
the participation of poor farmers in setting priorities and allocating funds. Direct demand-led 
and pluralistic approaches to extension are used and the extension system has been 
improved and is trying to extend its outreach to poor farmers. Some policies, strategies and 
mechanisms have been put in place to support women farmers having equal access to 
extension services (either public or private). A majority of rural poor households have access 
to some land, though this access is not always secure. However, vulnerable groups such as 
women and indigenous populations do not always enjoy the same access to land as other 
poor groups. 
Women have equal legal rights but there are discriminatory practices against women’s 
access to and ownership of agricultural land in practice. Similarly, women’s broader 
economic rights are recognised by law, yet insufficiently enforced to be effective. Zambia’s 
Constitution recognises a right to food, but not a right to social security. Moreover, social 
safety nets in Zambia are still rudimentary and cover only few risks for a limited number of 
beneficiaries. The majority of the population is at risk of poverty. Zambia also has a very low 
civil registration rate: only 14 per cent of live births. 
Nutrition features in national development policies and strategies, and while Zambia has 
developed a costed nutrition plan, a realistic costed plan for the National Food and Nutrition 
Strategic Plan 2011–2015 continues to be needed (SUN 2012a). The country has a long 
history of developing policies addressing hunger and undernutrition. It has identified numeric 
time-bound nutrition targets. 
Zambia has regularly undertaken demographic and health surveys during the last two 
decades (1992; 1996; 2001; 2007); the latest representative national survey data is now over 
five years old. Its vitamin A supplementation programme is successful, reaching 92 per cent 
of children aged between 6 and 59 months with at least high doses (2009) (SUN 2011). The 
GoZ actively promotes complementary feeding in addition to breastfeeding. Many provisions 
of the International Code of Marketing for Breastmilk Substitutes have been enshrined in 
Zambian law. 
The 1967 National Food and Nutrition Act established a National Food and Nutrition 
Commission within the Ministry of Health (MoH) (Harris and Drimie 2012). It coordinates 
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action on nutrition in Zambia between government departments and agencies. The 
establishment of a multi-stakeholder platform for SUN is also underway (SUN 2012a).21 The 
Food Security Pack (FSP) policy instrument is considered an example of successful 
intersectoral coordination (Harris and Drimie 2012). 
The GoZ can do more to improve the environmental factors that drive better nutrition 
outcomes. Little over six in ten people have access to safe drinking water, and only 48 per 
cent of the population has access to sanitation. Furthermore, other areas that may require 
further government attention include making laws ensuring women’s equal economic and 
agricultural land access rights effective in practice. The strengthening of safety nets in a 
context of widespread poverty and food insecurity could also have major impacts on hunger 
reduction. 
5.3.3 Expert perceptions of political commitment 
In Zambia, 40 experts (31 men, 9 women) were interviewed in the period August–September 
2012 through a local team led by RuralNet Associates. This team had also conducted the 
2011 survey, so was well-versed in the practicalities of arranging and conducting the survey. 
Experts were carefully selected to ensure a balanced sample with substantial representation 
of government officials, civil society organisations, research and academic institutions, 
international donors and some members of the private sector and media. Survey 
respondents were selected on the basis of having substantial knowledge and expertise in the 
area of hunger and nutrition. Thanks to the face-to-face interview approach, response levels 
were very high. 
Expert survey findings are first discussed for the theme of public expenditures, and then for 
the theme of government policies and programmes. 
Whereas in 2011, the survey did not distinguish specifically between hunger and nutrition 
commitment, the 2012 figures clearly show some important differences. 
The GoZ has designated nutrition budget lines. Yet, overall, experts consider that current 
public expenditures by the GoZ signal a fair commitment to hunger reduction, and a less than 
mediocre commitment to reduce undernutrition (Table 5.9). For all but one question, 
respondents gave substantially lower scores for nutrition commitment than for hunger 
commitment. For instance, budget expenditures on hunger are much more sensitive to both 
electoral cycles and emergencies (e.g. droughts/floods) than expenditures for nutrition. The 
experts opined that absolute budgets for hunger are mediocre, and fairly weak for nutrition, 
and spending on both is conducted through modestly transparent financing mechanisms. 
Indeed, while the total earmarked fund for nutrition through the National Food and Nutrition 
Council is US$1.2 million for the year 2012, however actual disbursements often fall short by 
50 per cent (SUN 2012b). 
Table 5.9 Expert perceptions of public expenditures towards addressing 
hunger and undernutrition, Zambia 
Questions* 2011 2012 
Hunger and 
nutrition 
Hunger Nutrition 
To what extent are government policy preferences reflected in 
budget expenditures? 
3.02 2.54 3.43 
                                               
21
 The SUN donor network, together with government has established a fully costed 1,000-day action plan and a pooled fund 
(SUN 2012a). 
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How strong or weak would you, in general, characterise the 
government’s absolute (in money terms) budget expenditures 
on hunger and nutrition? 
3.05 2.79 3.45 
How sensitive are government budget expenditures on hunger 
and malnutrition to electoral cycles? 
2.04 1.77 3.18 
How sensitive are government budget expenditures on hunger 
and malnutrition to emergencies/disasters? 
2.18 1.90 2.83 
How well has the national government developed transparent 
financial mechanisms for earmarked funding? 
- 3.03 3.16 
Indicator score (mean of means) 2.57 2.41 3.21 
Note: Mean score: 1 = very strong commitment; 5 = very weak commitment. 
*Tabulated questions are shortened. For full versions, see Annex 2 with questionnaires. 
Overall, for the theme of policies and programmes, scores for 2011 and 2012 are somewhat 
different. The composition of the group of experts was quite similar, with many respondents 
being re-surveyed. In 2012, lower mean scores are allocated to various indicators, most 
notably for institutional coordination and for government intention and action (Table 5.10). 
Small improvements are seen for the locus of initiative and for credible incentives, which 
however remain weak. It may be too early to say whether this reflects an (implicitly less 
positive) assessment of the government that came to power in 2012. However, it should be 
noted that political leadership on hunger and nutrition is seen to be mediocre, particularly so 
for nutrition. 
Table 5.10 Expert perceptions of public policies and programmes 
addressing hunger and undernutrition, Zambia 
Indicator 2011 2012 
Hunger and 
nutrition 
Hunger Nutrition 
Institutional coordination 2.19 2.84 3.12 
Government intention & action 2.01 2.66 2.91 
Locus of initiative 1.79 1.65  
Analytical rigour 3.10* 2.89 3.00 
Learning and adaptation 2.96 2.93 3.08 
Public commitment 2.49 2.44 2.65 
Mobilisation of stakeholders 3.00 2.85 2.92 
Continuity of effort 2.99 2.79 3.13 
Credible incentives 4.45 4.01 4.07 
Political leadership - 2.86 3.23 
Overall score (mean of means)  2.79 2.98 
Note: Mean score: 1 = very strong commitment; 5 = very weak commitment. 
*Recalculated from 2011 data to allow for comparability with 2012 data. 
For both the expenditure theme and the policies and programmes theme, expert 
assessments suggest that the GoZ shows lower commitment to nutrition than to hunger 
reduction. The pattern is consistent, but particularly pronounced for the financial resources 
committed to nutrition improvements. 
A closer look at the policies and programmes theme shows the following. In 2012, the ‘locus 
of initiative’ remained strong; that is, agencies designing policy are also in charge of 
overseeing their implementation, to foster high levels of ownership and improved chances of 
successful implementation. 
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The experts further noted that the government does fairly strongly in terms of demonstrating 
its ‘public commitment’, with quite similar scores for 2011 and 2012. Respondents noted that 
GoZ policy documents clearly express government priorities, and goals as well as desired 
outcomes regarding hunger and undernutrition reduction. Hunger and nutrition budget lines 
are considered to be set out in a mediocre manner for hunger, and in a less than mediocre 
manner for nutrition. Overall, policies are also considered fairly open to public scrutiny. 
Government systems that generate knowledge and evidence for hunger are not particularly 
strong or weak (‘analytical rigour’) and ‘policy learning and adaptation’ from experiences 
elsewhere is mediocre. While the GoZ has fairly regularly carried out national nutrition 
surveys during the 1990s and 2000s, the last survey dates from 2007. Arguably, government 
policymaking is now not as well informed by up-to-date evidence as it used to be. ‘Policy 
learning and adaptation’ remains mediocre. 
While various mechanisms have been put in place to support policy coordination, these are 
neither strong nor weak at developing broad support from a variety of policy stakeholders 
(‘mobilisation of stakeholders’). Investments in enhanced administrative and financial 
capacities to deal with hunger and undernutrition are also rather mediocre (‘continuity of 
effort’). 
Political leadership at the top level is fairly strong for hunger reduction, though mediocre for 
nutrition commitment. Political leaders are seen to speak out fairly strongly on hunger and 
nutrition issues, but their limited knowledge on the causes and possible solutions for these 
hold back more effective action. Furthermore so, political party manifestos are not particularly 
good at identifying desirable hunger and nutrition outcomes. 
While it was noted that 2012 scores for institutional incentives are somewhat improved 
compared to 2011, systemic incentives in the bureaucracy to address hunger and 
undernutrition remain weak. Experts suggested, however, that individuals within these 
agencies are somewhat more accountable (and likely to be rewarded or penalised for 
good/bad performance) than the government departments, bodies and agencies at large. 
5.3.4 Community perceptions of political commitment 
As part of the primary research, eight focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted in 
four locations in Zambia: Kavalamanja and Chitope in Luangwa District, and Kamanga and 
Mutendere in Lusaka District. Discussions were held with men and women separately. This 
section highlights how members of these communities perceive their government’s intentions 
and actions towards the reduction of hunger and undernutrition. 
Food production in Luangwa District is among the lowest in the country, due to low levels of 
precipitation. Drought-tolerant crops such as sorghum and millet are grown for subsistence 
purposes, and other food crops include maize and cow pea. Charcoal-selling is a popular 
income-generating activity in the area. Luangwa District is prone to drought and flooding, and 
crops are raided by wild animals. In Chitope, production levels of maize (the area’s staple 
crop) are too low to warrant purchase by the government’s Food Reserve Agency (FRA). As 
a result, household incomes are very low in the area affecting their ability to purchase food. 
The period from December to March is known as the ‘hunger period’. Granaries are empty, 
and people are busy cultivating their fields, with little time to do piece-work for generating 
income. 
In Lusaka District, most people are not involved in agricultural activity, and buy food from 
local markets. They typically work in the informal sector and are involved in street trading, 
such as selling charcoal or second-hand clothes (salaula). Here, people relate hunger and 
undernutrition to limited employment opportunities resulting in low household disposable 
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incomes. While the informal sector keeps growing in the absence of formal sector jobs, 
incomes raised are too low to guarantee all family members three meals a day. It is quite 
common for families to have only one meal a day, and hunger drives prostitution, stealing, 
borrowing money at high interest rates (kaloba) and indebtedness. In these townships, well-
to-do families usually consume meat, whereas the poor can only sometimes afford this. 
Vegetables, beans and kapenta (a small local fish) are commonly eaten. Respondents 
opined that a meatless diet is unbalanced and leads to malnutrition in children. Unlike rural 
Luangwa, hunger in Lusaka does not tend to be seasonal. As in rural areas, the rainy season 
tends to reduce people’s ability to earn income through labour, trade and services. While 
female-headed households, orphans and the aged make up the most vulnerable community 
members, respondents at both urban and rural locations noted that hunger and malnutrition 
affect almost everyone. 
The next section reflects on community experiences and perspectives of government action 
in realm of hunger and undernutrition. 
In Luangwa district communities want the government to support agriculture in order to 
enhance food production. They suggested investing in irrigation; vegetable and livestock 
production; fish farming; maize marketing; agricultural extension and seed provision; soil-
enriching crops; and training on cultivation of drought-tolerant crops and protecting crops 
from wild animals. Respondents also mentioned access to credit and job creation and 
suggested nutrition training and the provision of food supplements. During drought, or 
following a bad harvest, participants expect the government to provide food relief. 
They [people from Agriculture] really need to appreciate that sometimes we have no 
rains and obviously helping us determine when it is good and right to farm would be 
helpful. 
(Male participant, Luangwa District) 
In Lusaka District, participants highlighted the need for the government to enhance job 
creation and ensure skills training for the youth, access to credit and support for vulnerable 
groups. During difficult times, participants expect food for work and reduced/subsidised 
mealie-meal prices. 
Unlike health services, access to drinking water is a distinct concern in the communities 
consulted. For instance, in Kavalamanja, residents get water from the Zambezi River 
because the communal solar water source sometimes breaks down. Mutendere Township is 
serviced by piped water but it is unreliable, especially in the dry season, and seen as 
expensive by many families. 
In contrast to the list of suggested actions that government could undertake, respondents 
were unable to identify many existing programmes or interventions. In Luangwa, people 
mentioned food relief distribution, whereas in Mutendere and Kamanga people mentioned 
the Programme for Urban Self Help (PUSH), a food for work programme engaging able-
bodied extremely poor people in roadwork (in exchange for mealie-meal and cooking oil). 
Government programmes are not seen in the area apart from the newly improved 
road. 
(Female participant, Lusaka District) 
We only see people from the Disaster Management Unit come to talk about relief 
food’. 
(Female participant, Luangwa District) 
The relief maize helps and it is targeted at the infirm, [and] orphans which is a good 
thing. 
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(Female participant, Luangwa District) 
While government programmes are appreciated for their contribution towards keeping 
hunger and undernutrition at bay, respondents argued more support is needed. Luangwa 
District is usually a food deficit area, yet major steps in preventing and addressing hunger 
and malnutrition in the area remain to be instituted. Moreover, there was a sense that the 
government officials do not realise the pressures that people face, and sometimes are 
obstructive to their pursuit to stay free from hunger: 
What we don't understand is that the government closes fishing when there is real 
hunger and during the drought... The government should let us fish but when we have 
rains like say March, then they can close the fishing season at least that way we have 
food. 
(Male participant, Luangwa District) 
Participants in the focus group discussions stated that, like the government, politicians ought 
to have a critical role in the reduction of hunger and malnutrition. It was felt that politicians 
should more regularly visit people in their constituencies in order to stay abreast of the 
problems. In all areas, MPs have not gone back to the people to interact with them after the 
2011 elections, whereas the voices of area councillors (Lusaka) and traditional leaders 
(Luangwa) are too feeble to receive any attention from the government. 
The MP doesn’t visit the area as he is too busy with government duties in Lusaka. 
(Male participant, Luangwa District)  
Since they [the politicians, the councillors and area MPs] were elected they don't 
come to listen to our problems, we only see them when there is a ceremony or a 
funeral. 
(Male participant, Luangwa District) 
5.3.5 Weighting schemes: community and expert preferences 
Chapter 2 showed how the HANCI research team applied an equal weighting scheme to the 
three themes that constitute the Hunger Reduction Commitment and Nutrition Commitment 
sub-indices. Recognising its subjective nature, we identified alternative weighting schemes 
based on the preferences of (a) experts and (b) communities affected by hunger and 
undernutrition. A simple exercise was devised for experts as part of the questionnaire survey, 
and for community members as part of the focus group discussions. Table 5.11 shows a 
summary of findings. 
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Table 5.11 Experts’ and community members’ subjective weighting 
schemes, Zambia 
 Legal frameworks Policies and programmes Public expenditures 
Experts 19% 49% 32% 
Communities 20% 40% 40% 
Expert and community scores are similar for legal frameworks, but distinct for policies and 
programmes and public expenditures. The communities allocated separate scores for hunger 
and nutrition, which were combined to determine the overall weighting scheme. 
Details of the weightings allocated in each of the communities consulted can be found in 
Annex 5. Table 5.12 shows a summary of findings. 
Table 5.12 A gendered breakdown of weights, community members, 
Zambia 
 Hunger Nutrition 
Legal 
frameworks 
Policies and 
programmes 
Public 
expenditures 
Legal 
frameworks 
Policies and 
programmes 
Public 
expenditures 
Male 21 44 35 20 36 44 
Female 20 39 41 16 46 38 
Total 21 41 38 18 41 41 
Note: Communities were consulted in rural Luangwa District and urban Lusaka. 
Participants were relatively unaware of the functions that laws could fulfil in combating 
hunger and undernutrition and accordingly allocated lower scores. At the urban sites 
(Mutendere and Kamanga), participants spoke with appreciation of the public works PUSH 
programme, in which they had participated for many years. People allocated 40 per cent 
weights to public spending as they want the government to spend substantially on relief food, 
on mealie-meal subsidies and on supporting the Programme Against Malnutrition (a semi-
government programme). 
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6 Conclusions 
The HANCI attempts to measure government commitment to reducing hunger and improving 
nutrition because this is something they can be held accountable to. The existence of a 
commitment score helps civil society hold governments to account. It also helps to guide 
resource allocation within and across countries. 
 
We have provided two methods for assessing commitment: cross-country using secondary 
data, and within country relying on primary data for community and ‘expert’ opinion. The 
primary data provides a complementary and up-to-date perspective on political commitment 
to reduce hunger and undernutrition, as it interrogates a set of commitment indicators for 
which no secondary data is available for a range of countries. 
 
Hunger and undernutrition are two related but distinct concepts and we accordingly calculate 
an index for each. 
 
We have been rigorous and thorough in our methodological approach, being transparent 
about the choices we have made and the basis for those choices. We have conducted 
statistical tests and other sensitivity analyses to assess the consequences of our choices. 
These allow us to be confident that the HANCI methods and findings are robust. 
 
The HANCI compares countries’ performance relative to one another, and aggregates 
relative (not absolute) political commitment levels. It does not identify absolute benchmarks 
of commitment to be achieved. However, absolute commitment levels can be ascertained for 
all individual indicators (not aggregations) by referring to the raw data (Annex 4). Countries 
that show relatively high commitment levels in the HANCI do not necessarily perform strongly 
on each of the composite indicators. High rankings should not be a reason to sit back and 
relax: often, substantial scope remains to enhance performance on selected indicators. 
Moreover, HANCI commitment rankings should not be confused with hunger and nutrition 
outcomes. 
 
For the country rankings based on secondary data we find: 
 
 Guatemala is top ranked and Guinea Bissau is worst ranked. 
 Strong overall commitment is shown by: Guatemala, Malawi, Madagascar, Peru, 
Brazil, the Philippines and Indonesia. The countries with very weak overall 
commitment are: Togo, Cameroon, Kenya, Liberia, Lesotho, Afghanistan, Mauritania, 
Yemen, Sudan, Myanmar, Burundi, Angola, DR Congo and Guinea Bissau. 
 The commitment to hunger reduction and the commitment to nutrition are not the 
same. They are only weakly correlated. 
 The top performers in commitment to hunger reduction are: Guatemala, South Africa, 
Malawi, Peru, Burkina Faso and Mali; and the top performers in nutrition commitment 
are Guatemala, the Gambia, Nepal, Mozambique and Malawi. 
 South Africa, Nepal and Mali show the biggest difference in rankings between hunger 
reduction and nutrition improvement. Out of 45 countries South Africa shows 2nd 
highest commitment levels for hunger reduction and ranks only 36th for nutrition 
commitment. Nepal ranks number three for nutrition commitment, 34th for hunger 
reduction commitment. Mali ranks 5th on hunger commitment and 29th on nutrition 
commitment. 
 The fast rising BRIICS show a variable performance in their commitment to hunger 
and nutrition. India is lagging substantially behind Brazil, China, Indonesia and South 
Africa. 
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 Countries with alarming hunger and undernutrition rates show both high and low 
commitments. 
 In countries facing alarming or serious hunger and undernutrition, low wealth does not 
prevent high commitment. Some countries with very low wealth demonstrate high 
commitment (e.g. Malawi) whereas the reverse is true for countries with substantially 
higher wealth (e.g. Angola or India), facing similar hunger and nutrition challenges. 
 Commitment shows a positive correlation with decadal improvements in stunting. 
 Greater government effectiveness is associated with a higher commitment to hunger 
reduction and nutrition improvement. 
 
While the primary research was not designed to compare across countries or to validate 
cross-country rankings, expert assessments do not seem to contradict the secondary data 
based assessments. Experts in Malawi considered their government to be fairly strongly 
committed to both hunger and undernutrition reduction, thus not contradicting Malawi’s high 
rank (number 2) in the HANCI. Experts in Bangladesh and Zambia allocated lower 
commitment scores and these countries also rank lower in the HANCI. 
 
Experts in each of the three case countries (Bangladesh, Malawi and Zambia) considered 
that government commitment to hunger reduction is stronger than commitment to 
undernutrition reduction. This is particularly pronounced in the area of expenditures (as 
compared to policies and programmes). Expenditures on hunger interventions are sensitive 
to electoral cycles, whereas nutrition expenditures are much less so, though neither gain 
much attention in political party manifestos. Encouragingly, experts in all countries noted 
reasonable to good levels of top-level political leadership on hunger and undernutrition. 
Senior leaders are deemed to have a fair grasp of the status of hunger and undernutrition; 
however, they only have a modest grasp of underlying (complex) causal factors, and tend to 
have a fairly weak understanding of possible remedies that may be employed. This political 
appetite for addressing hunger and nutrition should be capitalised on by supporting greater 
efforts to enhance senior politicians’ understanding of its causes and solutions, and also by 
involving members of parliament and local political leaders, whom communities view with 
scepticism. 
 
Communities in Bangladesh, Malawi and Zambia consider that real political commitment 
takes the shape of government policy and programmes. Communities much appreciated 
such efforts but are also often critical of them. Key limitations include insufficient reach and 
the manipulation of implementation (producing inequitable outcomes). Communities 
emphasised that they want government action to enable them to help themselves, for 
example, through appropriate agricultural extension services; through ensuring that 
economies generate sufficiently remunerative jobs; and through ensuring that discriminatory 
practices against women are tackled. 
 
In order to enhance transparency and accountability in government efforts to reduce hunger 
and undernutrition, commitment to hunger and undernutrition reduction should be one of the 
indicators to be assessed as a potential post-2015 development goal. 
 
Donor countries also have a key role to play; their commitment needs to be monitored, and 
they need to be held accountable for their commitment to reducing hunger and undernutrition 
in the high burden countries 
 
Will commitment indices help to inspire greater political commitment to reduce hunger and 
undernutrition and ultimately contribute to bringing down hunger and undernutrition levels? 
The next phase of the HANCI project will undertake econometric work for the secondary data 
index and follow-up fieldwork for the primary data index, with partners in selected countries. 
For the indices to be worth collecting, we must be able to show they contribute to efforts to 
build commitment to end the twin scandals of hunger and undernutrition. 
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Annex 1 37 secondary data indicators 
considered but excluded from HANCI 
 Indicators Reason for exclusion from HANCI 
1 Total expenditure on health as % of GDP HANCI prefers expression of health spending 
as share of public expenditures as clearer 
indicator of government commitment 
2 % government expenditure on education Too indirect an indicator 
3 Social protection expenditure Data not available 
4 Food price inflation for consumers (annual per 
cent) 
Data not available 
5 Length of maternity leave laws Data available, yet of limited applicability 
(only to formal economy employment) 
6 Does the country use a multi-sectoral approach to 
nutrition? 
Data unavailable for sufficient number of 
countries 
7 Signatory to SUN movement? Applies only to (30-odd) SUN countries 
8 Contraceptive prevalence (%) Too indirect an indicator 
9 Community health workers density (per 10,000 
population) 
Too indirect an indicator 
10 Density of public health workers (per 10,000 
population) 
Too indirect an indicator 
11 Do governments have a breastfeeding promotion 
programme? 
Insufficient variation in data 
12 Do governments have a vitamin A supplementation 
programme for children? 
Insufficient variation in data 
13 Do governments have a zinc supplementation 
programme for children? 
Not applicable to many countries 
14 Do governments have a salt iodisation 
programme? 
Not applicable to many countries 
15 Do governments have programmes for 
management of childhood severe acute 
malnutrition? 
Limited data availability 
16 Do governments have a maternal micronutrient 
supplementation programme? 
Insufficient variation in data 
17 Do governments have food fortification strategies? Limited data availability 
18 Do governments have school nutrition 
programme? 
Limited data availability 
19 Do governments have a diet diversity programme? Limited data availability 
20 Immunisation/vaccination coverage Too indirect an indicator 
21 Do governments promote safe hygienic practices? Limited data availability 
22 Do governments promote female/maternal 
education programmes? 
Too indirect an indicator 
23 Antenatal care coverage data Limited data availability 
24 Commitment of high level leadership Limited data availability 
(Cont’d.) 
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Annex 1 (cont’d.) 
 Indicators Reason for exclusion from HANCI 
25 Multi-stakeholder platform on nutrition Limited data availability 
26 Business engagement with nutrition established? Limited data availability 
27 Do governments include a nutrition component in 
agricultural policy? 
Limited data availability 
28 Is there a nutrition component in education 
strategy? 
Limited data availability 
29 Public expenditure on agricultural R&D as % of 
agricultural GDP 
Limited data availability 
30 Do governments have national dietary guidelines? Limited data availability 
31 Gender equality data (WB) Limited data availability 
32 Equal political representation of men and women 
in rural areas 
Too indirect an indicator 
33 Public resources for rural development Too indirect an indicator 
34 Access to water for agriculture Limited data availability 
35 Do governments have food safety regulations? Too indirect 
36 Do governments enhance well-qualified human 
resources on nutrition? 
Limited data availability 
37 Do governments undertake programmes to combat 
overnutrition? 
Limited data availability 
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Annex 2 Overview of questions in expert survey 
developing countries, by indicator 
Indicator Questions in questionnaire 
Institutional 
coordination 
Q29. Has the government appointed a coordinating body that promotes joined up thinking/action 
(Q29 was Q26 in 2011) 
Q30. If YES to Q29 – how successful is/are the body/ies in delivering a coordinated cross-
agency approach to addressing hunger ( Q27 in 2011) 
Q30. If YES to Q29 – how successful is/are the body/ies in delivering a coordinated cross-
agency approach to addressing nutrition 
Q31. What is the strength of coordination efforts by national government with sub national (e.g. 
State) government efforts to improve hunger outcomes 
Q31. What is the strength of coordination efforts by national government with sub national (e.g. 
State) government efforts to improve nutrition outcomes 
Government 
intention and 
action 
Q2. Government priority to hunger 
Q2. Government priority to nutrition 
Q5A. Government consideration of policy 1 ( all Q5s were Q6s in 2011) 
Q5A. Government consideration of policy 2 
Q5A. Government consideration of policy 3 
Q5A. Government consideration of policy 4 
Q5A. Government consideration of policy 5 
Q5B. Adequacy of government efforts towards fulfilling policy 1 
Q5B. Adequacy of government efforts towards fulfilling policy 2 
Q5B. Adequacy of government efforts towards fulfilling policy 3 
Q5B. Adequacy of government efforts towards fulfilling policy 4 
Q5B. Adequacy of government efforts towards fulfilling policy 5 
Q 34. How good is the implementation of public policies on hunger (Q34s was Q30 in 2011) 
Q 34. How good is the implementation of public policies on nutrition 
Locus of 
initiative 
Q4A. Extent policy 1 was initiated by state agency responsible for executing it 
Q4A. Extent policy 2 was initiated by state agency responsible for executing it 
Q4A. Extent policy 3 was initiated by state agency responsible for executing it 
Q4A. Extent policy 4 was initiated by state agency responsible for executing it 
Q4A. Extent policy 5 was initiated by state agency responsible for executing it 
Analytical 
rigour 
Q18. Importance of scientific evidence in policy making processes for hunger (Q18s was Q17 in 
2011) 
Q18. Importance of scientific evidence in policy making processes for nutrition 
Q19. How developed are government systems that generate knowledge and evidence for 
hunger (Q19s were Q18 in 2011) 
Q19. How developed are government systems that generate knowledge and evidence for 
nutrition 
(Cont’d.) 
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Annex 2 (cont’d.) 
Indicator Questions in questionnaire 
Public 
commitment 
Q14. How clear are public policy preferences in government docs. (was Q16 in 2011) 
Q15. How well are the goals of improving hunger outcomes expressed in State development 
strategies/policies 
Q15. How well are the goals of improving nutrition outcomes expressed in State development 
strategies/policies 
Q16. How well are budget lines related to hunger developed in the State budgets 
Q16. How well are budget lines related to nutrition developed in the State budgets 
Q17. How well defined are hunger outcomes in policies 
Q17. How well defined are nutrition outcomes in policies 
Q22. How accessible is government policy on hunger to public scrutiny (Q22s was Q21 in 2011) 
Q22. How accessible is government policy on nutrition to public scrutiny 
Learning and 
adaptation 
Q20. How likely are government policies to be adjusted when strong evidence suggests change 
in course for hunger (Q20s was Q19 in 2011) 
Q20. How likely are government policies to be adjusted when strong evidence suggests change 
in course for nutrition 
Q21. To what extent the government experiment and innovate with new policy approaches in 
hunger (Q21s were 20 in 2011) 
Q21. To what extent the government experiment and innovate with new policy approaches in 
nutrition 
Mobilisation of 
stakeholders 
Q6. How well do agencies responsible for the design of hunger policies build social/political 
support (all Q6s were Q7s in 2011) 
Q6. How well do agencies responsible for the design of nutrition policies build social/political 
support 
Q6. How well do agencies responsible for the implementation of hunger policies build 
social/political support 
Q6. How well do agencies responsible for the implementation of nutrition policies build 
social/political support 
Q8. How well policy strategies/decision-making bodies allow representation of divergent 
interests in area of hunger (Q8s was Q9 in 2011) 
Q8. How well policy strategies/decision-making bodies allow representation of divergent 
interests in area of nutrition 
Q9. How successful are agencies in gathering support to overcome resistance from threatened 
interests of stakeholders in hunger (Q9s was Q10 in 2011) 
Q9. How successful are agencies in gathering support to overcome resistance from threatened 
interests of stakeholders in nutrition 
(Cont’d.) 
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Annex 2 (cont’d.) 
Indicator Questions in questionnaire 
Continuity of 
effort 
Q35A To what extent does the government enhance administrative capacity to address hunger 
reduction (Q35s were Q31s in 2011) 
Q35A. To what extent does the government enhance administrative capacity to address nutrition 
problems 
Q35B. To what extent does the government enhance financial capacity to address hunger 
reduction 
Q35B. To what extent does the government enhance financial capacity to address nutrition 
problems 
Q36A. To what extent does the government utilise administrative capacity to address hunger 
reduction (Q36 was Q32 in 2011) 
Q36A. To what extent does the government utilise administrative capacity to address nutrition 
problems 
Q36B. To what extent does the government utilise financial capacity to address hunger 
reduction 
Q36B. To what extent does the government utilise financial capacity to address nutrition 
problems 
Credible 
incentives 
Q32. Achievement/failure to achieve public policy objectives credibly rewarded/sanctioned – 
policy design agencies for hunger (Q32s was Q28 in 2011) 
Q32. Achievement/failure to achieve public policy objectives credibly rewarded/sanctioned – 
policy design agencies for nutrition 
Q32. Achievement/failure to achieve public policy objectives credibly rewarded/sanctioned – 
implementing agencies for hunger policies 
Q32. Achievement/failure to achieve public policy objectives credibly rewarded/sanctioned – 
implementing agencies for nutrition policies 
Q33. Achievement/failure to achieve public policy objectives credibly rewarded/sanctioned – 
policy designers for hunger (Q33s was Q28 in 2011) 
Q33. Achievement/failure to achieve public policy objectives credibly rewarded/sanctioned – 
policy designers for nutrition 
Q33. Achievement/failure to achieve public policy objectives credibly rewarded/sanctioned – 
implementers of hunger policies 
Q33. Achievement/failure to achieve public policy objectives credibly rewarded/sanctioned – 
implementers for nutrition policies 
Political 
leadership 
Q12. To what extent do senior political leaders speak out against hunger and malnutrition (all 
Q12s were Q14s in 2011) 
Q13. How convincing are public statements made by senior politicians (all Q13s were Q15s in 
2011) 
Q17. How well defined are hunger outcomes in political manifestos 
Q17. How well defined are nutrition outcomes in political manifestos 
Q23A. Level of empirical understanding of the status of hunger and malnutrition – senior 
politicians (Q23s were Q22 in 2011) 
Q23B. Level of empirical understanding of the casual factors of hunger and malnutrition – senior 
politicians 
Q23C. Level of empirical understanding of the potential solutions to hunger and malnutrition – 
senior politicians 
Q24. How developed is presidential/prime ministerial leadership in the country on hunger 
Q24. How developed is presidential/prime ministerial leadership in the country on nutrition 
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Annex 3 HANCI indicators for hunger; hunger 
and nutrition; nutrition 
Hunger Hunger and nutrition Nutrition 
Government spending on 
agriculture 
Security of access to land 
Access to agricultural 
extension services 
Constitutional right to food 
Women’s access to 
agricultural land 
Civil registration of live births 
Status of safety nets 
Constitutional right to social 
security 
National nutrition survey 
Women’s economic rights 
Nutrition budget 
Vitamin A coverage 
Access to drinking water 
Access to sanitation 
Skilled birth attendance 
Enshrine ICBMS in domestic law 
Government spending on health 
Extent nutrition features in national 
development policies/strategies 
National nutrition policy, plan or strategy 
Multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder 
coordination mechanism 
Time-bound nutrition targets 
Governments promote complementary 
feeding 
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Annex 4 HANCI raw data (22 indicators, 45 
countries) 
 Government 
spending on 
agriculture 
Government 
spending on 
health 
Nutrition 
budget 
Security of 
access to 
land 
Access to 
agriculture 
extension services 
Civil 
registration 
of live births 
Status of 
safety nets 
Vitamin A 
coverage 
Afghanistan 1.0 1.6 0.0 2.8 3.1 37 1 96 
Angola 3.5 7.2 0.0 3.0 3.3 29 3 28 
Bangladesh 7.3 7.4 1.0 3.2 3.8 10 3 100 
Benin 5.6 9.6 0.0 3.1 4.5 60 4 100 
Brazil 2.1 7.1 1.0 4.5 4.5 93 7 29 
Burkina Faso 20.4 13.5 0.0 3.5 4.5 77 3 100 
Burundi 4.4 8.1 0.0 3.5 3.2 75 2 73 
Cambodia 7.5 10.5 0.0 3.4 3.2 62 3 98 
Cameroon 3.6 8.5 0.0 3.5 4.1 70 4 89 
China 8.1 12.1 0.0 4.2 4.1 90 5 29 
Congo, DR 1.8 9.1 0.0 2.8 3.0 28 1 83 
Côte d’Ivoire 2.0 5.1 1.0 2.8 3.0 55 3 100 
Ethiopia 13.7 13.5 1.0 3.8 4.3 7 4 84 
Gambia 8.5 11.3 1.0 3.9 4.0 53 2 100 
Ghana 10.3 12.1 0.0 3.5 4.0 63 5 93 
Guatemala 1.4 16.2 1.0 3.8 3.7 97 4 36 
Guinea Bissau 0.5 11.3 0.0 3.3 3.0 24 1 100 
India 1.4 3.6 0.5 3.5 4.0 75 4 34 
Indonesia 5.0 7.8 1.0 3.9 3.5 53 5 80 
Kenya 3.4 7.3 1.0 4.0 4.0 60 3 62 
Lesotho 3.2 13.4 0.0 3.8 3.7 45 3 90 
Liberia 2.5 11.1 0.0 2.9 2.8 4 3 97 
Madagascar 8.0 14.7 1.0 3.5 4.3 80 3 95 
Malawi 12.2 14.2 1.0 3.8 3.7 50 3 96 
Mali 11.0 10.6 0.5 3.4 3.7 81 5 99 
Mauritania 5.5 7.3 0.5 3.3 4.3 56 4 97 
Mozambique 9.1 12.2 1.0 4.0 4.0 31 4 100 
Myanmar 8.3 1.0 0.0 2.1 2.8 72 1 94 
Nepal 4.3 7.9 1.0 3.5 3.1 42 2 91 
Niger 15.1 11.1 1.0 3.0 4.0 32 3 98 
Nigeria 7.0 4.4 0.0 3.2 3.3 30 4 91 
Pakistan 6.6 3.6 0.0 3.4 4.0 27 3 87 
Peru 2.4 14.3 1.0 4.4 3.7 93 5 6.2 
Philippines 5.0 7.6 0.0 4.0 4.1 83 5 91 
Rwanda 3.5 20.1 1.0 4.5 4.3 63 4 92 
Senegal 13.9 11.6 1.0 3.6 4.2 75 4 97 
Sierra Leone 7.7 6.4 1.0 3.1 4.0 78 4 100 
South Africa 2.2 11.9 1.0 4.0 3.3 92 6 39 
Sudan 5.4 9.8 0.0 3.6 3.7 59 1 82 
Tanzania 5.5 13.8 1.0 4.3 5.0 16 4 99 
Togo 8.0 15.4 0.0 2.8 2.3 78 3 100 
Uganda 5.4 12.1 0.0 4.5 4.3 30 4 64 
Vietnam 6.3 7.8 0.0 3.6 3.3 95 6 95 
Yemen 1.0 4.3 0.0 4.5 4.0 22 3 47 
Zambia 8.3 15.6 1.0 3.5 4.0 14 4 92 
(Cont’d.) 
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Annex 4 (cont’d.) 
 Governments 
promote 
complementary 
feeding 
Access to 
drinking 
water 
Access to 
sanitation 
Skilled birth 
attendance 
Extent of nutrition 
features in national 
development 
policies/strategies 
National 
nutrition policy, 
plan or strategy 
Multi-sectoral and 
multi-stakeholder 
coordination 
mechanism 
Afghanistan 1 50 37 36 0.19 1 1 
Angola 1 51 58 80 0.00 1 1 
Bangladesh 1 81 56 53 0.56 1 1 
Benin 1 75 13 84 0.23 1 1 
Brazil 1 98 79 98 0.24 1 1 
Burkina Faso 1 79 17 85 0.10 1 1 
Burundi 1 72 46 99 0.19 0 1 
Cambodia 1 64 31 89 0.33 1 1 
Cameroon 0 77 49 82 0.06 1 0 
China 1 91 64 92 0.00 1 0 
Congo, DR 0 45 24 88 0.15 1 1 
Côte d’Ivoire 1 80 24 85 0.30 1 1 
Ethiopia 1 44 21 28 0.02 1 1 
Gambia 1 89 68 98 0.33 1 1 
Ghana 1 86 14 90 0.14 1 1 
Guatemala 1 92 78 93 0.00 1 1 
Guinea Bissau 1 64 20 93 0.12 1 0 
India 0 92 34 75 0.47 0 0 
Indonesia 1 82 54 93 0.09 1 1 
Kenya 0 59 32 92 0.08 1 1 
Lesotho 1 78 26 92 0.17 0 0 
Liberia 0 73 18 79 0.29 1 1 
Madagascar 1 46 15 86 0.27 1 1 
Malawi 1 83 51 92 0.90 1 1 
Mali 1 64 22 70 0.02 1 1 
Mauritania 1 50 26 75 0.32 1 1 
Mozambique 1 47 18 92 0.59 1 1 
Myanmar 1 83 76 80 0.11 1 1 
Nepal 1 89 31 44 0.09 1 1 
Niger 1 49 9 46 0.53 1 1 
Nigeria 1 58 31 58 0.08 1 1 
Pakistan 1 92 48 61 0.09 1 0 
Peru 0 85 71 95 0.17 1 1 
Philippines 1 92 74 91 0.18 1 1 
Rwanda 1 65 55 98 0.30 1 1 
Senegal 0 72 52 87 0.44 1 1 
Sierra Leone 1 55 13 87 0.12 1 1 
South Africa 1 91 79 97 0.00 0 0 
Sudan 1 58 26 56 0.00 1 0 
Tanzania 1 53 10 88 0.00 1 1 
Togo 0 61 13 87 0.36 1 0 
Uganda 1 72 34 94 0.16 1 1 
Vietnam 1 95 76 91 0.05 1 1 
Yemen 0 55 53 47 0.09 1 1 
Zambia 1 61 48 94 0.24 1 1 
(Cont’d.) 
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Annex 4 (cont’d.) 
 Time- bound 
nutrition targets 
National 
nutrition 
survey 
Constitutional 
right to food 
Women’s access 
to agricultural 
land 
Women’s 
economic rights 
Constitutional 
right to social 
security 
Enshrine 
ICBMS in 
domestic law 
Afghanistan 1 1 1 0.5 0 0 9 
Angola 0 0 3 0.5 1 1 3 
Bangladesh 1 1 5 0.5 1 1 8 
Benin 1 0 3 0.0 1 0 9 
Brazil 0 0 5 0.5 2 1 9 
Burkina Faso 0 1 2 0.5 1 1 9 
Burundi 0 1 3 0.0 0 0 4 
Cambodia 1 1 3 1.0 1 1 8 
Cameroon 0 1 5 0.0 0 0 9 
China 1 0 2 0.5 1 1 8 
Congo, DR 0 1 3 0.5 0 1 7 
Côte d’Ivoire 0 1 3 0.5 1 1 4 
Ethiopia 0 0 5 0.5 0 1 7 
Gambia 0 1 5 0.0 2 0 9 
Ghana 1 1 4 0.0 1 1 9 
Guatemala 1 1 5 0.5 1 1 9 
Guinea Bissau 0 1 4 0.5 0 0 7 
India 0 0 4 0.5 1 1 9 
Indonesia 1 1 4 1.0 1 1 8 
Kenya 0 1 5 0.5 0 0 6 
Lesotho 0 1 2 1.0 2 0 3 
Liberia 0 1 4 1.0 1 1 5 
Madagascar 0 1 3 0.5 1 1 9 
Malawi 1 1 5 0.5 1 1 8 
Mali 0 1 3 0.5 1 1 8 
Mauritania 0 1 2 0.5 1 0 3 
Mozambique 0 1 3 0.5 1 0 9 
Myanmar 0 1 5 0.5 1 0 3 
Nepal 1 1 2 0.5 1 1 9 
Niger 0 1 3 0.5 2 0 8 
Nigeria 1 1 5 0.5 0 1 8 
Pakistan 0 1 5 0.5 1 1 9 
Peru 0 1 4 0.5 1 1 9 
Philippines 1 0 3 0.5 2 1 9 
Rwanda 0 1 3 0.5 1 0 4 
Senegal 0 0 3 1.0 0 0 8 
Sierra Leone 1 1 4 0.0 0 1 4 
South Africa 0 0 5 0.5 1 1 6 
Sudan 0 1 4 0.0 1 1 2 
Tanzania 0 1 4 0.5 0 1 9 
Togo 1 1 3 0.5 1 1 4 
Uganda 0 1 5 0.0 0 1 9 
Vietnam 1 1 2 0.5 1 1 8 
Yemen 0 0 1 0.5 0 0 9 
Zambia 1 0 5 0.5 1 0 8 
 86 
Annex 5  Community weighting schemes: 
Bangladesh, Malawi and Zambia 
Community weighting schemes for hunger and nutrition, by 
gender, Bangladesh 
 Hunger Nutrition 
Legal 
frameworks 
Policies and 
programmes 
Public 
expenditures 
Legal 
frameworks 
Policies and 
programmes 
Public 
expenditures 
Dhaka 
Male 13 75 13 58 28 14 
Female 12 63 24 14 71 15 
Total 12 68 20 33 52 15 
Nilphamari 
Male 16 67 17 18 41 41 
Female 44 37 19 26 56 18 
Total 29 53 18 22 48 30 
Patuakhali 
Male 32 50 18 35 47 18 
Female 20 60 20 19 64 17 
Total 25 53 19 26 56 18 
Bandarban 
Male 24 50 26 29 34 37 
Female 22 52 26 21 46 33 
Total 23 51 26 25 39 35 
All sites 
Male 19 63 18 30 38 32 
Female 29 50 22 21 60 19 
Total 24 56 20 25 49 26 
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Community weighting schemes for hunger and nutrition, by 
gender, Malawi 
 Hunger Nutrition 
Legal 
frameworks 
Policies and 
programmes 
Public 
expenditures 
Legal 
frameworks 
Policies and 
programmes 
Public 
expenditures 
Balaka 
Male 20 50 30 50 30 20 
Female 20 50 30 20 50 30 
Total 20 50 30 35 40 25 
Kasungu 
Male 15 50 35 13 47 40 
Female 15 50 35 15 50 35 
Total 15 50 35 14 48 38 
All sites 
Male 15 50 35 32 38 30 
Female 15 50 35 18 50 32 
Total 15 50 35 25 44 31 
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Community weighting schemes for hunger and nutrition, by 
gender, Zambia 
 Hunger Nutrition 
Legal 
frameworks 
Policies and 
programmes 
Public 
expenditures 
Legal 
frameworks 
Policies and 
programmes 
Public 
expenditures 
Kavalamanja 
Male 20 40 40 30 30 40 
Female 25 30 35 45 20 35 
Total 22 35 37 47 25 38 
Chitope 
Male 30 45 25 15 45 40 
Female 20 50 30 10 55 35 
Total 25 47 28 12 50 38 
Mutendere 
Male 20 55 25 20 50 30 
Female 25 45 30 25 50 25 
Total 22 50 28 22 50 28 
Kamanga 
Male 15 35 50 15 20 65 
Female 10 30 60 10 35 55 
Total 12 33 55 13 27 60 
All sites 
Male 21 44 35 20 36 44 
Female 20 39 39 22 40 38 
Total 20 42 37 21 38 41 
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Annex 6 Outcome mapping HANCI uptake and 
impact 
Type of stakeholder Boundary partner Expect to see Like to see Love to see 
a. Civil society 
partner organisations 
ActionAid 
Bangladesh (AAB); 
Oxfam India (OA) 
Partners identify their 
key boundary 
partners and 
stakeholders; share 
HANCI findings with 
them 
AAB/Oxfam India to 
adopt HANCI 
methodology or 
findings in their 
programming in 
coming years 
AAB develops a 
Bangladesh specific 
index, or self-funds 
the primary research 
from 2015. OI to 
continue financially 
supporting Indian 
index beyond current 
commitments for 
2012–13. 
evidence AAB conducts partner 
mapping; identifies 
priority partners for 
info sharing and 
reports on demand 
for and actual follow-
up action, if any 
AAB/OI annual 
reports, workplans or 
programme outlines 
to show how they 
adopt HANCI in their 
programming. New 
co-funding by 
partners towards 
HANCI activities and 
objectives 
AAB develops a 
Bangladesh specific 
index, or self-funds 
the primary research 
from 2015. Oxfam 
India to continue 
financially supporting 
Indian index 
status of evidence  OI has uptake of 
HANCI by regional 
offices included as 
one of their 
programming outputs. 
AAB to contribute 
new funds to support 
conducting expert 
workshops 
AAB develops a 
Bangladesh specific 
index, or self-funds 
the primary research 
from 2015. OI to 
continue financially 
supporting Indian 
index 
As these are 
stakeholders for IDS, 
we may conduct an 
outcome mapping 
exercise with project 
partners (in selected 
countries) for their 
own boundary 
partners – this would 
require additional 
resources 
Greater knowledge of 
HANCI by other civil 
society stakeholders 
Civil society coalitions 
to use HANCI to 
generate greater 
public debate on 
governments' and 
donors' political 
commitment to 
reduce hunger and 
undernutrition 
HANCI to become 
integral part of anti-
hunger and nutrition 
campaigns by civil 
society stakeholders 
evidence Wherever possible, 
HANCI partners will 
forward feedback on 
use and relevance 
from their partners; 
Consider use of 
automatic tracking 
tools – ask comms 
Wherever possible, 
HANCI partners will 
forward feedback on 
use and relevance 
from their partners 
Wherever possible, 
HANCI partners will 
forward feedback on 
use and relevance 
from their partners 
status of evidence    
(Cont’d.) 
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Annex 6 (cont’d.) 
Type of stakeholder Boundary partner Expect to see Like to see Love to see 
b. Partners of 
HANCI’s civil society 
partner organisations 
In donor countries 
(DFID/Irish Aid) 
DFID/Irish Aid share 
HANCI findings with 
their boundary 
partners and 
stakeholders 
DFID to recommend 
HANCI to SUN for 
inclusion in its 
accountability toolbox 
SUN becoming a 
boundary partner 
evidence    
status of evidence    
c. Government 
decision-makers 
In developing 
countries 
Greater knowledge of 
HANCI by experts 
working in 
government (through 
communities products 
and events including 
workshops) 
Governments 
respond formally or 
informally in media or 
otherwise to their 
countries' rankings 
Governments to 
announce (spending, 
legal, policy and 
programme) 
measures they will 
undertake to improve 
their HANCI 
commitment scores 
evidence HANCI findings reach 
decision-makers, e.g. 
through partners, or 
comms and launch 
events; expert 
workshops 
Citations of HANCI in 
government 
documents made 
publicly available or 
other public spaces 
Media reports, press 
releases, 
parliamentary debate 
transcripts 
status of evidence    
d. Politicians none HANCI findings reach 
politicians through 
partners 
Politicians publicly 
respond to HANCI 
findings 
Politicians actively 
campaign on hunger 
and reference HANCI 
evidence  Media reports. 
government press 
releases; 
parliamentary debate 
transcripts 
Parliamentary debate 
transcripts, political 
party manifestos 
status of evidence    
(Cont’d.) 
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Annex 6 (cont’d.) 
Type of stakeholder Boundary partner Expect to see Like to see Love to see 
e. International 
donors (bi + 
multilateral) and 
relevant government 
departments 
Irish Aid (IA); DFID IA/DFID to reference 
and use HANCI in its 
programming and 
advocacy events 
IA/DFID to promote 
HANCI with their 
stakeholders, e.g. 
with SUN and country 
offices 
SUN Secretariat to 
officially adopt HANCI 
as one its 
accountability 
indicators 
evidence HANCI features in 
official reports by 
DFID, or is mentioned 
on their website 
DFID documentation 
recommending 
HANCI for inclusion 
in SUN (e.g. 
Summary report on 
Hunger Summit). 
DFID to use HANCI 
in its hunger event 
(summer 2013). IDS 
will be invited to 
present HANCI at IA 
EU Presidency 
Summit 
Regular interactions 
with SUN Secretariat, 
following a 
presentation of 
HANCI 
status of evidence See Summary report 
on Hunger Summit 
2012 – some notes 
on HANCI 
See Summary report 
on Hunger Summit 
2012 + 2013; IA EU 
Presidency summit 
conference + 
PowerPoint 
PowerPoint 
presentation HANCI 
to SUN Secretariat, 
invitations to events 
FAO Gaining FAO interest 
to consider using 
HANCI to develop 
their monitoring of 
political commitment 
as per their mid-term 
review strategy for 
2013–17 
FAO to incorporate 
HANCI aspects in its 
monitoring of political 
commitment as per 
their mid-term review 
strategy for 2013–17 
FAO to become 
boundary partner; 
and FAO to routinely 
collect data on 
political commitment 
to reduce hunger and 
undernutrition 
evidence Invited PowerPoint 
presentation HANCI 
to FAO 
FAO documentation 
and communications 
Regular interactions 
with FAO; FAO to use 
HANCI or (aspects 
of) its methodology to 
monitor political 
commitment on an 
annual basis 
status of evidence    
(Cont’d.) 
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Annex 6 (cont’d.) 
Type of stakeholder Boundary partner Expect to see Like to see Love to see 
f. International civil 
society and advocacy 
groups/networks 
ONE/Save the 
Children 
HANCI and its 
findings to feature in 
ONE/Save advocacy 
reports and informally 
influences their 
programming and 
advocacy activities 
An official 
collaboration between 
IDS/ONE/Save to use 
HANCI in 
programming and 
advocacy at 
international and 
national levels 
Develop effective 
partnerships and 
work with ONE/Save 
in-country offices in 
primary research and 
advocacy 
evidence HANCI methodology 
inspiring Nutrition 
Barometer of Save, 
2012 
MoU or other formal 
expression of 
collaboration with 
ONE/Save; use of 
HANCI by CIFF in 
advocacy efforts 
New collaborations 
for primary research 
and advocacy in 
Nepal, Tanzania and 
other countries 
status of evidence Nutrition Barometer 
of Save, 2012 
references HANCI 
and uses its thematic 
methodology 
  
IDS Other IDS projects on 
hunger and nutrition 
to reference or use 
HANCI materials or 
findings 
  
evidence Notes from nutrition 
group IDS 
  
status of evidence    
g. Academics  HANCI to feature in 
Lancet 2013 series 
on nutrition 
HANCI to feature at 
Lancet international 
launch events in May 
2013 
HANCI to inspire 
academic debate on 
better ways to 
measure political 
commitment to 
reduce hunger and 
undernutrition 
evidence   Academic citations 
status of evidence    
h. Media actors  Global media such as 
Guardian 
Development, and 
AllAfrica to feature 
HANCI 
National and sub-
national media in 
various countries to 
report on HANCI 
findings and to 
broadcast comms 
products, e.g. audio 
postcards 
YouTube videos of 
HANCI to have over 
5,000 views by end of 
2013 
evidence    
status of evidence    
i. Focus Group and 
Community Voices 
communities (not all 
affected 
communities) 
    
evidence ? ? ? 
status of evidence    
(Cont’d.) 
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Annex 6 (cont’d.) 
Type of stakeholder Boundary partner Expect to see Like to see Love to see 
j. Global popular 
audiences 
    
evidence HANCI website traffic statistics  
status of evidence    
k. Hunger and 
Nutrition experts 
(cross-cut) 
 Experts from survey 
panel to link up with 
one another within 
and across countries, 
as result of HANCI 
process 
  
evidence Use of forum on website – traffic figures  
status of evidence    
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Annex 7 Operationalisation of indicators 
Indicator Main source* URL
†
 Operationalisation Year Variable name 
Government 
spending on 
agriculture 
IFPRI and ReSAKSS 
calculations using IMF 
Government Statistics 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/P
NADS602.pdf 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/017/i
3028e/i3028e.pdf 
Government expenditures on agriculture as share of total 
government expenditures (percentage) 
2005–11 agexpend 
Government 
spending on 
health 
WHO Nutrition 
Landscape Information 
System 
http://apps.who.int/nutrition/land
scape/report.aspx?rid=161&tem
plate=nutrition 
Government expenditure on health as a share of total government 
expenditure (percentage) 
2010 healthexpend 
Nutrition budget SUN country summary 
reports (not in public 
domain); SUN country 
fiche; IDS Nutrition 
Governance; Save the 
Children Nutrition 
Barometer; WHO 
Landscape Analysis. 
http://www.ids.ac.uk/nutritiongov
ernance 
0 = no budgets or where no confirming information could be found; 
0.5 = sectoral budgets for nutrition; 
1 = separate budget line for nutrition 
2011–12 nutribudget 
Security of access 
to land 
The International Fund 
for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) 
http://info.worldbank.org/govern
ance/wgi/pdf/IFD.xlsx 
Assesses the existence of an institutional, legal and market 
framework for secure land tenure and the procedure for land 
acquisition and accessibility to all. 
The Ratings Scale goes from 6 (high) through 1 (low), as follows: 
6 = Good for 3 years; 
5 = Good; 
4 = Moderately satisfactory; 
3 = Moderately unsatisfactory; 
2 = Unsatisfactory; 
1 = Unsatisfactory for 3 years. 
For coding details see p.6 of: 
http://www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/80/e/EB-2003-80-R-3.pdf 
2011 landaccess 
Note: *In addition to these main sources for some countries we sourced the data from specific country sources. These sources are highlighted in the online data base. 
†
The URLs were last confirmed 
live on 4 April 2013 even though the data were extracted in 2012. 
(Cont’d.) 
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Annex 7 (cont’d.) 
Indicator Main source* URL
†
 Operationalisation Year Variable name 
Access to agri. 
extension services 
The International Fund 
for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) 
http://info.worldbank.org/govern
ance/wgi/pdf/IFD.xlsx 
This indicator assesses to what extent the agricultural research 
and extension system is accessible to poor farmers, including 
women farmers, and is responsive to the needs and priorities of 
the poor farmers. Coding is done in the same manner as for the 
'security of access to land' indicator. For coding details see p.8 of: 
http://www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/80/e/EB-2003-80-R-3.pdf 
2011 rdaccess 
Civil registration of 
live births 
UNICEF: DHS/MICS http://www.childinfo.org/birth_re
gistration_tables.php 
Percentage of children under five years of age who were 
registered at the moment of the survey 
2005–10 birthreg 
Status of safety 
nets 
Transformation Index of 
the Bertelsmann Stiftung 
(BTI) 
http://www.bti-project.org/index/ 10 = Social safety nets are comprehensive; 
7 = Social safety nets are well developed, but do not cover all risks 
for all strata of the population; 
4 = Social safety nets are rudimentary and cover only few risks for 
a limited number of beneficiaries; 
1 = Social safety nets do not exist 
2010 welfare_status 
Vitamin A 
coverage 
MICS4 Indicators, 
UNICEF field offices and 
WHO, Countdown to 
2015 reports, author 
calculations based on 
country DHS data 
http://www.unicef.org/statistics/i
ndex_countrystats.html 
The percentage of children aged 6–59 months who received 2 high 
doses of vitamin A supplements within the last year 
2007–10 vitamina 
Governments 
promote 
complementary 
feeding 
SUN Reports/world 
breast-feeding trends 
initiative 
http://www.worldbreastfeedingtr
ends.org/docs/INDICATOR-
1.pdf 
Whether governments promote complementary feeding practices 
of children aged 6–9 months and continued breastfeeding of 
children at ages 12–15 and 20–23 months. 0 = no; 1= yes 
2008–11 suppfood 
Access to drinking 
water 
WHO Nutrition 
Landscape Information 
System 
http://apps.who.int/nutrition/land
scape/report.aspx 
The percentage of population with access to an improved drinking-
water source 
2010 wateraccess 
Access to 
sanitation 
World Bank Database http://data.worldbank.org/indicat
or/SH.STA.ACSN 
The percentage of population with access to improved sanitation 
facilities 
2010 sanitaccess 
Note: *In addition to these main sources for some countries we sourced the data from specific country sources. These sources are highlighted in the online data base. 
†
The URLs were last confirmed 
live on 4 April 2013 even though the data were extracted in 2012. 
(Cont’d.) 
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Annex 7 (cont’d.) 
Indicator Main source* URL
†
 Operationalisation Year Variable name 
Skilled birth 
attendance 
UNICEF: DHS/MICS http://www.childinfo.org/antenat
al_care_country.php 
Percentage of women aged 15–49 years attended at least once 
during pregnancy by skilled health personnel (doctor, nurse or 
midwife) 
2005–10 preg 
Extent of nutrition 
features in 
national dev. 
policies 
Web-based searches See Annex 8 in HANCI report 
for a list of documents consulted 
for each country 
The total count of key search terms in a selected policy document 
divided by the number of pages in the document. Search terms: 
nutritio•.•; undernutrition/under-nutrition; malnutrition/mal-nutrition 
nutrient; diet•.•; stunt•.•; wasting/wasted; short-for-age; short for 
age; height-for-age; height for age; weight-for-age; weight for age; 
weight for height; weight-for-height; underweight; under-weight; 
low birth weight; thinness; micro-nutrient; micronutrient; 1000 days; 
one thousand days; breastfeed•.•; behaviour change; behaviour 
change; Iron deficiency anaemi/anemi; zinc; deworm; de-worm; 
vitamin A; supplementary feed; complementary feed 
 npolicy 
National nutrition 
policy, plan or 
strategy 
EIU Global Food Security 
Index; Save the Children 
Nutrition barometer 
http://foodsecurityindex.eiu.com/ 
http://www.savethechildren.org.
uk/sites/default/files/docs/Data_f
or_Nutrition_Barometer_0.pdf 
Whether a national nutrition policy, plan or strategy exists: 1 = yes; 
0 = no 
2012 nplan 
Multi-sectoral and 
multi-stakeholder 
coord. mechanism 
SUN fiches/Country docs  Whether a multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder coordination 
mechanism exists: 0 = no; 1 = yes 
2011–
2012 
stakecoord 
Time-bound 
nutrition targets 
SUN 2.2, 2.3, / Save the 
Children nutrition 
barometer 
http://www.savethechildren.org.
uk/sites/default/files/docs/Data_f
or_Nutrition_Barometer_0.pdf 
Whether governments identify time-bound nutrition targets in 
public policy documents: 0= no; 1 = yes 
2011–
2012 
ntarget 
National nutrition 
survey 
UNICEF http://www.childinfo.org/mics4_s
urveys.html 
Has there been a Demographic and Health Survey / Multiple 
Indicator Cluster Survey /comparable national nutrition survey in 
the past three years? 1 = Yes if the survey was dated 2009 or 
thereafter, or currently underway; 0 = No new survey undertaken 
after 2009 
2008–
2012 
dhs_mics 
Note: *In addition to these main sources for some countries we sourced the data from specific country sources. These sources are highlighted in the online data base. 
†
The URLs were last confirmed 
live on 4 April 2013 even though the data were extracted in 2012. 
(Cont’d.) 
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Annex 7 (cont’d.) 
Indicator Main source* URL
†
 Operationalisation Year Variable name 
Constitutional 
right to food 
FAO information paper http://www.fao.org/docrep/MEE
TING/007/J0574E.HTM 
Different levels in which the right to food is enshrined in 
constitutional law are identified in Vidar (2006): 1 = High, 2 = 
Medium High, 3 = Medium, 4 = Medium Low, 5 = Low (see Annex 
III in the source document for more details about these categories) 
2003 rtf 
Women’s access 
to agricultural land 
OECD's Gender, 
Institutions and 
Development Database 
(GID-DB) 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx
?datasetcode=GIDDB2012# 
Score based on women’s legal rights and de facto rights to own 
and/or access agricultural land. Value based on the following 
scale: 
0 = equal; 
0.5 = Women have equal legal rights but there are discriminatory 
practices against women’s access to and ownership of land in 
practice; 
1 = Women have no/few legal rights to access or own land or 
access is severely restricted by discriminatory practices. (note: in 
HANCI calculation, this scoring is reversed for consistency) 
2012 womenland 
Constitutional 
right to social 
security 
FAO information paper http://www.fao.org/docrep/MEE
TING/007/J0574E.HTM 
The Constitution clearly references a right to social security (see 
Annex II of the source document). 0= no; 1= yes 
2003 rsocsec 
Women’s 
economic rights 
The Cingranelli-Richards 
(CIRI) Human Rights 
Data Project 
http://humanrightsdata.org/ The extent to which women have equal economic rights in law and 
in practice. 0: there were no economic rights for women in law and 
systematic discrimination based on sex may have been built into 
law; 
1 = women had some economic rights under law, but these rights 
were not effectively enforced; 
2 = women had some economic rights under law, and the 
government effectively enforced these rights in practice while still 
allowing a low level of discrimination against women in economic 
matters; 
3 = all or nearly all of women’s economic rights were guaranteed 
by law and the government fully and vigorously enforces these 
laws in practice 
2010 wecon 
Note: *In addition to these main sources for some countries we sourced the data from specific country sources. These sources are highlighted in the online data base. 
†
The URLs were last confirmed 
live on 4 April 2013 even though the data were extracted in 2012. 
(Cont’d.) 
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Annex 7 (cont’d.) 
Indicator Main source* URL
†
 Operationalisation Year Variable name 
Enshrine ICBMS 
in domestic law 
Unicef http://www.unicef.org/nutrition/fil
es/State_of_the_Code_by_Cou
ntry_April2011.pdf 
The extent to which the International Code for Marketing of 
Breastmilk Substitutes is enshrined in law: 
9 = ICBMS is fully in law; 
8 = Many provisions of ICBMS are in law; 
7 = Few provisions are in law; 
6 = Voluntary adoption of all, or nearly all provisions of the ICBMS; 
5 = Some provisions voluntary; 
4 = Measure drafted awaiting final approval; 
3 = Being studied; 
2 = Action to end free breast milk substitutes; 
1 = No action 
2011 brstmlksub 
Note: *In addition to these main sources for some countries we sourced the data from specific country sources. These sources are highlighted in the online data base. 
†
The URLs were last confirmed 
live on 4 April 2013 even though the data were extracted in 2012. 
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Annex 8 Policy documents analysed for 
nutrition key words 
Country Searched document Period 
Afghanistan Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) 2008–2013 
Angola MPLA Development Program 2012–2017 
Bangladesh 6th Five year Plan 2011–2015 
Benin Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) 2011–2015 
Brazil Plano Plurianual (PPA): Plano Mais Brasil 2012–2015 
Burkina Faso Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development (SCADD) 2011–2015 
Burundi PRSP II 2025 
Cambodia National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) 2006–2010 
Cameroon Growth and Employment Strategy Paper (GESP) 2010–2020 
China 12th Five Year Plan (FYP) 2011–2015 
Côte d’Ivoire PRSP 2009–2015 
Congo, DR Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (PRGSP) 2006–2008 
Ethiopia Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) 2011–2015 
Gambia PRSP 2007–2011 
Ghana Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) 2010–2013 
Guatemala Plan estratégico SEGEPLAN 2008–2012 
Guinea Bissau PRSP II 2011–2015 
India 11th Five Year Plan 2007–2012 
Indonesia National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) 2010–2014 
Kenya Kenya Vision 2030: First Medium Term Plan (MTP) 2008–2012 
Lesotho PRSP: National Strategic Development Plan 2013–2017 
Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) 2008–2011 
Madagascar Madagascar Action Plan (MAP) 2007–2012 
Malawi Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) 2006–2011 
Mali PRSP II 2007–2011 
Mauritania PRSP III 2011–2015 
Mozambique Programa Quinquenal do Governo 2010–2014 
Myanmar Framework for Economic and Social Reforms (FESR) 2012–2015 
Nepal Three Year Intermin Plan 2007–2010 
Niger PRSP II: Accelerated Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (ADPRS) 2008–2012 
Nigeria PRSP: National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) 2003–2007 
Pakistan Vision 2030 2007–2030 
Peru Plan Bicentenario: El Perú hacia el 2021 2011–2021 
Philippines Philippine Development Plan 2011–2016 
Rwanda PRSP 2008–2012 
Senegal PRSP II 2007–2015 
Sierra Leone PRSP II 2009–2012 
South Africa National Dev Plan: Vision for 2030 2012–2030 
Sudan The Five Year Plan 2007–2011 
Tanzania The Tanzania Development Vision 2025 2025 
Togo PRSP 2009–2011 
Uganda National Development Plan 2011–2015 
Vietnam Socio-Economic Development Plan 2006–2010 
Yemen Socio-Economic Development Plan for poverty reduction 2006–2010 
Zambia Vision 2030 2007–2030 
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